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Abstract
Country-size asymmetry may crucially shape the monetary and fiscal policy interac-
tions in a monetary union. Small and large countries cause different cross-border effects
and may have different bargaining power in a stabilization policy game. Strategic inter-
actions arising from different policy objectives and non-cooperative policies might play a
significant role in the actual policymaking of a country-size asymmetric monetary union.
We analyze cooperative and non-cooperative optimizing stabilization policies in a
micro-founded New-Keynesian two-country monetary union model, under two policy
scenarios. One, where monetary and fiscal policy instruments exert their stabilization
roles exclusively through the demand channel without any consequence on debt sustain-
ability other, where fiscal policy has both demand and supply-side effects but where
lump-sum taxes are not enough to ensure fiscal policy solvency. We derive optimal strate-
gic policy mix within an asymmetric country-size monetary union, and assess the effects
of some institutional arrangements (cooperation, fiscal constraints, weight-conservative
central bank) and of the level of public debt on the effectiveness of policy stabilization.
We found that country-size asymmetry within a monetary union qualifies meaning-
fully monetary and fiscal policy strategic interactions. A small country, suffering larger
externality effects and benefiting less from a common monetary policy for stabilization
purposes, has to optimally rely on a more active fiscal policy and, as expected, it expe-
riences more welfare costs than a larger country. Furthermore, welfare evaluation of the
alternative policy games shows that a large country achieves a better stabilization per-
formance under fiscal leadership and that it may resist to a policy cooperation arrange-
ment.We also found out that large and small debt levels condition the stabilization assign-
ments of the different policy instruments. Moreover, in a large-debt monetary union, and
focusing exclusively on stabilization costs, the large country may face incentives to raise
public debt while the small country may prefer to be more disciplined. In a small-debt
monetary union, reverse incentives can occur: a small country may face incentives to raise
debt permanently.
iii
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INTRODUCTION
Fiscal and monetary policy interactions are crucial in the current agenda of economic
policy, both academically and institutionally, because of their relevance within the Euro-
pean Monetary Union (EMU) framework. In fact, there is a trade-off between the use of
national fiscal policies to undertake the stabilization of idiosyncratic shocks and the cred-
ibility of the common monetary policy targeted at price stabilization. In this context, the
implementation and the recent reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) as well as
the need for closer policy cooperation are, thus, different tentative approaches to improve
such trade-off in terms of welfare.1 The debate on the need for closer policy cooperation
is an active one, addressing both fiscal policy cooperation among the member states of
the EMU (horizontal cooperation) and fiscal and monetary policy cooperation (vertical
cooperation). Not only are the nature and the size of the cross-border repercussions of na-
tional fiscal policies and the spillovers between fiscal and monetary policies determinant
in this dispute the policy objectives of the monetary and fiscal authorities are determinant
as well. These spillover effects have different expressions in small and large countries.
Moreover, small and large countries in the EMU have asymmetrical bargaining power, as
apparently embedded in the recent reform of the SGP.2 Hence, small and large countries
may experience different stabilization policy trade-offs and, in that case, they are expected
to have different interests concerning institutional policy reforms.
Thus, the functioning of the EMU with country-size asymmetry motivates some chal-
lenging research issues on macroeconomic theory.
First, the analytical framework must be able to provide some insights on the distinc-
tion between macroeconomic policy conducting in a country-size homogeneous monetary
union and, on the other hand, in an heterogeneous one.
The Treaty establishing the European Union already provides a scope for fiscal policy coordination
through a number of mechanisms such as the SGP itself or the Excessive Deficit Procedure, the Mutual
Surveillance Procedure and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines.
According to Eichengreen (2005), the small and large countries had different points of view on the
reform of the SGP. Reecting the asymmetrical bargaining power of the two groups of countries, the
agreement reached in March 2005 was closer to the point of view of the large countries.
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Second, a related theoretical issue is the need to conveniently model the practice of
stabilization policy conducting. One way to approximate positive policymaking through
theoretical exercises is by deriving optimal policy games under divergent policy objectives
of the different policymakers.3 The key questions then are to assess what is the actual
policy-mix, how far it is from the optimal solution and which country – small or large –
loses more and would be more prone to enhance changes in the policy arrangements.
An expected gap between optimal and actual macroeconomic policies raises the is-
sues of the desirability of closing policy cooperation and of the gains from imposing fiscal
policy constraints. Thus, it is relevant to assess the relative incentives of the small and of
the large countries to follow such policy arrangements.
Finally, all these questions may have different answers depending on the fiscal policy
instruments available for stabilization purposes and on whether non-distortionary sources
of government financing exist. When taxes do not fully adjust in order to guarantee fiscal
policy solvency, there are additional sources of strategic interactions between fiscal and
monetary authorities and the relative level of government indebtedness may impinge on
the design of the optimal stabilization policies. Thus, the analysis of the monetary and
fiscal policy interactions should encompass both fiscal policy regimes – balanced budget
vs. debt financing policies.
A significant strand of academic literature on the interactions of fiscal and monetary
policies within a monetary union has used static game-theoretic models.4 Their main fo-
cus has been on the potential strategic nature of the interactions between the discretionary
fiscal policies of multiple governments and the stabilization efforts of a common central
bank. For instance, Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998) illustrate the argument that the exis-
There are doubts in the literature on how to describe policymaking, especially, on what concerns
fiscal policy and its interactions with monetary policy. For instance, Canzoneri et al (2003), arguing that
the frequency of fiscal decision-making - determined by the political and budgetary processes - is hardly
coincident with the business cycle frequency, propose thinking fiscal policy as one of the many sources of
shocks to which the monetary authorities have to respond. Alternatively, other authors, like Colciago et al
(2007), think fiscal policy by focusing on the functioning and design of the automatic stabilizers. Calmfors
(2003) argue that automatic stabilizers could be destabilizing in the case of permanent supply shocks and
that, in spite of the political-economy problems of fiscal policy, it may be a need for an active fiscal policy
stabilization role. Empirical literature does not dismiss the existence of such a discretionary fiscal policy in
the context of the EMU (see, Gali and Perotti, 2003).
Beetsma and Debrun (2004) provide a thoroughly review of this literature.
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tence of multiple fiscal authorities weakens the strategic position of each one of them vis-
à-vis the common monetary authority (power effect) and conclude that strict fiscal policy
cooperation (horizontal cooperation) is counterproductive. Catenaro and Tirelli (2000)
relativize this conclusion by adding to the model cross-border repercussions of national
fiscal policy (externalities effect), potentially conducing to free-riding problems, when
each national fiscal authority fails to internalize the adverse consequences of its own pol-
icy on the other fiscal authorities. The relative strength of the two effects – power effect
vs. externalities effect - determines whether fiscal policy cooperation is desirable. Uhlig
(2003) provides another interesting illustration of the free-riding problem in the interplay
between national fiscal authorities and the common central bank in a monetary union, to
conclude for the need of strengthening the SGP. Dixit (2001) and Dixit and Lambertini
(2001, 2003a) discuss the value of monetary commitment when fiscal policy is discre-
tionary, the role played by the different timing structures of the policy game, and the im-
portance of homogeneous policymakers’ objectives for the macroeconomic outcomes in
a monetary union.
The analysis of the strategic policy interactions using a static framework allows pol-
icy games to be solved analytically.5 However, it has the important drawback of not con-
veniently incorporating expectations, which are now consensually seen to have important
implications for current economic behaviour and policy design. This has encouraged the
development of tractable dynamic general stochastic equilibrium models suitable for the
analysis of fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union. These models incorporate
imperfect competition and nominal rigidities - in line with the ones recently developed
and used for monetary policy analysis – and they usually represent a monetary union ei-
ther as a continuum of small open economies or as a set of two large economies. Gali
and Monacelli (2006) have been the first to develop an analytical framework describing
a monetary union where countries are sufficiently small, having negligible effect on the
others instead, Beetsma and Jensen (2004, 2005) exemplify the two-country representa-
tion of a monetary union with endogenous fiscal policy. The latter has the advantage of
Some authors like Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999), Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) or Chari and Kehoe
(2004) introduce dynamics in a tractable way, through a two-period model where public debt is set
strategically.
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nesting the case of a monetary union with country-size asymmetry, where small countries
co-inhabit with large countries that impose large externalities. An extensive branch of this
literature has focused on the derivation of optimal fiscal and monetary policies from the
perspective of the monetary union as a whole.6 Few works have considered policymak-
ing in non-cooperative policy regimes and even fewer have considered strategic policy
interactions arising from the structure of the game played by the policymakers. In the
context of a monetary union and using a dynamic framework, van Aarle et al (2002) and
Beetsma and Jensen (2005), for instance, analyze the non-cooperative monetary and fiscal
policies when policymakers set their instruments simultaneously in a Nash game, while
Kirsanova et al (2005) examine the case of monetary leadership game. Non-cooperative
policy games, where monetary and fiscal authorities - with different policy objectives -
can set strategically their policies in order to inuence the other policymaker’s policy re-
sponse, may provide a more realistic picture of how monetary and fiscal policy interact.
This can be easily understood if we take the example of a large country in a monetary
union that may benefit from setting its fiscal policy strategically in order to inuence the
common central bank to adopt a monetary policy biased towards the interests of the fiscal
authority.
So far, little attention has been paid to the stabilization role of fiscal policy in dynamic
general equilibrium multi-country models – the so-called new open economy macroeco-
nomics (NEOM) models – not only because of the doubts on the usefulness of fiscal policy
as a stabilization tool, but also because, in the words of Coutinho (2005, p. 809), “very lit-
tle is still known about the stylized facts of the transmission of fiscal policy which would
enable to choose alternative specifications.”7 Fiscal policy has begun to be revisited and
incorporated in these models through balanced budget fiscal policies where government
spending is the single fiscal policy instrument. More recently, there has been a concern to
allow for a richer menu of fiscal policies by relaxing, for instance, the assumption of Ri-
cardian equivalence or by using alternative fiscal policy instruments. For example, Leith
See, among others, Beetsma and Jensen (2004, 2005), Ferrero (2007), Gali and Monacelli (2006) and
Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007a).
See, for instance, Coutinho (2005) and Lane and Ganelli (2002) for extensive surveys on fiscal policy
in the NEOM models.
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and Wren-Lewis (2007b) consider three alternative fiscal instruments and try to assess
their relative effectiveness for stabilization purposes.
In the context of these challenging research issues raised by country-size asymme-
try in a monetary union, our main objectives, through which we expect to contribute to
the relevant literature, are the following: (i) to characterize optimizing stabilization poli-
cies in a monetary union when policymakers may act strategically (ii) to assess whether
institutional policy arrangements, such as policy cooperation, fiscal policy constraints or
monetary policy delegation to a weight-conservative central bank, can improve the stabi-
lization outcomes (iii) to appraise how the level of government indebtedness constraints
the effectiveness of policy stabilization. In particular, we intend to examine how country-
size asymmetry shapes these outcomes and how it determines possible recommendations
on monetary and fiscal policy arrangements to be applied, for instance, in the EMU con-
text.
To address the above mentioned issues we begin by setting a baseline framework:
a two-country micro-founded macroeconomic model for a closed monetary union with
monopolistic competition and sticky prices, in line with the ones firstly developed by
Benigno (2004) for monetary policy analysis, and extended by Beetsma and Jensen (2004,
2005) to include fiscal policy. The fiscal policy instrument is the welfare-improving public
spending, fully financed by lump-sum taxes. Hence, the fiscal policy has no supply-
side effects and the monetary policy does not interfere with the government sources of
financing. Afterwards, we extend the model to include a more realistic fiscal policy setup,
including additional sources of strategic interactions between the fiscal and the monetary
authorities. Following the recent work of Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007a, 2007b), we allow
the model to include two fiscal policy instruments yielding both demand and supply-side
effects – respectively, home-biased government spending and distortionary taxes - but
where lump-sum taxes are no longer enough to guarantee fiscal policy solvency.
The model also includes ination persistence and enables capturing several differ-
ences in the structure of the two economies: namely, asymmetric degrees of nominal
rigidity and ination persistence and the existence of country-size asymmetry. The model
also enables different levels of public debt for each country to be considered, which pro-
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vides a relevant framework to analyse how long-term sustainability constrains the role of
fiscal policy for short-run stabilization purposes.
Necessarily, we derive a welfare criterion to allow the derivation of optimal stabiliza-
tion policies and the ranking of the alternative policy outcomes under different strategic
set-ups. This relies on a quadratic approximation to the union-weighted average of the
representative households’welfare where linear terms are removed through the use of a
subsidy fully financed by lump-sum taxes, as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), for
instance.8 The characterization of optimal stabilization policies under non-cooperative
and dynamic settings requires the model to be solved numerically using appropriate al-
gorithms that reect the various timing structures of the policy games: Nash, monetary
leadership and fiscal leadership. We follow the methodology developed in the recent work
of Kirsanova and co-authors (Blake and Kirsanova, 2006, for a closed-economy setup and
Kirsanova et al., 2005, for an open-economy setup) to find the leadership discretionary
equilibrium with dynamic rational expectations macroeconomic models.9
The plan of the thesis is as follows. In chapter 2 we present the setup for policy analy-
sis. We first outline the model with and without binding budgetary solvency constraints
then, we derive a second-order approximation to union-wide welfare and present the alter-
native policy objectives next, we present the methodology and the algorithms underlying
the optimal policy solutions finally, we present the calibration that allows the compu-
tation of numerical simulations. In chapter 3 we perform the policy analysis related to
dynamic responses to exogenous disturbances under the several policy regimes and eval-
uate the respective welfare implications, under balanced budget fiscal policies. Chapter 4
performs equivalent policy analysis in the model with debt. Chapter 5 concludes and, in
appendix, we derive some technical details and present figures and tables.
Benigno and Woodford (2004, 2005, 2006), for a closed-economy, and Ferrero (2007), for a
monetary union, present an alternative way to remove the linear terms of the social loss function, in the
presence of a distorted steady-state. They focus on timeless optimal commitment policies and they need
to compute second-order approximations to the structural equations of the model to get a purely quadratic
loss. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a,b), Correia et al (2003) and Lambertini (2006b) illustrate the
so-called Ramsey approach, which configures an alternative to the joint design of optimal policies. Neither
of these approaches is compatible with the study of the policy problem under discretion.
	Adam and Billi (2006), for a closed-economy setup, present an alternative computational method
that delivers second-order accurate welfare expressions for economies with a distorted steady-state within
the linear-quadratic approach.
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1.1 A baseline model for a monetary union
Currently, there is some consensus on the need of developing models with micro-
foundations that allow more analytical rigor and a welfare criterion for policy evaluation.
The objective is to evaluate and compare the equilibria resulting from alternative policies,
from the point of view of the private-sector objectives that underlie the behavior assumed
in the model for the effects of those policies. For that, the model’s structural equations
need to be derived from optimizing foundations. However, the answers one could obtain
depend crucially upon the assumptions made about the structure of the economy. The
assumptions on the nature of nominal rigidities, on the preferences and on the financial
market structure are decisive to the welfare results.10 Since the correct model specification
remains controversial, the welfare criterion used to evaluate policy remains controversial
as well. Policy recommendations derived from this research program must be highly qual-
ified. In the open-economy context the controversy on the useful micro-founded work-
horse model for macroeconomic analysis is exacerbated by the greater number of assump-
tions that have to be made relative to the closed-economy setup. There is a concern on
converging to a ”preferred” specification that should be supported by extensive empirical
evidence. Typically, research on this topic is done by departing from a benchmark model
and introduce some variants on it in order to evaluate the consistency of its predictions.11
The shortcomings just described seem to have stimulated to the work in the edifi-
cation of a new paradigm for the analysis of macroeconomic interdependence that could
offer a superior alternative to the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model. In fact, recently,
there has been an explosion of academic literature on the ”new open economy macroeco-
nomics”.

Cf., for instance, Woodford (2003) on the discussion of the derivation of a proper welfare criterion in
a closed-economy setup and the suveys of Lane (2001) and Lane and Ganelli (2002) on the open-economy
modelling.
In the ”new open economy macroeconomics” literature the model of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995,
1996) is a natural benchmark model.
7
THE SETUP FOR POLICY ANALYSIS
Since we want to focus on the policy interdependences within a monetary union, we
will consider that the latter is a closed area. Hence, the models we are interested com-
bine elements of the closed-economy literature and of the recent open-economy literature
on exchange rate determination. However, we will follow recent literature on currency
unions and we will minimize the incorporation of elements from the open-economy liter-
ature. For instance, in spite of the recognition that current account plays a relevant role
in the transmission of disturbances, the major part of the models de-emphasise the impor-
tance of this channel by assuming complete financial markets and/or by assuming unitary
intratemporal elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods in consump-
tion.12 In fact, following Benigno (2004), Benigno and Benigno (2006) and Beetsma
and Jensen (2004, 2005), the only element that we will incorporate in our model that
makes it departing from the closed-economy setup is a cross-country consumption elas-
ticity smaller than domestic elasticities of substitution.13
There is now a very recent literature that studies the interactions of monetary and fis-
cal policies within a micro-founded framework. Beetsma and Jensen (2004, 2005), Gali
and Monacelli (2006), Kirsanova et al. (2005, 2006), Lambertini (2004, 2006b), Leith
and Wren-Lewis (2007b), Canzoneri et al. (2005) and Ferrero (2007) represent this new
branch of literature applied to a currency union’s setup. While it is consensual to treat the
interest rate as the monetary policy instrument, it is recognized that fiscal policy has many
dimensions and that the several fiscal policy instruments have different effects. Even when
one elects the public spending as the fiscal policy instrument, one gets different effects on
the domestic economy when this is financed through lump sum taxes, distortionary taxes
or public debt. The spillovers that these different sources of financing generate are also
different. Hence, the fiscal and monetary policy interactions depend on the type of the fis-
cal policy implemented. Beetsma and Jensen (2004, 2005) and Gali and Monacelli (2006)
assume that the fiscal policy instrument is public spending financed by lump sum taxes,
Fabio Ghironi (2000) criticizes this modeling device of removing the problems caused by
non-stationarity by shutting off an important channel of interdependences - the current account
movements.
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) overstate this important source of inefficiency in the open-economy
setting, the monopoly power of a country in its terms of trade.
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Ferrero (2007) presents a model where fiscal policy is conducted through distortionary
taxation and public debt and Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007b) consider three potential fis-
cal instruments - government spending, labour income taxes and revenue taxes.
We will consider two fiscal policy scenarios: one, where the fiscal policy instrument
is home-biased government spending financed by lump-sum taxes the other, where both
government spending and distortionary sales taxes are fiscal policy instruments and lump-
sum taxes are not enough to guarantee fiscal policy solvency. In the first scenario fiscal
policy is balanced-budget and only has demand-side effects while, in the second scenario,
fiscal policy has demand and supply-side effects but it is constrained by the need to verify
the government’s budget constraint.14 We take, as a baseline model for the monetary
union, a two-country model that closelly follows those of Beetsma and Jensen (2004,
2005) and extend them to allow for a more generic case of cross-country consumption
elasticity and for ination persistence.
Henceforth, we consider a monetary union with two countries, H(ome) and F(oreign),
populated by a continuum of agents on the interval    The population on the segment
  belongs to country H, while agents on   live in country F. In each country there
are two sectors - households and firms - and one fiscal authority.
1.1.1 Households
In period , the lifetime utility function of a representative Home-household is given
by:
In fact, we also have considered a fiscal policy scenario where government spending was the sole
fiscal policy instrument with binding government budget constraints. However, we could not get stable
discretionary solutions for usual levels of debt because we have imposed government intertemporal budget
constraints at the national level and because government spending uctuations are welfare-reducing. In
a monetary union where the monetary policy instrument only can address aggregate union-wide effects,
the short-run stabilization of country-specific variables conicts with the satisfaction of the national
government budget constraints and the system becomes instable. Hence, we had to use a model with two
country specific fiscal policy instruments (the government spending and the tax rate) with one of them
(the tax rate) having no direct effect on the social loss function. Notice that, in the open economy setup
with optimal policies and debt constraints, most of the literature uses either the tax rate as the sole fiscal
policy instrument (which does not affects directly welfare), as Ferrero (2007) does, or uses the tax rate and
government spending as fiscal policy instruments, as Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007a, 2007b) do.
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where the index j denotes a variable that is specific to household j and the index H denotes
a variable specific to the country H where j resides.
Each household delivers utility from consuming across baskets of home and foreign
produced goods, from public good provision by the own-country government, while she
receives disutility from labour effort . Here,  denotes hours of work type  that firm
 will use as the unique input. There is a mass of one wage setting households working
at each firm. We introduce the possibility of welfare being positely affected by domestic
public spending. However, since we assume that it affects in a additive and separable way,
the optimality conditions of the representative household are the same of the case where
government spending is pure waste.15
To simplify the algebraic form of the results we will adopt the isoelastic functional
forms:
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where 	 is a bounded exogenous disturbance16 and 	 is a real consumption Dixit-
Stiglitz index defined, as in Benigno and Benigno (2006) or Lombardo and Sutherland
(2004), by
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(2)
This is the case when    The parameter  measures the relative importance of public versus
private consumption for welfare. Ganelli (2003) stresses the relevance of incorporating government
spending in the utility function in a non-separable fashion.
We introduce a country specific demand shock by letting the marginal utility of consumption be
stochastic.
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and 	 and 	
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	 are Dixit-Stiglitz indexes of consumption across the continuum of differ-
entiated goods produced respectively in country H and F.
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The elasticity of substitution between the goods produced in each country  may
differ from the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign consumption baskets
 17. It is assumed that countries H and F produce a continuum of goods in the segments
  and  , respectively. There are no trade barriers and the two countries share
the common currency and, in consequence, the price of each variety of good is the same
across countries. Given these assumptions and the structure of preferences, purchasing
power parity holds.
The implied overall consumption-based price index is18
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while the country-specific price indexes  and 	 are given by
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where   is the price of good  produced in country H and   the price of a good
produced in F. The terms of trade,  , is defined as the relative price of the Foreign bundle
of goods in terms of the Home bundle of goods   	 
The problem of the representative household can be separated into an intertemporal
and an intratemporal problem.
This specification nests the specifications of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1996) for    and
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) for   .
Formally, the consumption price index  solves the problem
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In its intratemporal problem, she allocates a given level of expenditure across the dif-
ferentiated goods so as to maximize its consumption index, 	. In its intertemporal prob-
lem, she chooses the optimal paths of consumption, labour and bonds. The optimal con-
sumption allocation across the differentiated goods19 gives rise to -individual demands
for goods  and 
  



 


	  
  

 

 
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		 (6)
where
	  




	 		   

	


	 (7)
Furthermore, since we assume that each fiscal authority allocates government pur-
chases only among the goods produced in the country of its sovereignity, the per capita
public spending indexes, in countries  and  , are given by
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Combining the previous expressions we obtain the total demands for goods  and 
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where   and  	 are the national aggregate demands that can be expressed as functions
of total consumption, relative prices and public spending as
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	The optimal allocation across goods home produced goods is obtained by solving the two problems:
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The individual consumption for the  -good is obtained analogously.
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where 	 is defined as 	 

 

	. Notice that each country’s relative price is
function of the terms-of-trade ( )



     

	


      (11)
so that changes in terms-of-trade imply a response in each country’s aggregate demand
that will be larger the smaller the size the country, that is, the large the degree of its
openness.20
In each country, all households begin with the same amount of financial assets and
own an equal share of all domestic firms. Further, we will assume that the representa-
tive Home household trades, with home and foreign households, a complete set of state-
contingent one-period nominal bonds denominated in units of the monetary union cur-
rency. Hence, financial markets are complete both at domestic and international level. To
insure her consumption pattern against random shocks at the time t, the Home household
decides to spend  in state-contingent one-period nominal bonds, where 
is the price of a bond, at date  , paying one unity of currency in a particular state of the
nature occurring in    !, and  is the number of these bonds purchased by the
representative home household at date  .21
The ow budget constraint for the representative Home household is for each state !
at date  , and for each date  
	

 




 " 

 

 



 # #  

 

 (12)
where "  is the nominal wage rate of labour of type  and, 
 #, is the share of
profits of domestic firm # going to household  in country  , while  is a lump sum tax
levied by the domestic government on its citizens.

For instance, if H is small relative to F (	    	) an increase in the terms of trade leads to a
reduction on the Home’s relative price that is greater than the increase in the Foreign’s relative price. In
consequence, the H’s aggregate demand increases by more than the F’s aggregate demand decreases.
We denote by 	  
 
  	 the history of events up to date T, where 	 is the state
realization at time T. At each date T, the economy faces one of finitely many states 	     	.
The date T probability of observing history 	 is given by 	 

	

and, since the initial state 
 is given,
	  
   Notice that 	 

	 	


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In each period     , the household chooses her period  allocation after the
realization of the event ! . She chooses the set of processes

	  

 	




, taking as
given all the other processes and the initial wealth, so as to maximize the intertemporal
utility function  subject to  We can discribe the problem she faces, by the setting
up the Lagrangian
$%&






	  	



+




-



-'

	





-
" 

 -

 



 #

#+ -



where ' is the lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint  at time  .
For any given state of the world, the first-order conditions for period  are


	  	



 ' (13)
'
" 

 (  


 (14)
  


'
'
(15)
where (   is an exogenous Home-specific wage mark-up that is used as a device
to introduce the possibility of "pure cost-push shocks" that affects the equilibrium price
behaviour but does not change the efficient output, as in Benigno and Woodford (2003,
2005). In the labour markets wages are exible and households may be monopolistic
suppliers of labour

if ( ) 

while firms are wage-takers22. Notice that, equation 
holds for each state at time  and for each state that may occur in   (conditional on the
state occurred in  ).
We can use  to obtain the risk-free nominal interest rate. In fact, we can get a
riskless one-period nominal bond from a portfolio of state-contingent one-period nominal
bonds that pays off one unit of currency in each state of world with certainty. Equation
 and no arbitrage imply that
The derivation of this mark-up factor is available upon request.
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
  *
  (16)
Hence, by taking conditional expectations of equation  and combining with we
get the familiar Euler equation


	  	



    *






	 	



(17)
Since the Foreign representative household solves a problem similar to that of the Home
household, we can use expression  to write




	 	







		 	
	

  

	  	





		  	
	


where have substituted the upper index  of the representative household of each country
by the corresponding index of the countries ( and  ).
If we assume that the initial state-contingent distribution of nominal bonds is such
that the life-time budget constraints of all households are identical, the risk-sharing con-
dition implies that


	  	



 

		  	
	


(18)
The full caracterization of household’s optimization requires that we add the transversality
condition








  (19)
and specify that the budget constraint  must hold with equality at each date  .
1.1.2 Firms
We assume a common linear techonology for the production of all goods produced
in each country, in which industry-specific labour is the unique variable input. There is
a continuum of firms of measure  in country  and of measure    in country  .
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The differentiated consumption good  , produced by firm  in country  , has the
production function
   %

   (20)
where % is an exogenous Home-specific technological shock common to all Home-firms,
and   is the firm-specific labour input offered by a continuum of Home-households,
indexed in the unit interval. Each of these households face the same first order conditions
so, in a symmetric equilibrium, the same level of the work effort they choose to spend


is equal to the aggregate labour input  . As we have already remarked, labour
is immobile across countries and, it is possible to have monopolistic distortions in labour
markets, if the wage-markup

(

 in equation   takes a value greater than one.
We admit the existence of persistence in ination by assuming that a fraction of
firms set prices by following a rule-of-thumb behaviour, while the other fraction follow
an optimizing forward-looking behaviour. We follow Gali and Gertler (1999) and Amato
and Laubach (2003), and assume that the fraction of firms that do not optimize ("rule-of-
thumbers") set their prices taking into account the last-period behaviour of all firms. The
structure of the price-setting behaviour is as following: i) as in Calvo’s (1983) model,
each period a fraction of firms have the opportunity to change their prices with a fixed
probability + while the remaining firms maintain the prices they have charged before
ii) differently from Calvo’s framework, a fraction   ' of firms that can reset their
prices choose to not set their prices optimally and use a rule-of-thumb behaviour because
of optimization costs. We allow for different + and ' across countries. Given these
mechanisms, and realizing that, in equilibrium, each firm in a given country and a given
period will set the same price when offered the chance to reset its price (optimally or not),
the evolution of the price index  is defined the following law of motion
   +
  

 +

  (21)
where
   '
 
 

 '

 (22)
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  is the price of an optimizing Home-firm, and  is the price set by a "rule-of-
thumber" firm. The latter is set according to
  




(23)
where   is the aggregate of the prices newly chosen in period  by both optimizing and
rule-of-thumb firms. If firm  has the "chance" to reset its price in period  and adopts an
optimizing behaviour, she chooses her price   to maximize





+



-,

    -"  

--

where   is given by   assuming that   still applies at !, , is a proportional
tax rate on nominal income assumed to be a time-varying exogenous disturbance with
the non-zero steady-state level , , and - is an employment subsidy that can be used to
eliminate inefficiencies associated with monopolistic competition and with distortionary
taxation23. The first term represents sales revenues net of taxes, while the second term
denotes total nominal cost in each period. In equilibrium, the stochastic discount factor
 is given by
  




	  	





	  	



After substituting the nominal wage rate and recasting the disutility of labour in
terms of aggregate production and relative prices, we get the first-order condition for the
optimizing wage-taker firm

 









+

(

 -



  	 %


 


 



+  , 

	  	





 



 
(24)
The numerator of this equation represents the present discounted value of the time-
varying gross markup over all current and future marginal costs, while the denominator
represents the present discounted value of all current and future marginal revenues net of
Following Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007a, 2007b), we use this employment subsidy as a device to
eliminate linear terms in the social welfare function without loosing the possibility of using the sales tax
rates as fiscal policy instruments. This employment subsidy is financed using lump-sum taxes.
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taxation. The gross markup is a combination of the constant price markup and the time-
varying wage markup



 (

.
1.1.3 Policymakers
The monetary policy instrument is the nominal interest rate *. We abstract from
monetary frictions so that our model can be interpreted as cashless limiting model (as in
Woodford, 2003). As a consequence, governments do not benefit from seigniorage rev-
enues. Moreover, the presence of nominal rigidities ensures that monetary policy affects
real activity.
Fiscal policy consists in public spending  and in an employment subsidy

-

financed by lump-sum   and distortionary ,  taxes. The period budget constraint for
the Home-fiscal authority is


 

 


,       

 

 


-"    (25)
We consider that lump-sum taxes fully adjust to balance the budget each period and Ri-
cardian equivalence holds.
1.1.4 Equilibrium
Traditionally, the derivation of a micro-founded welfare criterion for policy evalua-
tion requires the derivation of the efficient equilibrium and the definition of the variables
in gaps. These are defined as the log-deviation of the actual variables from their effi-
cient levels. With balanced budget fiscal policies, that equilibrium can be derived through
two different but equivalent maximization programs. One, under a exible-price setup,
where monopolistic and tax distortions are removed through an employment or a produc-
tion subsidy, and where fiscal authorities coordinate and choose government spending that
maximizes the representative agent utility subject to the households and firms optimality
conditions. The other way of getting the efficient equilibrium requires, previously, the
18
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resolution of the social planner’s problem and, afterwards, the finding of a exible-price
equilibrium that supports the optimal allocation. This is obtained by setting a production
or employment subsidy that, by removing distortions, allows the coincidence of the two
equibriums. In addition, the fiscal authorities implement the government spending rules
that follow from the social planner’s solution. Beetsma and Jensen (2004, 2005) follow
the first methodology, while Gali and Monacelli (2006) but also Leith and Wren-Lewis (
2007a, 2007b) follow the second. We follow the latter methodology.
The social planner’s problem and the efficient equilibrium The optimal allocation
for the monetary union as a whole, in any given period   can be described as the solution
to the following social planner’s problem

C, C
	
, C

	,
			 

  
	


n



	  	



+




-



+ -



		  	
	


+


	

-

	

(26)
subject to the production technologies
   %

 

 	 
	
  %
	
 
	

the resource constraints
   	

   	
	
  


   	  	

	   	
	
	   
	

and the consumption price indexes
	 





	

   



		
 

 

		 





		

   



			
 

 

where it was already admitted that the social planner will choose to produce equal quan-
tities of the different goods in each country. Moreover, the aggregation over all the agents
(households, governments and central bank) cancels out the budget constraints so that the
social planner’s solution is not constrained by their verification.
19
THE SETUP FOR POLICY ANALYSIS
This maximization program yields the following optimallity conditions

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






	
	
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 

  	 %


 (27)
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
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
 (32)
This means that the marginal loss of utility of producing an additional unit of the
composite good at country *   -    	 % - must be equal, at the margin, to the
utility gained from privately consuming it at  and  as well as to the utility gained from
its consumption by the domestic government.
From the four first optimally conditions we get that


	  	



 

		  	
	


(33)
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In a symmetric efficient steady-state equilibrium, it follows that     	   
	  		  	 	  	
	
  	 	

	  	
	
	   	 and   	  .
The complete solution for the efficient equilibrium is given by the following expres-
sions
	    . !/   !0

   !0.
 	    . / %  (36)
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  0  . !/   !0

.!
 	    . %  (37)
	      .0  . !  !0  %	   %  (38)
	  		  		  			      .  . !  !0  %	   %  (39)
where variables with a tilde denote the log-deviation of the efficient equilibrium from their
steady-state levels. We use variables with a hat to denote the log-deviation of their actual
values from their steady-state levels and, naturally, to the log-deviation of the exogenous
disturbances from their deterministic values. Moreover, a generic "world variable", 1,
is defined as 1  1   1	 and a "relative variable", 1, is defined as
1  1	 1 .
When lump-sum taxes endogenously vary to ensure a balanced budget each period,
this efficient allocation corresponds to decentralized ex-price equilibrium where monop-
olistic and tax distortions were removed through an employment or a production subsidy,
and where the government spending follow the rules derived under the social planner’s
optimization. These government spending rules coincide with the ones obtained when fis-
cal authorities coordinate and choose  and 	 to maximize ?? in the exible-price
setup where distortions were removed.
The steady-state and the sticky prices equilibrium
Steady-state
To avoid the traditional inationary bias problem due to an inefficiently low steady-state
output level, we will assume the existence of an employment subsidy that removes average
monopolistic and tax rate distortions.
In order to compute this employment subsidy, observe that the profit-maximizing
Home firms, in a exible-price setup, choose the same price     so that

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
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and, the Foreign counterpart of this price-setting behaviour is given by

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    ,	 
(	

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 
    
 
 

 	 	 %
	


We allow the possibility of the two union monetary country members having dif-
ferent levels of steady-state sales tax rates. So, for getting symmetry in the steady-state
levels of the output, consumption, government spending and prices, we need to impose
that 

(

 -

 
	
(

 -	

 ( where, as we have already
remarked, the employment subsidy - is fully financed by lump sum taxes.
In this steady-state, we verify that


		

 (

  %

and, if the employment subsidy - is set so that (  , one replicates the efficient steady-
state output level. Hence, we assume that there is an employment subsidy in country
*   that takes the value
-  
  

 , 

(
(40)
The steady-state nominal (an real) interest rate, obtained from , is *    .
Sticky prices equilibrium
We get the aggregate demand block system, from log-linearization of equations  
    and  around the efficient steady-state. The aggregate supply block fol-
lows from log-linear approximation of equations    and  as well as from their
Foreign counterparts.
The log-linearized model, with variables in gaps, is given by the following dynamic
system:24


  

  /

*  2


 (41)
  !   3   ! 

  !

 (42H)
	  !3   ! 
	
  !

 (42F)
These log-linearizations are available upon request.
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where 5 , 5	 , 4 , 4  4	 and 4	 are defined as:
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Variables in lower case letter are defined in gaps. For a generic variable 1, its gap is
given by &   1  1 where  1 denotes log-deviation from the zero-ination efficient
steady-state We represent the terms-of-trade gap by 3

     where
     .
  . !  !0
 %	   %  (45)
The interest rate gap is *

 * * with
*  
/

 	  	   	   	  (46)
Eq.  is the IS equation written in terms of the world consumption gap and the
world nominal interest rate gap. Eqs. (43H) and (43F) are aggregate demand equations,
where ! is the steady-state consumption share of output. The absence of terms in demand
shocks show that demand shocks alone have no impact in gap variables. Notice also that
consumption is not affected by current income because it is purely forward looking. In
consequence, public spending increases output but there is not a "Keynesian multiplier".25
See Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2007) for a closed-economy model that admit non-Ricardian
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Eqs. (43H) and (43F) are hybrid open economy Phillips curves, which describe the
aggregate supply (AS) in each of the monetary union’s countries. Domestic ination rate
depends positively both on expected future domestic ination, because optimizing pro-
ducers know that they may be able of resetting their prices at next period and on past
domestic ination, because of rule-of-thumber producers. This hybrid ination-inertia
Phillips curve formulation26 collapses into the purely forward looking new Keynesian
form, when   '  . Positive gaps on the terms-of-trade, consumption and pub-
lic spending have inationary consequences at Home, because they increase demand for
Home produced goods, which leads to more work effort that raises marginal costs. More-
over, the positive gaps on the terms of trade and on the consumption exert an additional
pressure on Home ination, because they reduce the marginal utility of nominal income
of Home’s households. The term  , a rescaled mean-zero mark-up shock at Home, ex-
erts a positive effect on ination but does not imply any change in the socially optimal
level of real output. It can be interpreted as a cost-push shock that precludes simultaneous
stabilization of ination, the private and public consumption gaps and the terms-of-trade
gap.
Eq. (44) is the terms-of-trade gap’s identity expressed through the ination differen-
tial. To secure the validity of log linearization, all shocks are bounded exogenous distur-
bances of order 6 7 
The system (41)-(44) provides solutions for endogenous variables given the paths for
policy instruments and the initial value of  .
1.2 Adding debt to the baseline model
In this section we are going to consider a fiscal policy scenario where both govern-
ment spending and distortionary sales taxes are fiscal policy instruments and lump-sum
consumers triggering multiplier effects analogous to the ones found in traditional Keynesian model.
Pescatori and Pisani (2006) develop a similar model for a monetary-union.
Steinsson (2003) generalize the rule used by Gali and Gertler (1999) for the backward looking firms,
in order to get the acceleration Phillips curve, when the fraction rule-of-thumber producers tends to one.
With this extension, the output gap and its lag enter into the hybrid Phillips curve.
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taxes are not enough to guarantee fiscal policy solvency. Hence, fiscal policy has demand
and supply-side effects but it is constrained by the need to verify the government’s budget
constraint. Here, lump-sum taxes   only adjust to fully accomodate the employment
subsidy

-

and the government intertemporal solvency condition is an additional bind-
ing constraint on the set of possible equilibrium paths of the endogenous variables.
The period budget constraints for the fiscal authorities of the Home and the Foreign
countries can be written as
8 =  +*8
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where 8 and 8	 represent the per capita nominal government debt of country H and
F. Using the demand expressions , the definition of the price indexes  and, the
assumption that lump sum taxes just cover the employment subsidy, these period budget
constraints can be rewitten, in per capita terms, as
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With asset markets clearing only at the monetary union level, the only public sector
intertemporal budget constraint is the union-wide constraint
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since the household’s transversality condition does not impose a correspondent restriction
on the national government’s debt. The household’s transversality condition only requires
a restriction on the sum of the debt issued by the two governments.27 However, there are
arguments to impose the verification of this intertemporal budget constraint at the national
levels. For instance, the equilibrium concept adopted by Ferrero (2007) and the existence
of a symmetric steady state with a finite debt allows him to focus on the case where the
This demonstration is available upon request.
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public sector intertemporal budget constraint holds at the national level. In other hand,
Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007b) appeal to the institutional EMU’s arrangement to impose
the verification of the intertemporal budget constraint at the national levels. Following
these authors, we set
+*8
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that can be simplified to
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since    in equilibrium. Here, 9

 



denotes, for *   , the
real value of debt at maturity in per capita terms. Log-linearizing  and   and
re-writing variables in gaps
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where  :  and  :	  are composite shocks defined as
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the steady-state tax rates required to support the exogenously given initial steady-state
ratio of public debt-to-output are given by
,   
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and the efficient levels of taxation , and ,	 in the two countries are
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the ones compatible with full stabilization of ination, private and public consumption
gaps and terms-of-trade gap so that the AS equations become
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Equations 41, 42H, 42F, 44, 49H, 49F, 50H and 50F summarize the dynamic behav-
iour of the economies as observed by policymakers.
1.3 Policy objectives
Policymakers solve their optimization problems each period, given initial conditions
and the rate of time preferences. The resulting optimal policy reactions lead to stochas-
tic equilibria that should be compared across through an appropriate metric. The natural
metric for welfare comparisons is a micro-founded social loss function. Benevolent au-
thorities adopt the social loss function as the setup for policymaking. Hence, this welfare
criterion enables us to derive optimal stabilization policies but also to evaluate alternative
policies that are derived from other institutional setups.
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1.3.1 Social loss function
In our framework, the natural welfare criterion is the discounted sum of the utility
ows of the households belonging to the whole union and both monetary and fiscal poli-
cies are coordinated. The average utility ows is defined at each time  as
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where it has been assumed that each country has a weight equal to its economic and
population size. The welfare criterion for the whole union is then defined as
"  
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
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
Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1998, 1999), Woodford (2003), Benigno (2004),
Amato and Laubach (2003), Steinsson (2003) and Beetsma and Jensen (2004, 2005), we
compute a quadratic (second-order Taylor series) approximation of W around a determin-
istic steady-state where all the shocks are set to zero. Ignoring the terms independent of
policy as well as terms of 	

7

or higher order, our second-order approximation de-
livers a representation of the welfare function:28
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The derivation of the social loss function is available upon request.
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Fluctuations of the consumption gap and in the public spending gaps imply wel-
fare losses due to households’ aversion towards consumption and public spending risk
/ and 1/0, as well as uctuations in work effort .. Home ination is more costly
the higher the degree of nominal rigidity

+

, the higher the elasticity of substitution be-
tween Home-produced goods  and the elasticity of disutility with respect to work effort
.. The welfare cost of ination vanishes

 

when prices are fully exible

+  


At the monetary union level, misallocation of goods also applies for deviations of the
terms of trade from their efficient level. The costs of this distortion   increase with
the elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign produced goods   with the
steady-state consumption share on output !  with . and with the symmetry on coun-
tries’ economic size. Following an asymmetric technologic shock, efficiency requires
that relative prices should be moved in order to shift the burden of adjustment "equally"
across the two countries (Benigno and López-Salido, 2006). This creates a trade-off for
the monetary authority which is also concerned with stabilizing Home and Foreign pro-
ducer ination rates. This trade-off is further amplified by last terms in the loss function,
which come from the presence of backward-looking firms in both countries. Policymakers
should also be concerned with stabilizing the growth rate of Home and Foreign ination
rates, when past ination is also important to explain ination persistence. This trade-off,
that the monetary authority faces, between stabilizing relative prices to their efficient lev-
els and stabilizing ination and the growth rate of ination in both countries provides a
rational for fiscal policy stabilization.
The cross term between the consumption gap and the weighted average government
spending gap occurs because positive co-movements between these two variables cause
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undesirable uctuations in world work effort, in addition to the effort uctuations caused
by each of these variables per se. There is also a negative cross-term between the terms
of trade gap and the relative spending gap that is increasing (in absolute value) with ., 
and decreasing with the asymmetry of countries’ size. This negative co-movement arises
because a positive terms of trade gap rises Home competitiveness, which, combined with
a negative relative public spending gap (more public spending at Home than at Foreign)
shift demand towards Home produced goods. As a consequence, work effort shifts from
Foreign towards Home households (cf. Beetsma and Jensen 2004 and 2005, for these
arguments).
1.3.2 Other policy objectives
When policymakers share the same objectives, the outcomes of the games played un-
der the different discretionary policy regimes are the same. Dixit and Lambertini (2003a,
2003b) show, in a static setup, that when fiscal authorities and monetary authority agree
on the ideal levels of country’s output and common ination rate, these will be obtained,
regardless the structure of the game or the existence of any disagreement about the rel-
ative weights of the objectives. Considering a dynamic closed-economy model, Blake
and Kirsanova (2006) and Kirsanova et al. (2006b) also show that discretionary out-
comes do not depend on the structure of the game. Hence, it is useful for the analysis
to set policymakers diverging in their policy objectives. There are many arguments sus-
taining this assumption. First of all, it is natural to admit that national fiscal authorities
are mainly concern with their own citizens and so, the objective functions of benevolent
non-cooperative fiscal authorities should reect only the utility functions of their con-
stituencies. The derivation of the appropriate utility-based loss functions for independent
and non-cooperative fiscal authorities requires extra computations to avoid linear terms.
Benigno and Benigno (2006) obtain loss functions, for cooperative and non-cooperative
monetary policy regimes, that are identical on the forms but are different in the targets
and the weights. Pragmatically, we approximate the national welfare criterions through
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welfare losses obtained from splitting the union-wide loss function. We let for future ex-
tension the derivations of the national welfare functions.
We should also take into attention other institutional arrangements that result in dif-
ferent objective functions for fiscal and monetary authorities. In the context of the EMU,
it is natural to admit that the ECB is likely to be more conservative than the politicians
who run the treasuries in the member countries, either by explicit mandate or by natural
inclination. This hypothesis can easily be modeled by distorting the weights on the ina-
tion and the output terms of the social loss function.29
Conversely, fiscal authorities are likely to be more concerned with output stabiliza-
tion than ination. Moreover, short-sighted politicians may discount more strongly the
future than benevolent politicians. Calmfors (2003) states that there are strong arguments
for a fiscal stabilization policy in the case of a country-specific recession but the argu-
ments are less clear-cut in case of a country-specific boom. This could be a rationale for
the consideration of asymmetric policy objectives, as Bennett and Loyaza (2005) have
considered in a static game theoretic model. Following the same strategy of the weight-
conservative hypothesis, we will consider that national fiscal authorities have symmetric
preferences but they are biased towards the stabilization of domestic output-terms.
We focus on the cases of a weight-conservative central bank and of output-biased
fiscal authorities, because they exemplify two different but concurrent argumentations on
the policy stabilization debate. On the one hand, delegating monetary policy to a weight-
conservative central bank is currently seen as a potential solution to reduce the time-
inconsistency problems of policy stabilization. On the other hand, these time-inconsistency
problems are seen to be aggravated by specific incentives of the fiscal authorities. The
political economy literature highlights several motivations that potentially result in fiscal
laxity and in wrong policy mix. Hence, whereas fiscal authorities, especially concerned
with output variability, are expected to aggravate policy stabilization problems, delegat-
ing monetary policy to a central bank more averse than society to ination variability is
	In addition, we could also consider that the ECB dislikes uctuations in its instrument policy variable,
that is, it has an interest rate smoothing objective. See for instance Buti et al. (2001) and Beetsma et al.
(2001).
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an institutional arrangement usually referred as a solution to mitigate such stabilization
problems. The table below summarizes the policy scenarios we will analyze.
Benevolent Cooperative Policymakers
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Benevolent non-Cooperative Policymakers
L = c

 
2
+

g
2
+

 g

 + q
2




 g

 3+

 

2
2
	 

2
2
L	 = c

 
2
+

g	
2
+

 
	
 + q
2




 g
	
 3+
	
 

2	
2
		 

2	
2
L! =L
Conservative Central Bank
L 	L
	

L! =1-


 c

 
2
+

n

g
2
+ 1-n

g	
2
+



n

g

+ 1-n

g	

+ q
2
 -

g	 -g



3

+

n 

2
2
+ 1-n 	 

2	
2
+n	 

2
2
+ 1-n 		 

2	
2
Output-biased Fiscal Authorities
L =
"

 c

 
2
+

g
2
+

 g

 + q
2




 g

 3

+1-"

 

2
2
	 

2
2
L	 =
"

 c

 
2
+

g	
2
+

 
	
 + q
2




 g
	
 3

+1-"

	 

2	
2
		 

2	
2
L! =L
1.4 Policy Games
We assume that fiscal and monetary authorities set their policy instruments in order to
minimize their loss functions, given the dynamic structure of the economies, and that they
can engage themselves in various policy games. We will consider, as a benchmark case
for policy analysis, that policymakers are benevolent and cooperate when they minimize
their policy objectives under discretion. To assess the importance of the time-consistent
problems on the policy stabilization performance, we also compute the optimal policy
solution under commitment. These two optimizing problems will be solved by using the
algorithms described recently by Soderlind (1999).
We also consider discretionary non-cooperative policy games and, depending on the
time of events, we can obtain Nash or leadership equilibria. In these different setups, the
timing of the events is as following: 1) the private sector forms expectations 2) the shocks
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are realized 3a) the central bank sets the interest rate in order to optimize its objectives
3b) the fiscal authorities choose the fiscal policy instruments to optimize their objective
functions. If 3a) and 3b) occurs simultaneously we get a Nash equilibrium if 3a) occurs
first and the central bank when chooses its policy is aware of the fiscal policy reaction
we get a monetary leadership equilibrium if the order of the occurrences is reversed, we
have fiscal leadership equilibria. We will assume that the fiscal authorities act at the same
time and play a Nash between them. To solve these dynamic policy games we use the
methodology developed by Blake and Kirsanova (2006) for a closed-economy setup and
by Kirsanova et al. (2005) for an open-economy model.
To illustrate the type of problems we are thinking on, we present next the case of
a full non-cooperative discretionary with monetary leadership and fiscal authorities as
followers playing a Nash between them.30
We have five strategic agents in the game. There are three explicit players, the mon-
etary and the two fiscal authorities, and two implicit players, the private sector of both
countries, that always act in last. In this type of game, the monetary authority moves first
and sets the interest rate. Then the two fiscal authorities decide the levels of their policy
instruments. Finally, the private sector in both countries reacts being the ultimate follower.
To solve this type of game, one inverts the order of playing and begins by solving
the optimization of the last player ending up with the optimization of the leader (the first
player). The private sector’s optimization problem is already solved out - the system of
the structural equations of the model - and can be represented by the system:
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where  are predetermined state variables and 1 are the effective instruments of private
sectors, the non-predetermined or jump variables (consumption and the two ination rates,
in our model). The policy instruments are represented by  , 	 and ! .  and
	 stand for the instruments of the followers which are, respectively, the Home and the
Foreign fiscal authorities, while ! represents the instrument of the leader, which is the

We present in appendix a numerical algorithm for the solution of the discretionary monetary
leadership regime.
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monetary authority. : is a vector of innovations to  with covariance matrix . This
system describes the evolution of the economy as observed by policymakers.
In the discretionary case, the three policymakers reoptimize every period by taking
the process by which private agents form their expectations as given - and where the
expectations are consistent with actual policies (Söderlind 1999). The two Nash fiscal
authorities minimize their loss functions treating the monetary policy instrument as para-
metric but incorporating the reaction functions of the private sectors. Assuming that the
fiscal authority of the H country has the following objective function:
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where  is the target variables for the H fiscal authority while  is the corresponding
matrix of weights. The target variables can be rewritten in terms of the predetermined
and non-predetermined state variables collected on vector =, in terms of the policy in-
struments  and in terms of combinations of these two variables. Being a follower, the
H fiscal authority observes monetary authorty’s actions and reacts to them. In a linear-
quadratic setup, the optimal solution belongs to the class of linear feedback rules of the
form:
  
  
! (55)
where  denotes feedback coeficcients on the predetermined state variables and  is
the leadership parameter. The other fiscal authority solves a similar problem and get:
	  
	  
	! (56)
Being in a Nash game, the two fiscal authorities do not respond to each other’s ac-
tions.
The monetary leadership authority takes into account these fiscal policy reaction
functions as well as the private sector’s optimal conditions, when solves its optimization
problem. Thus, the leader can manipulate the follower by changing its policy instrument.
The monetary leadership reaction function takes the form of:
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!  
! (57)
1.5 Calibration
Our baseline calibration was chosen taking as reference Beetsma and Jensen (2004,
2005), Benigno and Benigno (2006), Benigno (2004), Benigno and López-Salido (2006)
and Ferrero (2007).
As it is common in the literature, we assume that each period corresponds to a one
quarter of a year. The one period discount factor of the private sector and policy makers
 is set to 0.99, which implies a four percent annual basis steady-state interest rate.
The parameter , the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in the same
country, is set such that the price mark-up is equal to 10%. We thus set  equal to 11,
which is a high value than the one found in the literature where distortions come only
from monopolistic competition in the goods market31. The elasticity of substitution be-
tween Home and the Foreign produced goods  is set to 4.5, as in Benigno and Benigno
(2006). These authors remark that, when this intratemporal elasticity is higher than the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption /  the home and the foreign goods
are substitutes in the utility. We follow Beetsma and Jensen (2004, 2005) and set the
coefficient of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption / at 0.4, which
implies a coefficient of risk aversion for private consumption equal to 2.5. This is also the
value we adopt for the coefficient of risk aversion for public spending 0  . The
steady-state value of consumption over output

!	

is set at 0.75 in our baseline
calibration.
Following Benigno and Benigno (2006) and Ferrero (2007), the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of labour supply to real wage, . is assumed to be 0.47.32 Our benchmark cal-
ibration intends to reect a perfectly symmetric setup from which we can diverge and
See Ferrero (2007) on this.
Beetsma and Jensen (2004, 2005) emphasize the dilemma of choosing reasonable values for this
parameter and for the mark-up and getting realistic magnitudes on the ination response to changes in real
variables. They set   
 and    on their papers of 2005 and 2004, respectively.
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assess how asymmetries affect the results. Hence, we begin by assuming that the two
economies in the monetary union have an equal size   , have identical degrees of
nominal rigidities

+  +	

and share the same proportion of rule-of-thumbers firms (1-
'=1-'	 . We select a value for + equal to 0.75, in order to get an average length of price
contracts equal to one year. Afterwards, we will allow this parameter to diverge across
countries and we will get countries with different degrees of nominal rigidities. This is an
important issue for a common monetary policy, as Benigno (2004) and Aoki (2001) have
noticed.
Many empirical studies agree in concluding that the empirical Phillips curve has a
significant backward-looking component. However, the empirical estimates vary widely
across them. Some of them find a predominant forward-looking component while, in oth-
ers, the backward-looking component prevails33. Since there is less consensus and the
evidence is less clear cut, we will follow Kirsanova et al. (2005) and calibrate to 0.5 the
fraction of firms acting as backward looking price setters ( ' ), but we will take par-
ticular attention to the results under other calibrations of this parameter. Notice that, with
 '   the domestic "hybrid" curves of Phillips collapse to the pure forward-looking
case. Finally, we assume that the log-linear deviations of average and relative shocks to
consumption and productivity follow an uncorrelated AR(1) process with common per-
sistence of 0.85, while the wage mark-up shocks are i.i.d., and the standard deviation of
the innovations are equal to 0.01.
We also try to assess an EMU scenario, taking as reference the five large countries
of the euro area - Germany, Italy, France, Spain and Netherlands -, which account for
about 85 per cent of the total GDP in 2005. There are various criterions we can follow to
collect these economies in two groups – one to represent country H and other to symbolise
country F.
Some authors like Benigno (2004) and Benigno and López-Salido (2006) highlight
the importance, for the design of the optimal monetary policy, of having a currency union
with structural heterogeneity in the degrees of nominal rigidity and of ination persis-
See for instance Gali and Gertler (1999) and Benigno and López-Salido (2006) for the prevalence of
the forward-looking specification and Mehra (2004) for a backward-looking extreme case.
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tence, when there is an endogenous non-distortionary fiscal policy instrument that en-
sures the verification of the government budget constraint for any given level of public
debt and all the other policy instruments are exogenous. In both cases, the terms-of-trade
is not insulated from monetary policy and this policy should be conducted to mitigate
the distortions in the relative price mechanism. While Benigno concludes that monetary
policy should follow an ination targeting rule which puts higher weight in the ination
rate of the country with higher degree of nominal rigidity, Benigno and López-Salido
conclude similarly for the country with higher degree of ination persistence. Andrea
Ferrero (2007) demonstrates that, when all fiscal policy instruments are exogenous, mon-
etary policy can not prevent explosive debts in a monetary union with symmetric nominal
rigidities whereas, in some cases, it can ensure debt sustainability when there are dif-
ferentiated degrees of nominal rigidity across countries. Actually, Ferrero characterizes
the optimal targeting rules for a monetary union calibrated to have asymmetric rigidi-
ties and where distortionary taxation and government debt are endogenously determined.
In a diverse fiscal regime, where home-biased government spending is the stabilization
fiscal policy instrument and lump-sum taxes automatically adjust to satisfy the budget
constraint, Beetsma and Jensen (2004, 2005) also integrate the existence of asymmetric
rigidities in their analysis of the optimal joint conduct of fiscal and monetary policy sta-
bilization in a two-country monetary union. They show that, with symmetric rigidities,
fiscal policy should not be employed in stabilizing union-level variables and monetary
policy does not stabilize relative variables but, with asymmetric rigidities, both policies
should be concerned with the stabilization of relative and aggregate variables.
Hence, it is evident that the asymmetry on price rigidity and on ination persistence
it is important for the design of the optimal stabilization policies in a monetary union.
However, Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007a) have shown that the optimal discretionary sta-
bilization policy plan depends crucially on the level of the debt-output ratio. The relative
efficiency of the monetary and fiscal policy instruments to accomplish the short-run and
the long-run stabilization assignments depends on the size of the debt stock: the tax rate
reveals to increase its short-run stabilization performance with the raise of the debt-output
ratio at the same time as it becomes less effective on the satisfaction of the government
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budget constraint. Despite the numerical constraints of the Maastricht Treaty prescrib-
ing, namely, that public debt should not exceed 60 per cent of GDP, it is a fact that some
countries in the euro area exceed largely this limit and that there is high heterogeneity
concerning this fiscal policy indicator.
Therefore, given the importance of public debt to the monetary and fiscal policy
interactions, we choose to calibrate a two-country EMU scenario using as criterion the
magnitude of the debt to GDP ratio. Taking as reference the five large countries of the
euro area we consider a high debt country (H) and a low debt country (F). The prototypical
H country represents Germany, France and Italy and its yearly steady-state debt-output
ratio is calibrated to 80%, which corresponds to the weighted average of the debt-output
ratios of these countries, in the period 2002-2005. Country F matches the average debt
ratio of Spain and Netherlands in the referred period (roughly 50%)34. Moreover, taking
weighted averages of the estimations of the degree of price stickiness and of ination
persistence for these countries provided by Benigno and López-Salido (2006), we get the
calibration for these structural parameters in the two prototype countries. Country H has
a high degree of nominal rigidity (+  ) and a relatively small degree of ination
persistence (the fraction of rule-of-thumb firms represents 26% of the total, >  ).
Country F represents a backward-looking country (>	  ) having a relatively low
degree of price stickiness (+	  ). Finally, our choice of the two EMU representative
countries35 also pins down the parameterization of the relative size of country H to  
. The stochastic processes are restricted to be the same in the two countries and the
first-order autoregressive coefficients and the variances of the shocks are calibrated taking
the posterior median estimates reported in Smets and Wouters (2003). Table D.1 reports
the calibrated values for the remaining parameters of the model and the implied steady-
state magnitudes for the baseline and the EMU scenarios.
Sources: ECB Monthly Bulletin - Euro Area Staitistcs Online - and Satitistics Pocket Book Online,
March 2007.
Benigno and López-Salido (2006) and Ferrero (2007) present an alternative EMU representation.
They use, as criterion, the degree of nominal rigidity (and the degree of ination persistence) to get two
homogeneous groups of countries. In spite of the use of a different criterion, we end up by getting two
countries with different degrees of price stickiness and ination persistence. Our country H includes
Germany and it is correctly parameterized to be a more forward-looking country with relatively low price
exibility.
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2. POLICY ANALYSIS IN A MODEL WITH BALANCED-
BUDGET FISCAL POLICIES
In EMU, where monetary policy is centralized, fiscal policy emerges as the lone
exible instrument available for individual countries to stabilize country-specific shocks.
However, there is still much to learn on how fiscal policy is transmitted and what would
the better specification of fiscal policy be, given its multidimensionality. There are still
many doubts about the usefulness of fiscal policy as a stabilization tool for reasons related
to political and budgetary processes.
In what follows, we will try to get some insights on the fiscal policy stabilization
gains in a monetary union, when each government uses, as fiscal policy instrument, a bal-
anced budget change on home-biased and useful government spending. Here, fiscal policy
has no supply-side effects, monetary policy does not interfere with the government financ-
ing sources and, thus, the sources of strategic interactions between fiscal and monetary
authorities are minimal. The fiscal and the monetary policy instruments exert both their
stabilization effects on the economy through the demand channel but with differentiated
impacts on country-specific and union-wide variables. We intend to assess how fiscal and
monetary policies interact in macroeconomic stabilization of a country-size asymmetric
monetary union, where policymakers lack credible commitment tools and where policy-
making “reality” is approximated by means of optimizing discretionary fiscal and mone-
tary policy games. Most of the recent literature that uses dynamic settings for policy sta-
bilization analysis restrains the discretionary policy games to the Nash policy game case.
But, the current policy debate seems to assume that the central bank moves first and that
the fiscal authorities follow and, thus, the policy stabilization game is a monetary lead-
ership game. However, some authors, like Beetsma and Bovemberg (1998), have argued
that, as it takes a long time to change fiscal policy instruments whereas monetary policy
can be adjusted more quickly, the policy game played by monetary and fiscal authorities
is a fiscal leadership game. Kirsanova et al. (2005) argue that, in a monetary union, fis-
cal authorities cannot act as Stackelberg leaders unless they coordinate themselves. We
think that we can envisage fiscal authorities having a first move advantage relative to the
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monetary authority while playing a Nash amongst them, if they set their policies non-
cooperatively. To gain intuition on the type of dynamic strategic policy interactions that
the different order of playing creates, we will consider all policy games.
Discretionary policies are appealing in order to represent policymaking because they
are time-consistent. However, they are not a first-best and, so, even when policymakers
are benevolent, there can be welfare gains from promoting institutional changes.
Moreover, some authors like Lambertini and Rovelli (2004) sustain that it is reason-
able to be apprehensive on the possibility of the balanced budget policies undermining the
stance of monetary policy in the pursuit of price stability. Even if fiscal discipline is not a
problem in this setup, ination pressures attached to expansionary fiscal policies of fully
tax-financed acting on the demand-side may occur. This argument focuses on the exis-
tence of diverging fiscal and monetary policy objectives and on the possible destabilizing
role of a disciplined fiscal policy, regarding price stability.
In line with these arguments, we intend to assess the potential benefits of some tradi-
tional institutional arrangements in the literature, such as: the imposition of fiscal policy
constraints the promotion of horizontal (among fiscal authorities) and vertical (among
monetary and fiscal authorities) policy cooperation and the delegation of the monetary
policy to a weight-conservative central bank. Our main objective is to reevaluate these
issues in a monetary union where small and large countries coexist.
In the next section, we will characterize optimal policies under benevolent policy
policymakers. We will analyze the dynamic response of the relevant endogenous vari-
ables to some exemplificative shocks and, we will quantitatively complement this analysis
with the computation of welfare losses. Next, we will extend the analysis to some non-
benevolent scenarios, where fiscal and monetary authorities have distorted policy objec-
tives. Finally, we will perform some sensitivity analysis seeking to address some specific
additional questions.
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2.1 Benevolent policy authorities
We start by assuming that all policymakers are benevolent and share the same policy
objective function: the union-wide social loss function. Under a common loss function,
the strategic interactions between the different policymakers are null and, thus, the equi-
librium is the same no matter what the discretionary policy games are. In this context,
we can legitimately set the discretionary cooperative regime as the benchmark for policy
analysis. Secondly, we will assume that policymakers remain benevolent but are biased to-
wards their own constituencies. Hence, we consider fiscal authorities to be domestically-
oriented, whereas the central bank remains union-wide oriented. This is a slightly more
realistic setup, for instance, in regard of the EMU functioning, and enables the discussion
of the gains from fiscal policy coordination and the assessment on which countries (large
or small) gain more from it.
In what follows, we first consider the optimal policy responses to symmetric shocks,
which are usually seen as an exclusive task for monetary policy. We conclude that, in the
cooperative regime, symmetric shocks do not create any policy trade-off to fiscal policy.
However, in the non-cooperative settings, both monetary and fiscal policymakers face
incentives to react to this type of shocks and, thus, there is also a case for a meaningful
analysis of the fiscal and monetary policy interactions.
The rationale for the use of the fiscal policy as a stabilization tool is mainly found
in the need to stabilize the effects of country-specific shocks. Moreover, since their im-
pact on the union-wide variables depends on the relative size of the country hit by the
shock, we expect country-size asymmetry to be an important variable in the policy inter-
action outcomes and in the distribution of the stabilization burden of these shocks across
countries. Hence, we will proceed with the policy analysis of the asymmetric shocks and,
finally, we will evaluate the welfare implications of the alternative policies.
2.1.1 Adjustments to shocks within a monetary union of equal-size countries
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Benchmark scenario: discretionary coordinated policies
Symmetric shocks
In the present model, where lump-sum taxes are endogenously adjusted to ensure inter-
temporal government solvency together with full efficiency, the budgetary consequences
of the monetary policy have no impact on welfare. Consequently, the central bank can
freely react to symmetric shocks without constraining the use of fiscal policy instruments.
Here, where, the sole fiscal policy instrument, it is home-biased and useful government
spending, there are welfare costs of making it diverge from its efficient level. Moreover,
both policy instruments exert their effects on the macroeconomic variables through the
demand channel, even though their impacts on the diverse welfare-related variables do
not have the same magnitude. Hence, it is natural to expect that, in a full cooperative and
benevolent regime, there is no place for the use of government spending gaps to stabilize
symmetric shocks.
In fact, given the existence of enough lump-sum taxes, neither the symmetric demand
shock nor the symmetric productivity shock creates any policy trade-off. Government ex-
penditures and the interest rate are optimally set at their efficient levels and they fully
stabilize the effects of these shocks. On the other hand, cost-push shocks do not affect
the efficient exible-price equilibrium. However, perfectly positively correlated cost-push
shocks raise ination in both countries and, since there are nominal rigidities, there are
inefficient uctuations across goods that are identically valued on individuals’ utilities.
The ination-output dilemma vivifies but it only applies to the use of the monetary pol-
icy instrument. Effectively, to lessen the misallocation of goods it is optimal to increase
the interest rate and set the H and F government spending at their efficient zero levels.
The raise of the interest rate decreases the consumption gap and, consequently, lowers the
ination rate in both countries. In our model specification, where government spending
has a crowding-out effect on consumption, it would be possible, by reducing government
spending, to attenuate the monetary policy effects on the consumption gap without penal-
izing ination. However, since the benefits from decreasing the aggregate public spending
gap, in terms of a lower uctuation in the consumption gap, are overwhelmed by the costs
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of having positive co-movements between the two variables36 and of having government
spending variability, fiscal policy does not share the stabilization burden of these shocks
with monetary policy. These results can be demonstrated, by observation of the feedback
coefficients of the optimal discretionary policy rules displayed in Table D.2. It is interest-
ing to observe that other authors, such as Blake and Kirsanova (Oct. 2006), obtain a dif-
ferent fiscal policy response to a cost-push shock in a closed economy framework. There,
the government spending rises in response to a cost-push shock and displays a traditional
counter-cyclical trajectory, because the AS equation and the social loss have terms which
depend on past ination and also on past output.37
Asymmetric shocks
Demand-side asymmetric shocks are irrelevant for policy stabilization in our model, be-
cause financial markets are complete. Due to perfect risk sharing, any idiosyncratic de-
mand shock alters the marginal utilities of consumption by the same amount in both coun-
tries. Thus, the effect on the terms-of-trade is null, because the work effort changes by
the same magnitude in the two countries.
A negative productivity shock at the Home country (H) lowers output and increases
the price level at H but, given price stickiness, there is a positive terms-of-trade gap and
also a positive output gap in H. The positive terms-of-trade gap shifts the demand from
Foreign produced goods to Home produced goods, lowering ination rate and the out-
put gap in the Foreign country (F). Under symmetric nominal rigidities, the monetary
policy can not affect cross-country ination differentials and, thus, domestic fiscal poli-
cies are needed to mitigate the welfare consequences of the misallocation of goods, at
the monetary union level. Hence, to alleviate these external distortions, the government
spending gap has to increase at F and to decrease at H. The world government spending
and the interest rate gaps stay at the respective zero steady-state levels, since the union-
wide variables are not affected by the shock. Figure 1 displays the impulse responses to
A positive co-movement between the consumption gap and the aggregate government spending gap
is welfare-reducing, because it causes undesirable uctuations in the work effort.
This follows from the adoption of Steinsson’s (2003) specification of the rule-of-thumb firms’
behaviour. In our model, we have followed Galí and Gertler (1999) and Amato and Laubach (2003) on this
and, thus, no output persistence occurs.
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a one-standard negative productivity shock at H, under the baseline parameters, except
for the elimination of any shock persistence. The dynamics are, as expected, very simi-
lar to the ones presented by Beetsma and Jensen (2005), apart from those in the ination
rates, which, exhibit a smoother trajectory due to the existence of ination persistence in
our model. Figure 1 confirms their findings on the counter-cyclical conduct of the fiscal
policy instruments in response to a country-specific productivity shock.
Different from productivity shocks, cost-push shocks, exemplified by mark-up shocks,
affect both relative and union-wide aggregate variables and, thus, call for the use of both
monetary and fiscal policy instruments in the stabilization process.
A cost-push shock at H raises its GDP ination rate and depresses the terms-of-trade
gap. Under full exible-price adjustments, the negative terms-of-trade gap would effi-
ciently shift demand from H to F goods. However, under nominal rigidities, this shift is
inefficient and it becomes optimal to stabilize relative ination and the terms-of-trade gap
through appropriate domestic fiscal policies. The government spending gap should de-
crease at H and increase at F. However, it is not optimal to raise the relative government
spending gap (  	  ) in order to close the terms-of-trade gap, even if we had
considered government spending as pure waste, because it gives rise to inefficient uc-
tuations in the work effort. Moreover, since the raise on the ination rate at H boosts
the aggregate ination by less than perfectly positively correlated shocks, the interest rate
also increases to a lesser extent. Figure 2 depicts the dynamics of the principal endoge-
nous variables in response to a one percent shock in the wage mark-up. It clearly shows a
pro-cyclical behaviour of the H government spending gap, contrasting with the response
to a negative productivity shock.
Furthermore, one can also verify that, after the first period, once expectations about
ination are incorporated in the price setting, both fiscal policy instruments shift in oppo-
site directions: the government spending gap becomes positive at H and negative at F.
Finally, it is important to state, once again, that all these experiments are in accor-
dance with the analytical findings of Beetsma and Jensen (2004, 2005) and that, as ex-
pected, fiscal policy specializes in the stabilization of the relative variables while the mon-
etary policy stabilizes the union-wide aggregate variables.
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Other policy solutions
Commitment
Cost-push shocks and productivity shocks lead to time-inconsistency problems with very
different magnitudes. Consequently, the divergences between the optimal policy solu-
tions, under commitment and under discretion, largely depend on the type of shock hit-
ting the economies. This can be easily understood by recalling that only fiscal policy
suffers from a commitment problem in response to a country-specific productivity shock,
given the inexistence of trade-offs for the monetary policy while both monetary and fiscal
policies experience time inconsistency in response to a cost-push shock, except when the
latter is of symmetric nature.
In fact, the main difference between commitment and the discretionary responses to
an idiosyncratic negative productivity shock is on the conduct of the relative government
spending gap. After the first period, it converges to steady-state by positive values, under
commitment whereas, under discretion, it converges to the steady-state level, from nega-
tive values. The welfare superiority of the commitment solution is revealed, essentially,
in the positive permanent co-movement between the terms-of-trade gap and the relative
government spending gap.
The dynamics of the endogenous variables, under commitment and under discretion,
after a country-specific mark-up shock, display larger discrepancies. These are especially
evident on the trajectories of the policy instruments. The latter are less actively used under
commitment and display a smoother path, in relation to the discretionary outcome. The
other macroeconomic variables also exhibit less short-run volatility under commitment.38
Hence, one can conclude that, relative to commitment, the optimal discretionary co-
operative policy manifests a stabilization bias that is apparent in the larger uctuations of
the macroeconomic variables. Since we have removed all the permanent distortions of the
model, the traditional equilibrium bias of the discretionary equilibrium is inexistent.
Only the foreign ination rate depicts large variance under the commitment solution. See Figures 3
and 4.
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Discretionary non-coordinated policies
In what follows, we focus on the policy analysis of the non-cooperative setups where fis-
cal authorities are exclusively motivated by the well-being of their own constituencies. A
simple comparison of the policy feedback coefficients in Tables D.2 and D.3, allows us
to immediately conclude that, and differently from the full cooperative regime, the aggre-
gate government spending gap () is actively used in the stabilization of symmetric and
asymmetric cost-push shocks. In fact, there is now a race between the monetary and the
aggregate fiscal policies in the stabilization of the aggregate effects of cost-push shocks:
aggregate fiscal policy becomes expansionist, while monetary policy remains restrictive.
However, in general, we also observe that the H and the F government spending gaps
are both less actively used, in response to these shocks and, so, the relative government
spending gaps suffer small changes.
To get the intuition of these results, it is important to note that, for instance, the H
government spending gap falls in response to a domestic cost-push shock and this atten-
uates the H ination rate but also the negative terms-of-trade gap and the impact on the
F ination rate. The H government does not internalize this positive effect on country F
and, thus, uses its policy instrument less actively than it would do in a cooperative setup.
In F, the government spending gap has to rise to mitigate the deationary consequences
arising from the restrictive monetary policy. This policy instrument ends up being more
actively used at F than at H, because there is a negative co-movement between the con-
sumption and the F government spending gaps that enhance welfare at F, while the reverse
occurs at country H. This asymmetric effect justifies a positive reaction of the aggregate
government spending gap to a country-specific cost-push shock and, consequently, to a
symmetric cost-push shock.
In the non-cooperative regimes, the order of moves is also a source of strategic inter-
actions between the fiscal and the monetary policymakers. In the fiscal leadership regime,
H government, anticipating the fact that the monetary authority will raise the interest rate
in response to a cost-push shock in H - to fight against excessive ination - will adopt a less
restrictive fiscal policy than in other policy regimes. The domestically-oriented benevo-
46
POLICY ANALYSIS IN A MODEL WITH BALANCED-BUDGET FISCAL POLICIES
lent F government will also behave less actively. Expecting an increase in the interest rate
that will negatively impact its GDP ination rate, the F government will moderately raise
government spending to help terms-of-trade stabilization. In sum, the H government, suf-
fering direct inationary pressures, will be better off if the monetary authority conducts a
more restrictive policy and, hence, moderates its restrictive policy. The F government will
be worse off if the central bank fights more aggressively the cost-push shock at H and,
thus, performs a less extreme expansionary policy. Hence, the fiscal policy response to
an idiosyncratic cost-push shock is more moderated when the fiscal authorities lead than
when they follow the monetary authority or than when all the policymakers move simul-
taneously. Conversely, the monetary policy has to be slightly more restrictive in the fiscal
leadership regime than in other non-cooperative regimes. Logically, this also applies to a
symmetric cost-push shock.
In regards to the responses to a country-specific negative productivity shock, H and F
fiscal policies, generate negative spillover effects that are not internalized by domestically-
oriented fiscal authorities. Both authorities conduct more active fiscal policies in the
Nash and in the monetary leadership regimes. This does not apply in the fiscal leadership
regime, because each authority ignores that the other fiscal authority will set a symmet-
ric policy, that prevents aggregate policy trade-offs, but it perceives that the union-wide
benevolent central bank will overreact to any excessive fiscal policy response. Hence,
both governments moderate their responses to the shock.
In sum, the nature of the spillover effects of the fiscal policy responses to the dif-
ferent shocks determine that: i) the relative government spending gap reacts to a lesser
extent to a country-specific cost-push shock and more to a productivity shock39, than in
the cooperative setup ii) the aggregate fiscal policy reacts counter-cyclically to union-
wide variables iii) the fiscal leadership regime substantially moderates the responses of
the government spending gaps to the shocks iv) with the exception of the fiscal policy
instruments, the dynamics of the other endogenous variables exhibit considerable simili-
tude across the different policy regimes.
	Except under the fiscal leadership regime.
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Fiscal policy rules
The time-inconsistency problems of fiscal policy (addressed above) may outweigh the
gains from using fiscal policy as a stabilization tool and, thus, it can be welfare-enhancing
to restrain its use. In particular and in an extreme scenario, it could be desirable, under
discretion, to exclusively provide the optimal provision of public goods (i.e., to set the
government spending gap at zero) every period. Call this passive fiscal policy rule. It be-
comes apparent, from the inspection of Figures 5 and 6 in the appendix that, constraining
fiscal policy, does not substantially affect the dynamics of the non-policy instrument vari-
ables, in face of a negative and country-specific supply shock. Thus, the eventual gains
of letting fiscal policy unconstrained would be due to cross-terms on the social loss func-
tion reecting undesirable uctuations in the work effort, at the union-level and across
countries, and arising from co-movements among variables. In particular, in relation to
the negative productivity shock at H (Figure 6), we verify that, under the benchmark solu-
tion, there is a positive co-movement between the relative government spending gap and
the terms-of-trade gap which is absent under the passive fiscal policy rule. Recalling the
social loss function (see eq. 51 in Chap. 1), we observe that this positive co-movement is
welfare-increasing and may overwhelm the costs of large variability on the government
spending gaps that occur under the benchmark solution.
Considering now the example of a positive mark-up shock at H, the benchmark so-
lution (discretionary cooperation) generates a negative co-movement between the relative
government spending gap and the terms-of-trade gap that causes an inefficient uctuation
of the work effort across countries (see Figure 5). Moreover, it was shown above that,
in response to this type of shock, the fiscal policy instrument is more actively used un-
der discretion than under commitment. Hence, potential welfare gains can accrue from
constraining the fiscal policy response to this type of shock, in the absence of credible
commitment.
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2.1.2 Insights for a monetary union with country-size asymmetry
Under the full cooperative regime, the government spending gap of the small country
has to be more actively used to stabilize a country-specific shock, than the fiscal policy
tool of the large country (cf. feedback coefficients in Table D.2 for    vs.   ).
To understand this result, it is important to note that the marginal costs and the ination
rates for smaller and more open economies are affected to a greater extent by changes in
relative prices which transmit to the per capita output gaps. Hence, for instance, a pro-
ductivity shock in one of the two countries has a direct impact on the terms-of-trade gap,
which, in turn, affects mostly the domestic variables of the small country. Consequently,
the home-biased government spending gap has to be used more actively by the small
country to alleviate such asymmetric effect of the shock. Moreover, relative to the large
country, the variance of the welfare-related variables of the small country is less weighted
in the loss function, also explaining its larger business cycle uctuations.
Likewise, an idiosyncratic mark-up shock in a big country benefits further from the
policy stabilization contribution of the monetary policy instrument and, again, requires a
relatively larger intervention of the fiscal policy instrument of the small country. Once
more, this is easily explained by the large intrinsic externality of that shock but also by
the different weights received by the country-specific variables in the social loss function.
If it is the small country to be hit by such shock, the domestic fiscal policy instrument has
to be more intensively used while the other policy instruments play a small stabilization
role than what they would have played in a symmetric monetary union. Thus, the fiscal
policy stabilization costs are not equally shared by the two countries, since the smaller
country has to respond more strongly to a disturbance either at home and overseas than
the big country has.
In terms of non-cooperative regimes and from the observation of the optimal feed-
back coefficients reported in Tables D.2 and D.3, we conclude that the Nash and the
monetary leadership regimes accentuate the asymmetry on the fiscal policies of the two
countries. The small country performs an even more active fiscal policy, except when it
responds to a domestic cost-push shock, while the large country conducts a slightly less
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active policy. Effectively, in comparison with the cooperative regime, one observes that,
as in a symmetric monetary union, the relative government spending gap responds less to
a cost-push shock. However, this response is relatively weaker if the shock hits the small
country. Similarly, the aggregate government spending gap becomes expansionist but to
a lesser extent when the shock occurs in the small country.
The fiscal leadership regime moderates the fiscal policy responses to the shocks but
this moderation is stronger for the fiscal policy of the large country. Under this policy
regime, the government of the large country, anticipating that the monetary authority will
be more reactive to its domestic cost-push shock, faces an incentive to adopt a looser
policy40, transferring the stabilization costs to the central bank. This incentive results in a
counter-cyclical policy. In this policy regime, the asymmetry between the fiscal policies
of the two different size countries is the largest.
We can then systematize our main findings in the global implications of the countries
size asymmetry.
First, our experiments show that policy stabilization favors the large country in detri-
ment of the small country. This can be easily exemplified by observing the impulse re-
sponses to a one-percent relative productivity shock in Figure 7: the specific variables of
the large country (H-variables) depict lower short-run volatility than those for the small
country (F-variables).
Second, country-size asymmetry leads to fiscal policy asymmetry, amplified in the
non-cooperative settings. However, the main differences occur in the dynamics of the
policy variables and thus, it is natural to expect that the small country will benefit from
being in a cooperative regime.
Finally, we verify that the large country profits from being in a fiscal leadership
regime, while the small country looses the most in this non-cooperative regime.

Expecting a restrictive monetary policy that creates a negative consumption gap, the fiscal authority
of the large country chooses to increase the government spending gap, therefore benefiting from a negative
co-movement between the two variables.
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2.1.3 Welfare analysis
From the analysis of the optimal policy responses to shocks, it became clear that,
in general, fiscal and monetary policies accomplish different stabilization tasks – fiscal
policy focus on the stabilization of relative variables, while monetary policy performs
the stabilization of aggregate variables - and that productivity and mark-up shocks create
different policy trade-offs and call for different stabilization policies. It is apparent that
the mark-up shocks generate more relevant policy trade-offs and, therefore, it would be
expected that these would imply larger welfare stabilization costs. In fact, there are other
factors that determine the welfare costs of the shocks. For instance, the way the mark-
up shock is normalized and the calibration one takes for its persistence and variance,
reveal to be essential for the differences found in the stabilization costs of the two supply
shocks. With our benchmark parameterization, the welfare effects of the productivity
shocks, under the different policy regimes, clearly dominate the welfare consequences
of the mark-up shocks (cf. results in Table D.8). Hence, we should be cautious on the
welfare evaluation of the various policy regimes and take into consideration the possible
divergent evaluations when considering the analysis of the two shocks separately.
There are basically three questions that are relevant to address under the present
setup. First, we want to know if there are gains from constraining fiscal policy, given the
existence of time-inconsistency problems and also fiscal authorities that may have pol-
icy objectives diverging from the objectives of the union-wide representative household.
Second, we try to reappraise the debate on the need for policy cooperation - an active one
in the EMU context - within a dynamic framework. In this context we compare the co-
operative solution with an extensive set of non-cooperative policy solutions. We start by
assessing whether gains accrue from enhancing cooperation even when the fiscal author-
ities are domestically-benevolent. Third, it is important to perceive, given the inexistence
of macroeconomic policy coordination in current EMU, which non-cooperative policy
regimes beneficiate more the union-wide stabilization performance and how the stabiliza-
tion costs are split between the small and large countries.
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The existence of a micro-founded welfare criterion enables the evaluation and the
ranking of the different policy stabilization outcomes and allows addressing the above-
mentioned questions. Tables D.6 and D.8 report the union-wide welfare losses under
the several optimal policy regimes (and with the benchmark parameter calibration) in a
monetary union exclusively hit by idiosyncratic shocks Table D.7 evaluates the welfare
losses of each country using, as an approximation to the correct welfare criterion41, the
welfare losses obtained from splitting the union-wide loss function.
By examining Table D.6, we conclude that constraining fiscal authorities with a pas-
sive fiscal policy rule delivers an inferior welfare outcome. However, a closer look at the
welfare losses reported in Table D.8, shows that this conclusion is not extensive to the
stabilization performance of both supply shocks. As noticed above, the stabilization of
mark-up shocks creates more time-inconsistency problems than that of the productivity
shocks. Accordingly, it would be reasonable to expect worse discretionary stabilization of
mark-up shocks and, thus, constraining fiscal policy may enhance welfare. In fact, results
show that a rule setting is welfare-improving if the economies are exclusively hit by idio-
syncratic mark-up shocks42 but, is welfare-reducing, if the productivity shocks prevail.
The discrepancies of the welfare losses under the two shocks are related to the assump-
tion of the persistence of the shocks and to the relative size of the mark-up shock.43 They
are crucial for the welfare outcomes we get when the economies are hit by all the shocks.
Restraining fiscal policy is welfare reducing, under the latter hypothesis, because of the
excessive importance productivity shocks have on business cycle uctuations.
Our experiments also suggest that there are welfare gains from promoting policy
cooperation and that it is the small country that gains relatively more from adopting this
Benigno and Benigno (2006) derive, instead, the quadratic utility-based objective functions for each
country in order to analyze the case of non-coordinated monetary policies. This requires second-order
approximations of the structural equations of the model and it is algebraically cumbersome.
This replicates the findings of Beetsma and Jensen (2004). The authors argue that this result is due to
the trade-off between the distortions associated with discretionary (relative) fiscal policy and discretionary
(aggregate) monetary policy. Thus, the elimination of the former distortion reveals to be welfare enhancing.
Here, this shock is calibrated as a one percent innovation in the mark-up, which represents a 0.0042%
shock in the GDP ination rate. Beetsma and Jensen (2004), for instance, normalize this shock to be a
1% shock in the ination rate and they get much more welfare losses. However, this normalization also
exacerbates the welfare importance of this shock. Few cost-push shocks in real world have this impact,
especially in the presence of nominal rigidities. Notice that a 1% shock in the relative productivity shock
has a direct impact on the terms-of-trade gap of 0.5582%, under our benchmark calibration.
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institutional arrangement.44 In fact, the large country has more to gain from being in a
fiscal leadership policy regime than in a full cooperative policy regime (cf. Table D.7)
and so the enforceability of macroeconomic policy cooperation in a monetary union may
be hardly attained within asymmetric-size countries.
Moreover, the welfare ranking of the three non-cooperatives scenarios shows that,
from the whole union point of view, the monetary leadership and the Nash policy regimes
are preferable to fiscal leadership. However, from the inspection of Table D.8, we con-
clude that this outcome arises from the relative large welfare effects of the productivity
shocks. The mark-up shock is better stabilized under a fiscal leadership regime. Lead-
ing fiscal authorities mitigate time-inconsistency problems of the monetary policy con-
versely, productivity shocks only cause time-inconsistency problems to fiscal policy and
a leading monetary authority is more successful in alleviating this distortion. Thus, the
welfare inferiority of the fiscal leadership regime arises because, in our baseline calibra-
tion of the stochastic process, cost-push shocks are exemplified by i.i.d. mark-up shocks
with rather negligent welfare impact.
We also observe that the large country is always better-off than the small country
and prefers to be in a fiscal leadership policy regime, where it beneficiates from its large
strategic power vis-à-vis the other policymakers. Diversely, the small country has lower
welfare stabilization costs under monetary leadership (cf. Table D.7).
2.2 Non-benevolent scenarios
We now propose to analyze the policy interactions that arise when fiscal and mone-
tary authorities have distorted policy objectives.
A first scenario that we can motivate within such analysis is the one assuming an
ination averse central bank. Delegating the monetary policy to a central bank that is
Under the cooperative regime, the small F-country focus on maximizing home welfare and on
stabilizing shocks hitting the large economy. Simultaneously, the large country imposes higher spillover
effects on the small country. Thus, while policy cooperation is not crucial for the large economy, it could
make be good for the small country. Our simulations confirm this expectation. The small country, facing
larger externalities, is better off if the large country internalizes them conversely, and the large country
hasn’t got much to gain when the small internalizes its smaller spillovers.
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biased towards the control of ination variability is usually a referred setup to reduce
the ination bias arising from the discretionary monetary policy. A central bank more
ination averse than society as whole, as Rogoff (1985) originally proposed, was shown
to provide welfare gains in a dynamic setup, even when the distortions that incentive an
ination bias are fully eliminated (cf., Clarida et al. 1999). However, as Luisa Lambertini
(2006) remarked, the time-inconsistency problem of the monetary policy is not the sole
problem when there is also endogenous fiscal policy. A conservative central bank creates
a divergence between fiscal and monetary policy objectives and that may be a source of
sub-optimal outcomes. Thus, there is no a priori conclusion favouring, unambiguously,
the delegation of monetary policy to an ination averse central banker.
To illustrate this scenario, we follow Blake and Kirsanova’s (2006) example, by con-
sidering that the ination welfare-related terms of the monetary policy objective function
receive higher weighs than they receive in the union-wide welfare function.
A second example fitting a non-benevolent scenario can be motivated by conicting
interests between national fiscal policies and common monetary policy concerning the
stabilization of the output terms. For instance, one of the fears underlying the fiscal ar-
chitecture of the EMU is the possibility of the fiscal policy stance to undermine monetary
policy in the pursuit of price stability. This hypothesis can be described by assuming that
governments are less worried with ination variability than society is or, alternatively, by
postulating that they are more dissatisfied with the uctuation of the macroeconomic real
variables. Once more we follow Blake and Kirsanova (2006): the demand-terms on the
benevolent fiscal authorities’ loss functions are attached with an additional weight.
We begin by characterizing the optimal discretionary equilibrium under the weight-
conservative central bank hypothesis and, afterwards, we go through the analysis of the
policy interactions when governments are particularly concerned with output uctuations.
Of course, the effects of imposing fiscal policy constraints will be assessed. Our focus
is on the existence of countries’ size asymmetry in the EMU and how this affects the
strategic policy interactions and the outcomes.
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2.2.1 Adjustments to shocks
Conservative central bank and benevolent domestically-oriented governments First,
it is important to note that a sufficiently high degree of weight-conservatism ( ) )
changes the qualitative response of fiscal policy to a domestic positive mark-up shock: this
response becomes expansionary and counter-cyclical.45 Furthermore, the monetary policy
responds more aggressively to this type of shocks and a wrong policy mix is manifested.
Figure 8 compares the impulse responses to a unit innovation in the mark-up at H, under
the benevolent and the conservative Nash policy regime. It appears that the domestic (H)
and consumption based ination rates exhibit less variability under weight-conservatism
but the F ination rate displays larger uctuation. In the first period, both government
spending gaps are positive under the weight-conservatism case but, their expansionary ef-
fects, are not enough to fully counteract the monetary policy overreaction and, thus, the
output gaps decrease more than under the benevolent setup. In fact, the conicting objec-
tives between fiscal and monetary authorities accentuate policy reactions: a more restric-
tive monetary policy and a more expansionist aggregate fiscal policy (). Additionally,
this conict moderates the relative fiscal policy () response to the mark-up shocks and,
thus, worsens the stabilization of relative variables (cf. Tables D.3 and D.4).
The central bank’s high aversion to ination variability has no significant impact
on the fiscal policy response to productivity shocks, because, under symmetric nominal
rigidities, productivity shocks do not cause any trade-off for monetary policy. This is
particularly evident in the fiscal leadership outcome, where the fiscal authorities anticipate
that the monetary authority will not react to a productivity shock (cf. feedback coefficients
on this shock, under benevolent and conservative fiscal leadership, in Tables D.3 and D.4).
The playing order takes special relevance in the policy response to mark-up shocks,
where policy trade-offs are extended to fiscal and monetary policies. In the fiscal lead-
ership policy game, the fiscal authorities, aware that the conservative central bank will
overreact to an inationary fiscal policy, will be more moderated in the conducting of fis-
See feedback coefficients in Table D.4, for a degree of weight-conservatism of 0.75.
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cal policies. In the monetary leadership regime, the conservative central bank anticipates
that the fiscal authorities will react to its excessive concern towards ination variability
through an expansionary aggregate fiscal policy. Consequently, the central bank will en-
gage in a more moderated restrictive policy than it would do in the Nash policy regime
(cf. Table D.4). In spite of these divergences in policy responses under the different pol-
icy regimes, the dynamics of the other endogenous variables do not present substantial
differences.
Finally, country-size asymmetry interacts meaningfully with the weight-conservative
delegating arrangement in the stabilization of mark-up shocks. In face of idiosyncratic
mark-up shocks, while the fiscal policy response of the large country is expansionary and
counter-cyclical, in the small country, the domestic fiscal policy remains, as in the benevo-
lent scenarios, restrictive and pro-cyclical (cf. Table D.4). It appears that, the government
of the large country faces additional incentives to counteract the central bank’s excessive
concern with ination uctuation. Conversely, the government of the small country (F)
perceives that both the effects of country-F idiosyncratic shocks and of its fiscal policy
reaction have lower impact on the design of optimal monetary policy. Consequently, the
fiscal authority of the small country ends up conducting fiscal policy in similar way as
with a benevolent central bank.46
Output-biased fiscal authorities and benevolent central bank If fiscal authorities are
less averse to ination variability than society is, they will have incentives to promote a
more expansionist fiscal policy than if they were benevolent. Similarly to the previous
case, the fiscal policy response to a domestic mark-up shock turns to be expansionary and
counter-cyclical, in contrast with the domestic fiscal policy response in the benevolent
scenarios. Observing, for instance, the optimal policy responses to an idiosyncratic posi-
tive mark-up shock when all the policymakers play Nash, we verify that aggregate fiscal
policy () expands further and this generates a more aggressive monetary policy con-
traction (cf. Tables D.3 and D.5). In addition, the relative government spending gap, re-
See Figures 9 and 10 for the impulse responses to a mark-up shock hitting, respectively, the large and
the small country, comparing the benevolent with the weight-conservative central bank Nash game.
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sponsible for the stabilization of relative variables, experiences a smaller variation in this
non-benevolent scenario than in the correspondent benevolent policy regime. Figures 11
and 12 in appendix depict the dynamics of endogenous variables in response to a positive
mark-up shock at H, under Nash with and without benevolent governments and under all
the policy regimes with output-biased fiscal authorities, respectively. The figures suggest
that the main consequences of the distorted objectives are on the dynamics of the govern-
ment spending gaps. Under the fiscal leadership regime the fiscal authorities, taking into
account the subsequent reaction of the monetary authority, expand slightly less than in
the monetary leadership or the Nash regimes. Thus, the high aversion to the variability of
output-related terms ends up by being reected, more intensively, in the lower variability
of the fiscal policy instruments.
2.2.2 Welfare analysis
To complement, quantitatively, the description of the dynamic response to shocks of
the previous section, we compute the welfare losses reported in Tables D.6-D.8.
The computation of the welfare costs under the different policy regimes, when the
monetary policy is delegated to a conservative central bank, confirms that this institu-
tional arrangement is harmful for welfare. Additionally, and as expected, we also confirm
that this inferior outcome is mainly imputed to the worse stabilization of the mark-up
shocks, in particular, the Nash regime, where policy responses to these shocks become
more extreme, yields the more damaging outcome (cf. Table D.8). Despite the worst
performance of the Nash policy regime in the stabilization of the mark-up shocks for the
weight-conservative central bank case, the welfare ranking of the policy regimes does not
show substantial differences. The fiscal leadership policy regime still performs the worst
stabilization performance while the monetary leadership delivers the lowest welfare sta-
bilization costs (cf. Table D.6).
Moreover, the costs of delegating the monetary policy to a conservative central bank
do not spread symmetrically across the monetary union, if countries are of different size.
Comparing the welfare losses under the benevolent and the conservative cases for the
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large and the small country (Table D.7), it is easy to verify that the small country is the
most harmed by this institutional arrangement.
Fiscal authorities with distorted policy objectives also augment the welfare cost of
macroeconomic policy stabilization in relation to the benevolent setups. The race between
fiscal and monetary authorities affects the stabilization performance of the two supply
shocks but, such larger stabilization costs, do not equally spread over the various pol-
icy regimes nor across different size countries (see Tables D.6-D.8). Welfare impacts are
lower under the fiscal leadership regime, where fiscal policy is more moderated. In fact,
accentuating the preferences of the fiscal authorities over output stabilization may over-
turn the welfare ranking of the policy regimes. In non-reported simulations, we found
that, when fiscal authorities do not care at all with ination variability, fiscal leadership
gives the better policy solution among the non-cooperative regimes. Moreover, under an
asymmetric country-size monetary union, the large stabilization burden of this hypothesis
falls mainly on the small country.
Finally, constraining fiscal authorities to pursue passive fiscal policy rules does not
improve welfare, even when policymakers have distorted policy objectives (cf. Table
D.6).
In sum, our non-benevolent exercises suggest that distorted policy objectives raise the
conict between fiscal and monetary authorities and aggravate welfare small countries
have more to loose with those scenarios than large countries and, that it may be better, in
the lack of alternative, to give a first move advantage to the policymakers with distorted
objectives.
2.3 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we intend to provide some sensitivity analysis regarding the parame-
ters of the model and of the policy objectives seeking to address a set of additional ques-
tions.
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First, we intend to reformulate and reassess the question of the desirability of policy
cooperation in the context of “non-benevolent” policy objectives. In order to do that, we
take an extreme case of policy specification: the monetary authority faces a pure ination
target while governments are totally biased towards actively reducing the output-related
terms variability.
Next, we assess if structural reforms, for instance, leading to a reduction of the degree
of nominal rigidity can improve welfare and, in particular, conclude which type of country
(large or small) is more acute to the need for reforms. This requires performing welfare
analysis under different degrees of nominal rigidity. Finally, some authors like Kirsanova
and co-authors, stress the importance of ination persistence on the welfare gains attached
to fiscal policy stabilization. They found that gains increase with ination persistence, in
a model with both ination and output persistence. We want to address the importance of
ination persistence in our model, where output persistence is ruled out we also want to
assess how the macroeconomic stabilization performance is affected by the existence of
asymmetric ination persistence across countries.
2.3.1 Reappraising the gains of policy cooperation
We found that, when policymakers agree on policy objectives and are motivated by
the well-being of the monetary union as a whole, monetary and fiscal policies special-
ize in different stabilization tasks: monetary policy stabilizes the aggregate effects of the
shocks while fiscal policy performs the stabilization of their relative effects. It was shown
that, in general, it is better to have a stabilization policy conduced by these optimizing
policymakers (benevolent cooperative setup) than to allow fiscal authorities to guide their
fiscal policies by the exclusive interests of their own citizens (non-cooperative setups).
We observed that, under our baseline calibration, there are welfare gains from enhancing
policy cooperation from all point of views, in spite of the existent time-consistency prob-
lems. However, in the case of a monetary union with different size countries, the large
country may have no incentives to cooperate.
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We propose to reappraise the gains of macroeconomic policy cooperation in a “non-
benevolent” setup. Following Lambertini and Rovelli’s (2004) exercise in a static frame-
work, we assume that the central bank, in line with the institutional EMU arrangement, is
assigned to, exclusively, stabilize ination (a case of extreme weight-conservatism) and
that fiscal authorities are only concerned with the stabilization of domestic output terms
(a case of extreme output-bias). The relevant question to be answered is on the optimal-
ity of this a priori task-specialization between fiscal and monetary policies. We want to
assess if, in this context, there could be gains from enforcing a cooperative arrangement
between fiscal authorities or if it would be better to induce all the policymakers to coop-
erate. The eventual welfare gains have to be evaluated from each policymaker’s point of
view and that of the whole union to appraise the feasibility of the cooperative solutions.
In particular, we will compare the welfare costs under a full non-cooperative setup with
the welfare costs arising under fiscal policy cooperation and full cooperation under the
monetary union social loss. These welfare costs are computed on the basis of the welfare
criterion of each authority and of the social welfare measure.
We find that, when policymakers have clearly different stabilization assignments in
the context of a monetary union: 1) horizontal and full cooperative stabilization policy
arrangements are hardly implemented if there are no appropriate enforcement devices 2)
the extreme conservative central bank prefers fiscal authorities cooperating in minimizing
the social loss function (horizontal cooperation) but national governments will face incen-
tives to deviate from this conduct 3) national fiscal authorities face incentives to ensure
a full cooperative regime but the central bank has more to gain from non-cooperating 4)
from the point of view of a representative household of the monetary union, it is better
to have some cooperative arrangement and full cooperation is better than horizontal pol-
icy cooperation (see Table D.9). These experiments also show that the fiscal leadership
regime is welfare superior to the other policy regimes.
The same qualitative results apply to the case of country-size asymmetry and are
extensive to an EMU scenario calibration of the model (cf. Table D.10), where the ma-
jor differences from the baseline parameterization with country-size asymmetry are the
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existence of asymmetries on nominal rigidity and on ination persistence.47 The main
qualitative difference, relative to baseline calibration, is on the ranking of the various
policy regimes from the viewpoint of the central bank. In the EMU scenario, the ex-
tremely conservative central bank would prefer to be in a monetary leadership policy
regime while, under the benchmark scenario, it would be indifferent among the diverse
policy regimes. In any circumstances, the national fiscal authorities and the representative
household would be better-off under fiscal leadership.
In sum, our results suggest that there are no welfare gains from assigning policymak-
ers with different stabilization objectives. It would be better to induce their agreement
on social policy objectives and the specialization of the policy instruments on different
stabilization tasks would emerge. If divergent policy objectives are already in place, it
is difficult to implement the welfare-improving cooperative solutions, because either the
national fiscal authorities or the central bank will prefer not to cooperate.
2.3.2 Nominal rigidity and ination persistence
Our modelling deliberately includes a production subsidy to eliminate steady-state
deadweight losses resulting from imperfect competition and distortionary taxation. How-
ever, these sources of inefficiency, as well as price stickiness, remain important to the
analysis of the business cycle and to the welfare costs. It is well-known that a first best
equilibrium is obtained when all distortions are eliminated but it is not obvious how wel-
fare behaves when one reduces, or removes, some of them.
In concrete, we wonder if structural reforms that consubstantiate, for instance, in a
reduction of the degree of nominal rigidity reduce the welfare costs of the policy stabi-
lization. In particular, we will try to assess which type of country has more to benefit from
raising nominal exibility.
There are basically two ways through which, decreasing the degree of price stick-
iness, can affect welfare in our model. First, by reducing the inefficient dispersion of
Differently from baseline calibration, the shocks under the EMU scenario display larger and
differentiated variances.
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output across firms, it decreases the weight attached to ination volatility in the welfare
function. Hence, there is a direct effect reducing welfare and changing the trade-off be-
tween ination and output stabilization.
Second, it indirectly affects welfare by changing the relative volatility of the various
welfare-related variables. From the observation of the AS equations, we conclude that,
when the degree of nominal rigidity diminishes (+ and +	 ), the H and the F ination
rates respond more to mark-up shocks and to the other welfare-related variables (private
and public consumption gaps and terms-of-trade gap). Simultaneously, the governments
spending gaps and the interest rate gap have large effects on the ination rates and small
effects on the output gaps. Thus, relative to ination terms, the indirect and the direct
effects on welfare to decrease the degree of nominal rigidity seem to go in opposite direc-
tions. Moreover, we should expect a different behaviour of the stabilization performance
of mark-up and productivity shocks, when one raises the degree of nominal exibility.
The intuition follows from the different impact of the two shocks on the efficient outputs
and, consequently, in the output gaps. In contrast with the productivity shock, the mark-
up shock should cause large output gap uctuation when prices become more exible.
The combination of all these effects may generate non-linearities that explain why wel-
fare can not behave monotonically with the decrease of the degree of nominal rigidity.
When the reduction of the degree of nominal rigidity occurs only in one of the coun-
tries, the monetary policy becomes apt to inuence and control the terms-of-trade gap
variability. Since the variability of this policy instrument has no direct welfare costs, idio-
syncratic shocks can be stabilized at a lower cost. Hence, there can be lower welfare costs
for the monetary union, when there is high price exibility in only one of the countries.
Welfare losses computations, under cooperative and non-cooperative benevolent sce-
narios, for different degrees of nominal rigidities are reported in Tables D.11-D.14. They
confirm that the stabilization costs of the two supply shocks evolve differently with the
degree of nominal exibility (+). Raising the degree of nominal exibility symmetri-
cally in both countries increases the welfare stabilization costs of the mark-up shocks and,
for high enough degrees of price exibility, decreases the stabilization costs of the pro-
ductivity shocks (Table D.13). In fact, similarly to the findings of Lombardo (2002), we
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find a non-monotonic relationship between the welfare stabilization costs of productivity
shocks and nominal rigidity: the latter decreases welfare up to a point where more rigid-
ity becomes welfare-improving.48 The small and more open economy, being the more
affected by the larger uctuation of relative prices, loses with a larger price exibility,
while the large economy benefits (Tables D.12 and D.14).
Our results suggest that, while focusing exclusively on the welfare consequences of
stabilization policies, structural reforms that reduce symmetrically nominal rigidity across
countries of a monetary union are likely to have a negative effect on welfare. In our dy-
namic model, sticky-prices distortion acquires a second-best quality when coupled with
internal and external monopolistic distortions (monopolistic supply in production and
monopoly power of a country in trade).49 Our results also suggest that in a country-size
asymmetric monetary union, these reforms could be welcomed by the large economies
but would face the contest of the small economies.
Under country-size symmetry, allowing asymmetry on price stickiness, that is, de-
creasing the degree of nominal rigidity in only one of the countries is welfare enhancing
for the union and for the country that remains with more nominal rigidity. The country
that carried out structural reform and raises its price exibility only gains when this ex-
ibility becomes high enough (cf. Tables D.11 and D.12).5051 Hence, in a monetary union
where the effects of the productivity shocks dominate, it could be good to accomplish an
asymmetric structural reform but this could hardly be fulfilled, given the probable resis-
tance of the country that is the object of the reform.
Decreasing the degree of nominal rigidity in the small country raises welfare from the
viewpoint of a representative household of the monetary union and of the large country
the small country only gains with the “reform” if this substantially reduces the degree of
See Lombardo (2002, p.30) for a rationale of this result.
	See Lombardo (2006) for similar argument on the degree of monopolistic distortion.

From inspection of Table D.14, one concludes that the specific calibration of the productivity shocks
relative to the mark-up shocks is crucial to explain those results. The welfare stabilization costs of the
mark-up shocks always increase with the symmetric or asymmetric raise of the degree of price exibility.
The elimination of the sticky-price distortion only outweighs the other (monopolistic) distortions
when it is high enough.
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nominal rigidity. The large country faces no incentive to implement a structural reform
that raises domestic price exibility.
In order to match the short-run dynamics exhibited by ination we considered, in the
model, the existence of rule-of-thumb price-setters. This generates ination persistence
affecting both the AS and the welfare equations. In general, it conduces to smooth paths
in ination but also in the policy instruments. Blake and Kirsanova (2006) and Walsh
(2003), in different settings, study how ination persistence affects the ranking of policy
rules. In experiments not reported here we did not find any significant change on the pol-
icy ranking. Table D.15, for some representative values of ination persistence (  ')
and the benchmark policy regime, suggests that decreasing symmetrically across coun-
tries the degree of ination persistence (increase of ') is welfare improving. However, as
in the case of nominal rigidity, the two supply shocks display divergent stabilization per-
formance with the change on the degree of ination persistence. The stabilization of the
productivity shock is enhanced with smaller ination persistence while that of the mark-
up shock is worse. In general, countries would not face any incentive for, individually,
accomplishing some type of reform that reduces their ination persistence. Our results
suggest that a small country may configure an exception and may benefit from lower do-
mestic ination persistence.
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3. POLICY ANALYSIS IN A MODEL WITH DEBT
Beforehand, we performed the policy analysis in an environment where the sole fis-
cal policy instrument was public spending and where the lump-sum taxes were adjusted
to ensure the satisfaction of the contemporaneous (and, thus, inter-temporal) government
budget constraints. The monetary and the fiscal policy instruments exerted both their sta-
bilization effects on the economy through the demand channel without any consequences
for debt sustainability. In the benevolent cooperative scenario, the home- biased and use-
ful government spending substitutes the use of the monetary policy that, in a monetary
union, is unable to address the effects of idiosyncratic shocks. In accordance with the re-
sults obtained by Beetsma and Jensen (2004, 2005), we have concluded that optimal fiscal
policy specializes in stabilizing relative variables while optimal monetary policy concen-
trates on the stabilization of the union-wide variables.
In a more realistic setting, where fiscal policy makes use of home-biased government
spending but also of distortionary taxes, and where lump-sum taxes are not enough to
guarantee fiscal policy solvency, there are additional sources of strategic interactions be-
tween the fiscal and the monetary authorities that, naturally, have important consequences
for the design of the optimal stabilization policies. Now, monetary policy impinges on
government budget constraints affecting the costs of the debt service, the real burden of
public debt and the tax basis income. Moreover, although we have eliminated the long-
run distortionary effects of the tax rate through a production subsidy that ensures an effi-
cient steady-state outcome, the use of the tax rate as a fiscal policy instrument introduces
short-run distortions that may be welcomed in order to counteract other distortions. From
the AS equations, we observe that the inationary effect of a cost-push shock is parallel
to the one produced by a change in the tax rate. Therefore, this fiscal policy instrument
can be successfully used to offset the impact of this shock.
However, if, on the one hand, stabilization gains arise from having another fiscal pol-
icy instrument, on the other hand, we have to be cautions with potential losses arising
from the possible conict between the short-run macroeconomic stabilization task and
the long-run debt stabilization task, which occurs due to the insufficient adjustment of
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lump-sum taxes. Furthermore, the relative efficiency of the monetary and the fiscal pol-
icy instruments to control public debt depends on the size of the debt stock. The larger
the steady-state debt-output ratio is, the greater the efficacy of monetary policy to stabi-
lize debt through its accrued impact on the debt-service costs. Hence, the optimal discre-
tionary stabilization policy plan and the role played by the fiscal and monetary policies
also depend on the debt-stock level. To appreciate the intuition of the discretionary policy
outcomes, it is important to understand the nature of the time-inconsistency problems un-
derlying pre-commitment policies. As Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007a) have demonstrated
in a closed-economy setup, policymakers face the temptation, given the expectations,
to use their policy instruments to change the ultimate debt burden they need to service.
This temptation is eliminated if the debt-output ratio returns to its pre-shock steady-sate.
Hence, in the discretionary solutions the policy instruments are changed to accomplish
short-run macroeconomic stabilization but also debt stabilization and, since they perform
differently these stabilization tasks when debts are small and large, the optimal policy
plans will reect a specialization of the policy instruments according to the debt levels.
As it will become evident subsequently, this specialization is not evident under op-
timal committed policies, where public debt does not return to its pre-shock level and
displays random walk behaviour.52 The optimal commitment policy plans ensure lower
short-run variability but a permanent disequilibrium in the debt-output ratio and in some
welfare-related variables. Conversely, the optimal discretionary policy plans produce
higher short-run volatility but long-term equilibriums.
These results suggest that the problems with time-consistent policies may reside in
their excessive concern with debt stabilization and, consequently, that it may be welfare-
reducing to impose fiscal policy constraints aiming at a strict stabilization of the debt-
output ratio. Effectively, our experiments confirm that constant-debt fiscal policy rules
lead to worse welfare outcomes than the ones obtained under unconstrained discretionary
policies, both with benevolent and non-benevolent policymakers.
This result is consistent with the ones found by Benigno and Woodford (2003), Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2004), Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007a, 2007b) and Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2006).
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Other institutional arrangements such as policy cooperation and the delegation of
monetary policy to a conservative central bank could mitigate the time-consistency prob-
lems and improve welfare. We will scrutinize the welfare consequences of these solutions
in a high-debt and in a low-debt monetary union where the member-countries have either
symmetric or asymmetric size. Furthermore, we will appraise how fiscal authorities that
are less averse to ination variability than society affect the stabilization outcome.
Finally, in the next section, we will characterize and evaluate optimal policies under
benevolent policy scenarios. Next, we will perform policy analysis under non-benevolent
policy scenarios and we conclude with a sensitivity analysis in an attempt to address some
specific additional questions.
3.1 Benevolent policy authorities
3.1.1 Adjustments to shocks under country-size symmetry
In what follows, we begin with analyzing stabilization properties associated to the
optimal discretionary cooperative regime. This involves the dynamic responses of the rel-
evant endogenous variables to three symmetric exogenous pure white-noise shocks in or-
der to sharpen the perception about the adjustment mechanisms involved.53 Subsequently,
we compare these outcomes with the ones obtained under the first best policies, the non-
cooperative discretionary policies and the monetary discretionary policy with a constant-
debt fiscal policy rule.
We have checked, by examining eigenvalues, that the solutions are saddle-path stable
for large debt stocks. However, for small debt-output ratios, the number of eigenvalues
inside the unit circle are larger than the number of pre-determined variables. This is usu-
ally seen as a case of model indeterminacy but, Blake and Kirsanova (2007) argue that
We follow Benigno and López-Salido (2006), Ferrero (2007) and Beetsma and Jensen (2005), among
others, that also perform the dynamic analysis by setting the autocorrelation coefficient of the shocks to
zero.
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the time-consistency property of the discretionary equilibria rules out this indeterminacy.
Nevertheless, these authors also demonstrate that isolated discretionary multiple equilib-
ria are likely to occur. We also have checked this possibility, by initializing the algorithms
with different matrices, and we did not find evidence of this hypothesis for our debt cali-
brations.
Benchmark scenario: discretionary coordinated policies Without accommodative
lump-sum taxes, both symmetric and asymmetric shocks have budgetary consequences
and require policy responses of the monetary and fiscal policy instruments. In spite of the
inexistence of any debt target in the social loss function, the optimal policy plan under
discretion reveals to be consistent with debt stabilization. Given expectations, the pol-
icymakers face the temptation to use policy instruments, in the first period, to mitigate
permanent debt effects. This provides an effective stabilization of the steady-state debt-
output ratio at its initial value, under discretion. This excessive optimal policy response
to debt disequilibria magnifies the differences relative to our previous setup, where there
were enough lump-sum taxes to satisfy government budget constraints.
Under balanced budget fiscal policies, symmetric productivity and demand shocks
did not create any policy trade-off and, under optimal policies, all the variables could
remain at their efficient levels. Additionally, a symmetric mark-up shock – implying the
usual consumption-ination dilemma - required, in the previous setup, the sole response
of monetary policy to achieve the optimal disequilibrium combination. Under binding
budget constraints, optimal policy responses to symmetric shocks require the use of both
monetary and fiscal policy instruments.
Naturally, in the context of a monetary union, the rationale for the use of the fis-
cal policy as a stabilization tool is mainly found in the need for stabilizing the effects of
country-specific shocks, given the inability of the common monetary policy to fully sta-
bilize this type of shocks. The differences concerning optimal policy responses to sym-
metric and asymmetric shocks were particularly evident in the previous model (Chap.
3), with optimal fiscal policy specializing in the stabilization of the relative effects of
the shocks and with monetary policy concentrating on their aggregate effects. In the
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present setup, optimal fiscal policy also has to stabilize aggregate variables. Moreover,
the steady-state debt-output ratio reveals to be crucial for the policy instruments special-
ization amongst the short-run macroeconomic stabilization and the long-run debt stabi-
lization assignments.
Symmetric shocks
Demand shocks
A positive aggregate consumption shock increases the natural interest rate and de-
creases the efficient provision of public goods.54 If monetary policy could adjust the in-
terest rate in accordance with the natural interest rate and if the fiscal policy could enforce
the same with government spending, this would have been enough to completely circum-
vent the effects of the shock. However, without lump-sum taxes automatically adjusting
to ensure government’s solvency, this policy would have had impact on public debt. De-
pending on the initial steady-state debt-output ratio, this impact can be positive or nega-
tive. For small debt stocks, the raise of the debt service costs is relatively small compared
to the decrease of public spending and the debt is reduced. The reverse can occur for large
debt stocks. Under optimal discretionary policies and binding solvency constraints, the
policy response to a demand shock becomes more moderated because of the additional
constraint to stabilize debt.
Therefore, for small steady-state debt-output ratios, the interest rate gap decreases
(current interest rate raises by less than its efficient natural level), the government spend-
ing gap increases and the tax rate gap decreases in all countries. The decrease in the
tax rates has positive effects in the aggregate supply so that ination falls and the output
gap rises. The overall policy response is expansionist and pro-cyclical. Conversely, for
large debt stocks, the interest rate gap decreases further and fiscal policy becomes con-
tractionary and counter-cyclical: the government spending gaps diminish and the tax rate
gaps increase (see Tables D.16 and D.17 and Figure 13 ). In this case, one observes an
output gap and ination co-movement in line with the ones that are usually expected, af-
This can be easily confirmed by looking to equations 37 and 46 in Chapter 1, above.
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ter a demand side shock: both individual countries and union-wide output gaps and GDP
ination rates increase.
Productivity shocks
A negative productivity shock in both countries lowers output and increases the price
level but, due to the existence of nominal rigidities, it gives rise to positive output gaps in
the two economies. Under a balanced budget, all policy instruments would optimally be
set at their efficient levels and the shock would be fully stabilized. However, without ade-
quate lump-sum taxes, there are also negative budgetary consequences requiring different
policy responses under small and large steady-state debt ratios.
For small debt stocks, the government spending gaps fall and the tax rates increase in
order to stabilize the debt. But, since the raise of distortionary taxation impacts positively
on the marginal costs, there will be additional inationary pressures that the monetary
authority will try to overcome through a restrictive policy. The increase in the interest
rate will moderately raise the debt service cost, given the low debt stocks. For large debt
stocks, the monetary policy may have important fiscal consequences. In this case, the
stabilization of the public debts is done through the combination of a less contractionary
fiscal policy and an expansionary monetary policy. Consequently, and in accordance with
the results reported by Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007a,b), the output and consumption
gaps display negative co-movements with ination under small debt stocks, and exhibit
positive co-movements under large debt stocks (cf. Figure 14).
Mark-up shocks
In a model with automatically adjusting lump-sum taxes, a mark-up shock hitting
a country would be eliminated through the use of the domestic tax rate without welfare
costs. The use of government spending or the interest rate to stabilize the shock would not
be necessary. When it is possible to use the tax rate, without any restrictions, to respond
to a mark-up shock, the trade-off between ination and output is absent.
With binding government solvency constraints, the tax rate can not be freely used to
respond to a mark-up shock because a decrease in the tax rate increases the government
debt. Hence, we expect the tax rate gap to increase with a domestic mark-up shock, as the
tax rate decreases less than the respective optimal level (i.e., the level that fully eliminates
70
POLICY ANALYSIS IN A MODEL WITH DEBT
the mark-up shock). As a consequence, beyond the debt effect, there are also ination and
output effects and there is an active role for other policy instruments.
For small debt stocks, the effectiveness of the fiscal policy instruments in order to
stabilize the debt is larger than for large debt stocks, while the reverse occurs with the
monetary policy instrument. On the one hand, fiscal policy is more restrictive in reaction
to a shock with negative consequences for government budgets, when it is constrained
by small levels of public debt than when it is constrained by large debt stocks. On the
other hand, monetary policy moves from an anti-inationary to a fiscal accommodative
conduct when the debt stocks are large enough. Hence, while for small debt stocks the
initial raise of the interest rate and the cut of the government spending gaps amplify the
negative output effect of the shock, for sufficiently large debt stocks, the drop of the
interest rate boosts consumption enough to neutralize the fall in government spending
gaps and so, the individual country and the aggregate output gaps increase. To alleviate
the accrued inationary pressures in the latter case, the tax rates have to follow the path
of their efficient levels more closely. Consequently, the increase of the tax rate gaps is
smaller when debt stocks are larger (see Figure 15 and Tables D.16 and D.17).
In sum, the relative dimension of government indebtedness crucially shapes the pol-
icy responses to shocks, under discretion. In particular, optimal fiscal policy responds
actively to symmetric shocks and this response, depending on the size of the debt stocks,
may be pro or counter-cyclical. Fiscal policy instruments are used pro-cyclically, when
debts are small, and counter-cyclically, when debts are large.
Asymmetric shocks
Demand-side asymmetric shocks are irrelevant for policy stabilization in our model, given
our assumption of financial market completeness at the international level. Thus, we focus
solely on productivity and mark-up shocks.
Productivity shock
A negative productivity shock at H gives rise to a positive terms-of-trade gap that
inefficiently shifts demand from F goods towards H goods. This has a lowering effect on
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the ination rate and on the output gap at F. Furthermore, there are also different budgetary
consequences for the two countries: negative for H and positive for F.55
Optimal discretionary policy in the cooperative regime requires a fall in the govern-
ment spending gap at H and a rise at F (a positive relative government spending gap), to
alleviate the H ination and the F deation arising from the positive terms-of-trade gap.
This is complemented with a raise in aggregate and relative tax rates and in the interest
rate gap, when the debt stocks are small enough. The raise of the tax rates helps to stabi-
lize debts while the increase in the interest rate gap forbids accrued inationary pressures.
Furthermore, the relative tax rate rise also helps the stabilization of relative ination.
However, with sufficiently large debt-output ratios, the policy roles to prevent exces-
sive ination and to stabilize debt are inverted. As before, monetary policy, through a fall
in the interest rate gap, works to reduce the debt service costs and, the tax rate at H de-
creases, to mitigate the inationary consequences. The optimal monetary policy response
to this shock becomes expansionary while the aggregate fiscal policy remains contrac-
tionary, since the aggregate government spending decreases and the aggregate tax rate
increases. It is worth noting that the optimal response of the tax rates may be overturned,
if the steady-state debt-output ratios are too high. The response to a negative productivity
shock at H may require a decrease in both tax rates and so the aggregate tax rate decreases,
if its inationary consequences become too sharp.
Mark-up shock
A mark-up shock at H raises the domestic production ination rate and decreases
the terms-of-trade gap. This puts inationary pressures on the F country. Because tax
rates can be used as stabilization tools, it is optimal to decrease them to compensate the
augmented mark-up distortions. However, since this has also negative budgetary conse-
quences, the domestic tax rate gap increases, nevertheless, this change will be smaller,
when the interest rate gap helps the stabilization of the debt stock. In effect, in response
to mark-up shock at H, the aggregate tax rate gap increases by a lesser amount when the
debt stocks are large than when they are small.56 Moreover, the interest rate gap increases
At H, the output, and not the output gap, deceases and, thus, the tax receipts diminish. At F, the
output (and the output gap) increases generating a budgetary surplus.
Actually, one observes that the F tax rate gap has to fall, when debts are large, to counteract the
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when debts are small, to mitigate the inationary pressures, and falls when debts are large,
to lessen the debt consequences, while aggregate government spending gap drops, in both
cases. Relative government spending increases to stabilize ination differentials. Addi-
tionally, if we disregard the tax rate gaps and focus on the actual tax rates, we verify that
the relative tax rate raises and facilitates the stabilization of relative ination.
Depending on the debt-output ratio level, the optimal government spending gap may
be pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical. Small debts retain the pro-cyclicality property of the
previous setup, while large debts call for a counter-cyclical government spending rule.
Other policy solutions
Commitment
In order to appraise the main differences between the optimal stabilization policies under
discretion and commitment, we consider the examples of a symmetric and an asymmetric
negative productivity shock. When comparing the responses to these shocks under com-
mitment (Figures 18 and 19) and under discretion (Figures 14 and 16), it is clear that the
welfare-related variables display a lot less volatility under commitment. In contrast, the
values of government debt at maturity (b) are permanently affected while under optimal
discretionary policy debt changes are only temporary. The existence of a unit root in pub-
lic debts that makes them permanently jump to higher permanent levels, under commit-
ment, also characterizes the other fiscal policy variables and the output gaps. Thus, com-
mitment apparently leads to less short-run macroeconomic volatility but to large long-run
variability compared with discretion. Moreover, despite the steady-state debt-output ratio,
the monetary policy instrument, in the first period, slightly accommodates the negative
budgetary consequences of the shocks and boosts ination while, in subsequent periods,
returns to its pre-shock level.
In the first period, there is the temptation, given ination expectations, to exploit
the AS equations and generate an extra source of debt financing – unexpected ination
– that reduces the need to adjust the other instruments. This allows the fiscal policy
excessive inationary pressures resulting from the decrease in the interest rate gap.
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instruments to accomplish a better stabilization of the welfare-related variables, in the first
period. Beyond the first period, ination expectations can no more be exploited under the
commitment solution, and the fiscal policy instruments have to be adjusted to sustain the
new steady-state debt stocks. The temptation to use the policy instruments, in the first
period, to reduce the debt-disequilibrium and to mitigate the costs of supporting the new
debt levels is eliminated, in subsequent periods, only if the debt-output ratios return to
their pre-shock levels. Hence, time-consistent discretionary solutions eliminate the unit
root result and are extremely sensitive to the levels of the steady-state debt-output ratios
(see Leith and Wren-Lewis, Feb. 2007, for a more complete analysis on this).
Looking at the short-run properties of the optimal policy plans under commitment
and under discretion, we conclude that balanced budget policies present larger similitude
with the former than with the latter.
Discretionary non-coordinated policies
Assuming that fiscal authorities are biased towards the satisfaction of their own citizens’
well-being and, thus, do not cooperate while optimally choosing their own policies, the
possibility of different optimal discretionary responses, correspondent to different policy
games, are introduced.
From the comparison of the feedback coefficients on the shocks of the monetary
policy instrument in Tables D.18 and D.19 with their corresponding counterparts in Table
D.16, we conclude that, for small steady-state debt-output ratios, the monetary policy
response to the various shocks, under the non-cooperative regimes and, in particular, the
Nash regime, is qualitatively the same as the one observed in the cooperative regime
but it is, globally, less active (less restrictive). In contrast, when all the countries in a
monetary union have large debt stocks, monetary policy accommodates the negative debt
consequences of the negative supply shocks and of the positive demand shock more and,
thus, becomes more expansionary. This contributes to the differences observed in the
variability of the consumption gap and in the variance of the ination rates in the Nash
and the cooperative policy regimes. When debts are small, the consumption gap is better
stabilized while the ination rates are worse stabilized under the non-cooperative Nash
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game than under the full cooperative regime the reverse occurs for large debt stocks (see
Figures 20, 21, 22 and 23, for a symmetric and an asymmetric negative productivity shock
cases under both policy regimes and small and large debts). We should also remark that
the uctuations of the real value of debt at maturity are larger (smaller) when debts are
small (large). Obviously, these results are mainly explained by the conducting policy of
H and F fiscal authorities. To exemplify these adjustments, we pursue with the analysis
of the reaction to a negative and non-persistent productivity shock at H, under the non-
cooperative setup.
With large debt stocks, a negative productivity shock at H leads to a decrease in the
domestic tax rate and government spending gaps to control the inationary impulse. The
decrease in the tax rate exacerbates the terms-of-trade gap deviation and the impact on F,
while the converse occurs with the movement of the government spending gap. Hence, the
domestic non-cooperative government makes less active use of the government spending
gap and more active use of the tax rate gap. This aggravates the budget consequences and
so, there has to be a stronger fall in the interest rate gap to pursue debt stabilization. Since
the fiscal policy instruments of the F government inict symmetric externalities, the tax
rate gap raises with more moderation and the government spending gaps increases to a
greater extent, at F.
Low debt stocks and non-cooperative regimes require, instead, more moderate re-
sponses from the monetary policy and the domestic fiscal policy instruments, but a more
active response from the F fiscal authority. Basically, this difference in the feedback co-
efficients of the H and F fiscal instruments is explained by the non-internalization of the
positive (negative) spillover effect of the fiscal policy at H (F) in the ination rate at F
(H).57 While the fiscal policy at H attenuates the change in the terms-of-trade gap and,
thus, diminishes the externalities of the shock, the fiscal policy at F accentuates it, aggra-
vating the inationary pressures at H. Domestically-oriented fiscal authorities ignore the
outside effects and use their policy instruments more moderately when they impose posi-
tive externalities (H) and more vigorously when these inict negative externalities (F).
Notice that the tax rate gaps raises in both countries, for low debt countries.
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This reasoning also explains the policy responses to symmetric shocks. Under small
debt stocks, the benevolent, but purely domestically-oriented fiscal authorities, ignore the
positive spillover effect of the fiscal policy and set their policy instruments sub-optimally
(see Figure 20). Under large debt stocks, both fiscal authorities face incentives to use their
tax rates more heavily (because of their non-internalized negative spillover effects) while
the reduction in the government spending gaps, causing positive spillover effects, is less
accentuated. The tax rates’ behaviour in the non-cooperative setting increases debts and,
thus, the monetary policy has to be looser (see Figure 21).
In this context, the playing order has an important role on the strategic policy in-
teractions and deserves some reection. We will perform the analysis of the leadership
regimes by comparison with the Nash regime, where it is assumed that the policymakers
act simultaneously. We focus on the responses to symmetric shocks.
When fiscal authorities are Stackelberg leaders relative to the monetary authority,
they anticipate that the latter is more concerned with union-wide variables than with do-
mestic variables. The fiscal authorities, biased towards maximizing domestic welfare, try
to overcome this by performing more active policies than under Nash. In particular, in
response to a negative productivity shock, they would raise the tax rates more when debts
are small, while the central bank raises the interest rate gap, and reduces the tax rates
when debts are large, while the central bank decreases the interest rate gap.
Under a monetary leadership regime, the central bank understands that the fiscal
authorities are biased towards the performance of the domestic welfare-related variables.
The monetary authority perceives that governments conduce less active polices, when
debts are small, and decrease the tax rates further, when debts are large, than they would
if their preferences were in accordance with enhancing the union-wide welfare. Hence,
the monetary authority should perform a more active stabilization policy when debts are
small and a less active policy when debts are large.
In spite of these specificities of the policy interactions under the various non-cooperative
regimes, the policy reaction functions and the impulse responses are not substantially dif-
ferent. In general, when debts are small, the impact on consumption and government
spending gaps is quantitatively smaller under the non-cooperative regimes than under the
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full cooperation regime. When debts are large, the latter performs a slightly better sta-
bilization of the consumption gap but the ination rates and the public spending gaps
display larger volatility.
Fiscal policy rules
In order to discuss the stabilization consequences of imposing constraints on fiscal policy,
we consider a constant debt rule for the government spending gap. In practice, this rule
implies that a positive enough real surplus must be created every period to cover the net
interest rate spending on outstanding real debt. In addition, we assume that the tax rates
are set at their efficient levels so that the tax rate gaps are zero.58 From the observation
of the impulse responses to the several shocks, it is easy to conclude that such policy
rule, combined with an optimal discretionary monetary policy, delivers much more short-
run volatility (Figures 24 and 25 exemplify these findings). The feedback coefficients
of the interest rate gap on negative supply and positive demand shocks are negative, and
broadly independent of the steady-state debt-output ratios (see Table D.16 and D.17).
This is explained by the negative impact on inations and output gaps when government
spending gaps adjust to maintain debt. This negative impact has to be alleviated through
an expansionary monetary policy.
3.1.2 Insights for a monetary union with country-size asymmetry
Symmetric shocks We would expect the policy responses to symmetric shocks to be
the same in a full symmetric setup and in a setup where the exclusive source of asymme-
try is the relative size of the union-country members. Effectively, while the cooperative
We have also considered the case of the tax rate adjustment to maintain constant debt while
government spending is set at its efficient level. Naturally, this hypothesis imposes lower welfare costs,
because the tax rate does not directly affects welfare. However, one may think that this hypothesis is
more difficult to implement namely for political economy reasons thus implying a greater volatility in the
tax rates. Nevertheless, if we took away the assumption of removing the long-run distortions through an
employment subsidy, this debt constant rule would possibly have larger welfare effects.
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solutions are in accordance with this conjecture, under non-cooperative nationally-biased
fiscal authorities, this does not hold.
Country-size asymmetry does not affect the policy reactions in the cooperative regime:
the large and the small country equally share the stabilization burden of the symmetric
shocks. However, under the non-cooperative scenarios and large debt stocks, it is the
small country that undertakes the more active fiscal policy stabilization role while the re-
verse occurs for small debt stocks (cf. Tables D.20, D.21, D.22 and D.23). Hence, in the
non-cooperative setups, aggregate (gw and tw) and the relative (gr and tr) fiscal policies
are both used to stabilize symmetric shocks.
Once more, we make use of a symmetric negative productivity shock as a meaningful
example to get the intuition of this result.
When a symmetric negative productivity shock hits a large country and debt stocks
are small, the domestic government spending gap falls and there is a raise in the domestic
tax rate that attenuates the spillover effects of the shock by reducing the terms-of-trade
gap variability (Table D.22). This positive externality of the fiscal policy is ignored under
a non-cooperative setup and, thus, the fiscal authority uses its instrument less actively. If
the two countries are of equal size, both take the same measures with equal intensity. A
large country imposes larger externalities but the weight attributed to the small country
in the social loss is in accordance with its relative size, that is, a small weight. When the
fiscal authority of the large country is only concerned with the welfare of its citizens, it
looks for the large part of the social loss. Hence, it will make use of its fiscal instruments
less actively but to a minor degree than the fiscal authority of the small country would do.
For this reason, the large country performs a more active fiscal policy in comparison to
the small country.
If the spillover effects of the fiscal policy are negative, as it happens with large debt
stocks, both fiscal authorities would be more active than in the cooperative setup as to
the use of the tax rate. But, the fiscal authority of the large country will face a relatively
smaller incentive for more active fiscal policies. Hence, larger volatility in fiscal policy
instruments is expected in small countries.
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Asymmetric shocks Under the full cooperative regime, the optimal policy response to
a negative supply shock that hits the large (H) country requires a more active use of the
monetary policy instrument and of the fiscal policy instruments of the small (F) country.
Marginal costs and ination rates for smaller and more open economies are more inu-
enced by a change in the relative prices and, thus, F fiscal policy instruments have to be
more actively used to counteract the effects of an idiosyncratic shock in the large country
the larger spillover effects of the domestic (H) fiscal policy instruments are not enough to
compensate for cross-border effects of the shocks.
The optimal use of the fiscal policy instruments of the large country depends on the
relative size of the debt stocks. In a low debt environment, the larger increase of the
interest rate gap relative to the adjustment when the countries are of equal size has sharp
negative budget consequences requiring a stronger increase in the domestic tax rate gap.
In a high debt environment, the interest rate gap falls more to help the stabilization of the
debt while the domestic fiscal policy instruments, now attached to the stabilization of the
short-run effects of the shock, suffer a more moderated variation.
When an idiosyncratic shock hits a small country, one observes that the feedback co-
efficients on this shock of the monetary policy and of the foreign fiscal policy instruments
are lower than under the symmetric monetary union. Again, we would expect a larger us-
age of the policy instruments by the F country. Effectively, one verifies that in a low debt
union environment, the fiscal policy instruments of the small country are less actively
used in response to a mark-up shock.59 In all other cases, the fiscal policy instruments of
the small country display a large active stabilization role.
From the comparison of the fiscal and monetary policy feedback coefficients under
the full cooperative regime with the non-cooperative Nash regime, we can conclude that
the changes on the parameters are similar to the ones observed in the low-debt country-
size symmetry case (Tables D.20 and D.22). For instance, under the Nash regime, the
optimal monetary and domestic fiscal policy responses to a negative supply shock hitting
the large country are less active whereas, by contrast, the small country has to perform
	It is important to remark that the small feedback coefficient of the tax rate gap in this shock means a
stronger adjustment in the tax rate.
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a more active stabilization policy. By analyzing Figure 28 and 29, it is apparent that, in
a low-debt environment, the Nash allows for a better stabilization of the output gaps and
worsens the stabilization of the ination rates, when compared to cooperation.
However, when departing from full cooperation, for large debt stocks, the feedback
coefficients of the policy instruments do not move in line with what was observed for the
symmetric union (Tables D.21 and D.23). In particular, and differently from what occurs
in the symmetric setup, the interest rate gap decreases a reduced amount whereas the
tax rates decrease by more in the Nash regime than under full cooperation, in response
to a mark-up shock in the large country. Consequently, and regarding Figure 26, the
welfare-related variables display less volatility in the non-cooperative regime, while the
government debt of the large country exhibits higher variability. We should remark as well
that the monetary policy in the Nash non-cooperative regime is also globally looser than
under full cooperation, in response to negative supply shock hitting the small country, and
that the domestic F government spending gap and the domestic F tax rate experience larger
uctuations (cf. Tables D.21 and D.23 and Figure 27).60 In practice, and as cooperation
is concerned, optimal policy under Nash enhances stabilization when the shocks hit the
large country and worsens stabilization if the shocks mainly hit the small country.
Country-size asymmetry may take especial relevance in policy interactions and in
the respective stabilization outcome, when policymakers face divergent policy objectives
and can benefit from having a first-move advantage. Particularly, we expect the fiscal
leadership regime to benefit the large country more, which would successfully impose the
fulfillment of its own policy objectives to the central bank and also to the other country.
The small country, having lower strategic power, would benefit more with a monetary
leadership regime with a central bank serving its policy on the union-wide interests. For
the union as a whole it is not clear which regime would perform a better stabilization
outcome, given the benevolent policy objectives.

When there is a positive mark-up shock, the efficient tax rate decreases to eliminate the mark-up
distortion. If the actual tax rate does not go alongside its efficient level, the tax rate gap increases. This
raise is larger, the smaller the decrease of the tax rate is. In the present case, the positive feedback
coefficient of the F tax rate gap on the F mark-up shock is smaller under Nash than under full cooperation.
Thus, the tax rate has decreased by more under the Nash regime.
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In fact, our experiments do not display significant differences among the various
non-cooperative regimes. The divergence between the fiscal and the monetary leadership
policy regimes, under countries size-asymmetry, is apparent on the monetary policy re-
sponse to a mark-up shock hitting the small or the large country. For instance, in a high-
debt environment, the interest rate gap more accommodates the budgetary consequences
of a positive mark-up shock that hits a large country under fiscal leadership than under
monetary leadership. Diversely, the monetary policy responds more to a mark-up shock
in the small country, under the monetary leadership than under the fiscal leadership policy
regime.61
Finally, it is worth noting that, for any of the debt levels, when fiscal authorities are
constrained by constant-debt rules, the interest rate gap decreases when the countries are
hit by negative asymmetric supply shocks. This reduction is naturally more intense the
larger the country hit by the shock. It is obvious from the inspection of the impulse-
responses that, so seriously constraining fiscal policy, gives rise to larger short-run uctu-
ations.
3.1.3 Welfare analysis
There are many factors that globally affect the performance of the stabilization poli-
cies. In particular, the relative size of the government debt stocks, the type and frequency
of shocks in the monetary union, the existence of country-size asymmetry and, obviously,
the structure of the optimizing policy games played by the policymakers. Some of these
dimensions were not considered in our previous model or took less relevance there. For
instance, in that model, the fiscal policy instrument was reduced to the government spend-
ing gap fully accommodated by sufficient lump-sum taxes thus, fiscal solvency constraint
was not binding. Hence, the stabilization of the long-run effects of the shocks over the
This different behaviour can be easily confirmed by looking at the feedback coefficient in these
shocks in Table D.22. Under fiscal leadership, the interest rate gap decreases 0.2294 in response to a
mark-up shock hitting the large country (H) and falls 0.1957 under the monetary leadership. The optimal
feedback coefficients on the mark-up shock of the small country are naturally small under both policy
regimes but, the interest rate gap decreases by 0.1582 when the central bank leads and decreases slightly
less (0.1547) when the fiscal authorities lead the monetary authority.
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debt was not a problem as it is the case with the current setup. It has also been showed
that time-inconsistency problems are much more important in the debt model and, thus,
the optimal benevolent cooperative plan under commitment diverges substantially from
the corresponding discretionary policy plan. This raises some relevant questions that can
be addressed even in benevolent policy setups.
First, since time-inconsistency problems are magnified by the budgetary consequences
of the monetary policy, we speculate on the desirability of constraining fiscal policy to the
exclusive control of the real value of debt.62 Following Ferrero (2007), we tackle this is-
sue by evaluating the welfare consequences when imposing a rigid fiscal policy rule: the
government spending gap is adjusted to ensure, in each period, a constant real value of
the debt, while the tax rate is set equal to its efficient value.63 This reects a more rigid
interpretation of the fiscal policy rules embedded in the Maastricht Treaty and in the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact, but it conveniently illustrates the potential costs of an excessive
concern with debt stabilization.
A second pertinent question to be addressed relies on the desirability to enhance
macroeconomic policy coordination. In the context of the EMU, this issue has two di-
mensions: horizontal policy coordination (coordination among the fiscal authorities of
the union country-members) and vertical coordination (coordination among the fiscal
and the monetary authorities). The arguments favouring these institutional arrangements
fall on the existence of spillovers between the fiscal and the monetary policies and on
the free-riding problem.64 Some of the coordination sceptics emphasise the extra time-
inconsistency problems which arise from the larger strategic-power of coordinated fiscal
authorities with different preferences as to those of the central bank.65 Others extend their
Political economy literature adds arguments on the specificity of the fiscal policy process that
rationalize the imposition of balanced budget rules.
This implies, in practice, that the tax rate fully stabilizes a mark-up shock. Setting the tax rate equal
to its steady-state value does not change, qualitatively, the results we obtained.
See Uhlig (2003) for an example of a static model on this free-riding problem.
See Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998) on this argument and Catenaro and Tirelli (2000) and Pina
(1999) on the discussion of its generality.
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scepticism to the benefits of monetary and fiscal policy coordination.66 Effectively, the
debate on the gains of macroeconomic policy coordination is still active.
Within our current setup, the sources of strategic interactions between the various
policymakers are scarce because they are benevolent and policy objectives only diverge
because governments are domestically-oriented. Here, fiscal policy cooperation also cor-
responds to full policy cooperation, given the coincidence of the monetary and fiscal
policy objectives. Moreover, through a production subsidy we eliminate the steady-sate
sources of suboptimal policy outcomes associated to discretionary policies, such as “in-
ation bias”, but the time-inconsistency problems associated to stabilization policies still
remain. In practice, providing full policy cooperation when policymakers decide sequen-
tially may, or may not, reinforce their incentives to exploit predetermined ination expec-
tations. The argument follows the same of the Rogoff (1985) when recast in a dynamic
setting: making policymakers diverge from socially desirable objectives may approximate
the discretionary stabilization solution to the optimal commitment outcome. Hence, it is
relevant to appraise if there are gains when enhancing policy cooperation, when policy-
makers determine their policies period-by-period in an optimizing manner.
Finally, the movement order in optimizing fiscal and monetary policy games is crit-
ical on the strategic policy interactions and the stabilization outcomes, when there are
diverging policy objectives.67 This takes especial relevance when the two countries have
different relative sizes and the stabilizations costs are unequally spread over them.
The existence of a micro-founded welfare criterion allows for the evaluation and the
ranking of the different policy stabilization outcomes and to address the above-mentioned
questions, using the benchmark parameter combination. Tables D.32 and D.34 report the
union-wide welfare losses under the various optimal policy regimes, in a monetary union
exclusively hit by idiosyncratic shocks and by symmetric shocks, respectively Tables
See Beetsma and Debrun (2004) for an extensive overview of a recent research on the interactions
between fiscal and monetary policy in the EMU.
In static frameworks, Dixit and Lambertini (2000 and 2001) and Lambertini (2006) found that the
Nash equilibrium is more extreme and worse than the leadership equilibria. In dynamic settings, Kirsanova
et al (2005) found that the Nash equilibrium results in large welfare losses while Blake and Kirsanova (
2006) verified that, in most cases, the Nash gives more active policy reactions and better social outcomes
than the leadership policy games.
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D.33 and D.35 show the welfare losses for each country using, as an approximation to the
correct welfare criterion,68 the welfare losses obtained from the split-off the union-wide
loss function. This intends to capture the traditional argument for the use of the fiscal
policy as a stabilization tool when the monetary policy is unable to undertake the stabi-
lization of country-specific shocks. However, in our current model and differently from
the previous no-debt model, the stabilization of the symmetric shocks also requires the
use of fiscal policies, even under full cooperation. Notwithstanding, the policy trade-offs
and the strategic interactions among fiscal and monetary policymakers are less important
for the stabilization of symmetric shocks and, as expected, a monetary union where sym-
metric shocks prevail, benefits from a larger welfare than a monetary union where asym-
metric shocks dominate. Our experiments confirm this result (cf. Tables D.32 and D.34)
and they also allow us to conclude that:
 Welfare losses are larger under discretion and in a monetary union with equal-sized coun-
tries.69 The representative household of the large country is clearly beneficiated, compared
to that of the small country, with the policy stabilization of idiosyncratic shocks.
 Constraining fiscal authorities, in order to follow constant-debt policy rules, has a sub-
stantial negative impact on stabilization performance, independently of the steady-state
debt-output ratios. This follows from the excessive response of the government spend-
ing gaps to debt deviations. This extreme variability is a direct source of welfare costs but
also an indirect one, by raising the variance of the other welfare-related variables. Fur-
thermore, when comparing the welfare losses under these fiscal policy constraints with
the ones obtained under the more favorable policy regime for each country, we verify that
the big country looses less than the small country, when debts are small, but it loses
relatively more, when debts are large.
 Relative to non-cooperative setups, discretionary policy cooperation worsens the union-
Benigno and Benigno (2006) derive the quadratic utility-based objective functions for each country,
to analyze the case of non-coordinated monetary policies. This requires second-order approximations of
the structural equations of the model and it is algebraically cumbersome.
	Equal-size countries in a monetary union lead, in practice, to more asymmetry on shocks at the union
level than in the case where country-size differs. Hence, stabilization is expected to be more difficult to
perform in a monetary union with equal size countries.
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wide welfare in a small-debt monetary union and, is welfare-enhancing in a large-debt
monetary union (Table D.32, cfr. Lcoop with LML through LNash). Hence, divergent
policy objectives may mitigate the time-inconsistency problems, when debts are small
and, raise them, when debts are large.70 When countries are of different size, the co-
operative solution is preferred by the small country, but only in a large debt environ-
ment. The large country prefers not to cooperate (Table D.33).
 Among the non-cooperative regimes, and from the whole union standpoint, the mone-
tary leadership policy regime performs better stabilization of the shocks, while the fis-
cal leadership depicts the worse stabilization performance (Table D.32). The large coun-
try, whose government benefits from having a large strategic power vis-à-vis the other pol-
icymakers, is better-off under fiscal leadership or Nash (respectively, for large and small
debt-stocks), while the small country clearly benefits from being in the monetary lead-
ership regime.
In sum, from our numerical analysis it is apparent that: there are welfare costs from
constraining fiscal policy to strictly stabilize the debt-output ratio full policy cooperation
is only welfare-enhancing in a large-debt monetary union but this regime would be dif-
ficult to implement because the large country prefers to be in non-cooperative regimes
among the non-cooperative regimes, the monetary leadership results in smaller union-
wide welfare losses and it reveals to be the best solution for the small country.
3.2 Non-benevolent scenarios
In the following section, we will analyze the policy interactions that arise when the
fiscal and the monetary authorities have distorted policy objectives. We focus on the cases
of a weight-conservative central bank and of output-biased fiscal authorities, because they

Large debts accentuate the dilemma between short-run and long-run stabilization missions and, at
the same time, change the relative stabilization roles of the fiscal and the monetary policy instruments.
Allowing policymakers to deviate from the social welfare objective aggravates the outcomes when debts
are large, because the monetary policy becomes looser. Small debt stocks keep monetary policy consigned
to the stabilization of the short-run effects of the shocks. In this case, benevolent non-cooperative regimes
moderate the monetary and the aggregate fiscal policy responses to the shocks, reducing the variance of the
welfare-related variables and, thus, increasing welfare.
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exemplify two different but concurrent argumentations on the policy stabilization debate.
On the one hand, delegating monetary policy to a weight-conservative central bank is cur-
rently seen as a potential solution to reduce the time-inconsistency problems of policy
stabilization. On the other hand, these time-inconsistency problems are seen to be ag-
gravated by specific incentives of the fiscal authorities. The political economy literature
highlights several motivations that potentially result in fiscal laxity and in wrong policy
mix. Hence, whereas fiscal authorities especially concerned with output variability are
expected to aggravate policy stabilization problems, delegating monetary policy to a cen-
tral bank more averse than society to ination variability is an institutional arrangement
usually referred to as a solution to mitigate such stabilization problems.
In this context, we begin to appraise how the weight-conservative hypothesis shapes
the policy responses to the shocks under monetary and fiscal leadership policy regimes71
and, then, follow with the case of fiscal authorities biased towards output gap stabilization.
3.2.1 Adjustments to shocks
Conservative central bank and benevolent domestically-oriented governments Our
experiments show that delegating monetary policy to a conservative central bank mag-
nifies its response to shocks, particularly under monetary leadership. The benevolent,
domestically-oriented, fiscal authorities try to compensate this overreaction by conduct-
ing less restrictive fiscal policies. In fact, on impact72 and in relation to the benevolent
scenario, the fiscal authorities decrease by less the government spending gaps and, de-
pending on the debt-stock levels, decrease by more or raise by less the tax rates in re-
sponse to shocks that have domestic inationary consequences.73
For a more straightforward analysis, we focus on the fiscal leadership and the monetary leadership
regimes, the two regimes that exhibit more extreme welfare outcomes under the benevolent setups.
We focus the analysis on the first-period policy interactions to shocks.
Cf. the coefficients of the policy reaction functions under monetary and fiscal leadership in Tables
D.24 and D.25 with the corresponding coefficients in Tables D.18 and D.19 for the same policy games but
benevolent policymakers.
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From the inspection of the impulse responses to symmetric and asymmetric shocks,
one verifies that the variables maintain, in general, the same trajectories of the benevolent
setups, but the weight-conservative hypothesis increases the volatility of the consumption
gap while it decreases the variance of the ination rates and that of the government spend-
ing gaps. It is also important to remark that this institutional arrangement provokes larger
variability on the real value of debts at maturity (see Figure 30 and 31 for symmetric
shocks and 32 and 33 for asymmetric shocks, under benevolent and weight-conservative
monetary leadership).
In fact, these overall results have slightly different expressions when the monetary
authority plays first relative to both fiscal authorities and when it behaves as a follower.
In the fiscal leadership policy game, the fiscal authorities, anticipating that the monetary
authority will fight more aggressively the inationary stress than they judge as desir-
able, follow even less restrictive fiscal policies than in the corresponding benevolent case.
When the conservative central bank policy leads the fiscal authorities, the former knows
that the latter policymakers are not sufficiently concerned with ination variability. As ex-
pected, the central bank will raise by more the interest rate gap in response to shocks that
have inationary consequences, but only when debts are small. However, in a high-debt
monetary union, the central bank decreases the interest rate gap in response to a shock
that has negative budgetary consequences, while governments have to reduce the gov-
ernment spending gaps and the tax rates to provide short-run stabilization. However, the
benevolent fiscal authorities ponder ination variability less than the monetary authority
does. To force fiscal authorities to adopt policies more in accordance to its preferences,
the monetary authority ends up decreasing the interest rate gap more than it would do in
the benevolent setup. In practice, as to the fiscal leadership regime, the monetary leader-
ship regime exacerbates the response of the interest rate gap to shocks but this conducting
policy only improves ination stabilization for large debts (see Figures 34 and 35).
Output-biased fiscal authorities and benevolent central bank We follow Blake and
Kirsanova (Oct. 2006) by considering a specification that is equivalent to the one used
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for the weight-conservative scenario: we assume that the fiscal authorities penalize the
variability of the welfare demand-related terms relatively more than society does.
Fiscal authorities that penalize ination variability less than the central bank and
society do, bring in another source of strategic interactions between the fiscal and the
monetary policymakers that, in the present model, tightens the monetary policy response
to shocks and reduces the use of government spending with direct welfare effects. In fact,
the qualitative changes on the policy responses to the shocks are very similar to the ones
observed under the weight-conservative scenario: i) depending on the magnitude of the
debt-output ratios, the interest rate gap raises by more or decreases by less in response
to shocks that have inationary effects, relative to the benevolent setups ii) similarly,
government spending gaps are used less actively but, in general, a domestic negative
supply shock requires a more intensive use of the domestic tax rate gap.
In spite of these qualitative similarities, the stabilization properties of this scenario
are significantly different from those of the weight-conservative case. The dynamics of
the welfare-related variables confirm that, in comparison to the corresponding benevolent
regimes, the ination rates display more volatility, particularly when debts are large, while
the output gaps and the government spending gaps exhibit smaller variances. Moreover,
our simulations do not corroborate the conclusion of larger uctuations on the real value
of the debts at the maturity, when governments are less prone than the benevolent central
bank to enhance ination stabilization. In fact, and in terms of the benevolent setups,
debts also return to their pre-shock steady-state values and depict small uctuations in a
number of situations. Figures 36-39 illustrate these findings, for a symmetric, negative
and non-persistent productivity shock case.
The playing order in the two leadership regimes shapes the strategic interactions be-
tween the fiscal and the monetary policymakers making ination relatively better stabi-
lized, under the monetary leadership regime, while the fiscal leadership regime ensures a
better stabilization of the consumption and the output gaps.
Anticipating that the fiscal authorities will perform output-biased stabilization poli-
cies, the benevolent central bank uses its policy instrument more actively to create some
extra recession, when debts are small, or to generate extra budgetary revenue that liberates
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tax rates to outweigh the inationary effects and, simultaneously, to mitigate recession,
under large debts. By their side, the non-benevolent fiscal authorities desire to reduce by
less the government spending gaps than in the benevolent setup and so, they have to raise
by more the tax rate gaps or to decrease them by less, to mitigate the budgetary conse-
quences. They are aware that, when debts are small, for instance, the monetary authority
will raise the interest rate gap in response to negative supply shocks. To circumvent the
recessionary effect of this monetary policy reaction, the fiscal authorities choose to raise
the tax rate gaps moderately. In general, the monetary leadership regime reaches a better
stabilization performance of the ination rates than the fiscal leadership regime while, the
latter, performs a better stabilization of the consumption and the output gaps (see Figures
40 and 41).
3.2.2 Welfare analysis
The question of whether monetary conservatism improves welfare has been fre-
quently addressed in the literature. Originally, this solution was proposed by Rogoff
(1985) to overcome the monetary commitment problem originating from an excessive out-
put target. Clarida et al (1999) recast Rogoff’s rationale for a conservative central banker
in a context where the commitment problem follows exclusively from the forward-looking
nature of ination. The welfare gains from this institutional arrangement were uncontro-
versial in the context of monetary policy models but it became doubtful in models that
integrate monetary and fiscal policies. A fiscal authority, acting strategically, may prevent
the conservative central bank to achieve a lower ination and may lead to a wrong policy-
mix. Dixit and Lambertini (2001, 2003a, 2003b), in the context of static models, highlight
the problems arising from making fiscal and monetary authorities diverge in their policy
objectives. Within dynamic closed-economy settings, Adam and Billi (2006) found that
monetary conservatism improves the conduct of stabilization policy but Blake and Kir-
sanova (Oct. 2006) only get this outcome when they introduce ination persistence into
their model.
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Our experiments suggest that the desirability of monetary conservatism depends on
the type of strategic policy interactions that can be developed in the economy and, so, is
highly model and parameter dependent. This can be easily verified by taking the example
of our small-debt monetary union representation, when countries have equal and unequal
sizes and shocks are country-specific. Looking at the welfare losses reported in the 2nd
half of Tables D.32 and D.33 for the small-debt case, we verify that making the central
bank more averse to ination than society has positive welfare consequences, when coun-
tries have equal size (4.75 vs. 4.79), but it may aggravate the welfare stabilization costs,
when countries have different relative dimensions (3.26 vs. 3.25). A more attentive ex-
amination of the distribution of the welfare losses among the two countries allows for the
perception of how country-size asymmetry shapes the strategic policy interactions and
impinges these outcomes. Under fiscal leadership, the government of the large country
anticipates the reaction of the conservative central bank and it is aware of its greater in-
uence. It ends up conducting a less active fiscal policy and this benefits the stabilization
of its welfare-related variables, diminishing the perceived costs of macroeconomic stabi-
lization. Diversely, the welfare-related variables of the small country are worse stabilized
and, in spite of its small weight on the union-wide loss function, this inferior stabilization
performance overturns the stabilization gains obtained by the large country and welfare
decreases at the union-wide level. Under monetary leadership, the central bank antici-
pates that the fiscal authority of the large country may react aggressively and with more
success to its anti-inationary policy. Instead of moderating its policy, the conservative
central bank ends up conducting a more reactive policy to the shocks hitting the large
country. This raises the welfare costs in the large country and makes welfare decrease in
the whole union, despite the welfare gains of the small country.
In a large-debt monetary union and from the union-wide perspective, there are wel-
fare costs from raising the central bank aversion to ination in the monetary leadership
policy regime but, there are welfare gains as well, if the fiscal authorities have a first-
move advantage. The divergent outcomes relative to the small-debt case follow from the
change of the policy instruments stabilization assignments. In a large-debt scenario, we
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should conclude that there is no need to set the central bank more averse to ination when
it leads but, it may be desirable to do that, if it follows fiscal authorities.
In what concerns output-biased governments, in general, welfare worsens compared
to the benevolent solutions (cf. Tables D.32 and D.34). Notwithstanding, the citizens of
the large and the small countries could be better-off with the distorted policy objectives of
their governments, under certain circumstances: the representative household of the large
country seems to be slightly better, if its government is a Stackelberg leader and cares
less ination variability than society in small-debt monetary union the representative
household of the small country would prefer to get a government with this characteristic
in office, if a benevolent common central bank is a Stackelberg leader in a large-debt
monetary union (cf. Tables D.33 and D.35).
3.3 Sensitivity analysis
3.3.1 Stabilization outcomes in a monetary union with divergent debt-to-output ra-
tios
In Chapter 3, the fiscal policy dimension of the stabilization problem was mainly
analyzed within an environment where government spending was the fiscal policy instru-
ment and where there were enough lump sum taxes to satisfy the government budget con-
straint. Recently, there is a growing branch of literature that recognizes the inexistence
of these non-distortionary sources of government receipts and looks for the fiscal policy
stabilization dimension when the intertemporal government solvency constraint is bind-
ing. Here, public debt and, specially, its steady-state debt-output ratio play a crucial role
on the fiscal and monetary policy interactions. There is a natural concern that large debts
may impair the stabilization performance of the policies and, correlatively, that it may be
optimal to impose limits on government indebtedness.
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Our experiments showed that, under commitment, the optimal stabilization policies
were not substantially affected by the levels of the pre-shock debt-output ratios but, the
discretionary policies were very sensitive to the public debt ratios. In accordance with the
analytical findings of Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007a), our results revealed the existence of
a threshold on those ratios that shifts the stabilization assignments of the various policy
instruments. It became clear that, for large enough debts, the monetary policy instru-
ment accommodates the budgetary consequences of the shocks, while the tax rates gain
efficiency in the control of their inationary consequences. Under our model parameter-
ization that threshold occurs for a very low debt-output ratio (19%) and, given the EMU
evidence on this, it may be arguable that we should only focus the analysis on high debt-
output ratios. However, if the existence of balanced budget fiscal policies is improbable,
because it requires the full availability of lump sum taxes, we may also claim that, for the
unreality of the inexistence of non-distortionary receipts, which accommodate, at least in
part, the budgetary consequences of the shocks. If this is the case, one can envisage the
qualitative results of a low debt scenario as a proxy of this policy setup. This is an addi-
tional reason to assess the stabilization performance of the policies under both high and
low debt-output ratios.
In a structurally symmetric monetary union, perfectly positively correlated shocks
only have welfare consequences because they have budgetary consequences that do not
allow the policy instruments to be set at their efficient levels. The impact of the shocks on
debt depends on their persistence and on the pre-shock debt-output ratio. Under our cal-
ibration, we verify that, in general, the budgetary consequences of the symmetric shocks
decrease with the size of the steady-state debt-output ratio (Table D.36). Moreover, as
we have already noticed, with the raise of the debt-output ratio, the policy instruments
change their ability to counteract the effects of the shocks on debt and on the welfare-
related variables: both fiscal policy instruments turn out to be less effective in controlling
debt and the tax rate becomes more efficient to control the ination rate in contrast, the
interest rate has a large impact on the debt service costs. Therefore, we observe that rais-
ing the steady-state debt-output ratios symmetrically in both countries may have positive
or negative welfare effects, under the various discretionary policy regimes, depending on
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the size of the debt-output ratio. If this ratio is sufficiently small, raising it is welfare-
reducing because, in spite of the small impact of the shocks, the fiscal policy instruments
that specialize in the debt stabilization also become less effective in performing their task.
For adequately high debt-output ratios, when the policy instruments changes their stabi-
lization assignments, there are welfare gains attached to large debt stocks, once the tax
rate became more apt to stabilize the ination rate. Nevertheless, we also verify that wel-
fare losses are small in a low-debt monetary union than in a high-debt union. That is, in
an environment that replicates a closed economy scenario, and focusing exclusively on
the stabilization costs, we conclude for the rationale of imposing limits on debts that do
not allow their long-run values to surpass a given threshold level at which the policy in-
struments change their stabilization assignments and that may justify an augmented gov-
ernment conduct of indebtedness. In fact, when debts are high, a country that unilaterally
increases its debt stock sees its welfare losses being reduced as well as the welfare losses
of the whole union, in spite of the negative effect on the wellbeing of the "well-behaved"
country. There will be stabilization gains for all the countries, if the "well-behaved" gov-
ernment raises its debt too. Opposite effects take place, when debts are small enough.
In a monetary union, where idiosyncratic shocks prevail and, therefore, the welfare
consequences of the shocks do not result exclusively from their budgetary effects, there
are amplified policy stabilization conicts, particularly when there are divergent policy
objectives. From examining the welfare losses reported in Table D.37, we conclude that
the discretionary, benevolent and full cooperative regime replicates the qualitative out-
comes of the previous setups but, naturally, with high welfare costs. However, for dis-
cretionary, non-cooperative policy regimes,74 raising the steady-state debt-output ratio
symmetrically across countries is welfare-reducing. In addition, in a high-debt monetary
union, a country that unilaterally raises its debt stock ameliorates its welfare, but it dete-
riorates welfare from the perspective of the other country and of the whole union. The
latter country will gain, and will improve the union’s welfare as well, if it follows that debt
deviating behavior and lets its indebtedness attain a higher level. Since in EMU there is
no policy cooperation, one finds accrued arguments for the imposition of debt limits that
The fiscal leadership regimes replicate the qualitative results of the monetary leadership regimes.
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push the steady-state debt-output ratios to levels that are consistent with our low debt sce-
narios.
The consideration of a monetary union, where small and large countries coexist,
places additional concerns on the stabilization performance of the policies and the pos-
sibility of small countries to benefit from a free-riding behavior that conduces to a large
indebtedness. In fact, we observe that, from the whole union’s point of view, the stabi-
lization performance is better under an unequal sized monetary union, for the reason that
this implies, in practice, having more symmetric shocks. In contrast, the shocks that hit
the small country are even more idiosyncratic and so, this country is naturally worse-off
than the large country.
Differently from the case where the union’s members have the same size, one veri-
fies that, raising symmetrically the steady-state debt-output ratio in both countries when
debts are high deteriorates the well-being of the small country while benefiting the large
one (see Table D.38).75 Hence, we can find here a rationale for the small countries to be
more enthusiastic about fiscal policy constraints that lead to a reduction of the public debt
in the monetary union. This argument is reinforced, when we look at the small-debt sce-
narios and verify that the small country is better-off there than in the high-debt scenarios.
Moreover, we also verify that, when both countries are fulfilling the same (high) target
for the annual steady-state debt-output ratio, say 60%, the small country faces no motiva-
tion to raise its debt beyond that limit, except when there is a benevolent cooperative and
discretionary policy regime. On the other hand, the large country does not envisage an in-
centive to raise its debt only in a monetary leadership with a weight-conservative central
bank. If the government of the large country adopts a looser conduct, the union-wide wel-
fare augments but the small country does not gain from having a government that follows
the loose behavior of a large country and raises permanently its indebtedness.
Hence, by focusing exclusively on the welfare consequences of the stabilization poli-
cies under various high debt-output ratios, we do not find a motivation to be especially
concerned with a potential free-riding behavior of the small countries that raises their pub-
lic indebtedness. In fact, they are more interested in being disciplined as well as enforcing
Except in a monetary leadership regime with a weight-conservative central bank.
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fiscal discipline for whole the union. The large country faces accrued incentives to be fis-
cally undisciplined and this may explain the fact that, in current EMU, large countries
tend to have larger debts than the smaller ones.
However, we have to temperate these settlements when we focus on the low-debt
monetary union scenarios. Here, the large country and the union-wide are manifestly
worse-off when the pre-shock debt ratios increase symmetrically or when the large econ-
omy raises its debt ratio unilaterally. Thus, by only looking for the stabilization motives,
this country would not face any incentive to be fiscally undisciplined and to accumulate
debt permanently. Notwithstanding, a deviating debt behavior of the government of the
small country would be welcomed from the viewpoint of the representative household of
the monetary union. In general, the small country gains with this conduct and the large
country does not face an incentive to follow it. Hence, according to our experiments, an
unequal-sized monetary union would tend to accumulate public debt differentially. Under
low-debt scenarios, the small countries would register large public indebtedness while,
under high-debt scenarios, it would be the large countries to get large debt-output ratios.
This debt asymmetry would be beneficial for the monetary union welfare.
3.3.2 Nominal rigidities
A structural reform that reduces the degree of nominal rigidity impinges directly
on welfare, because it reduces the penalization of ination variability, however, it also
indirectly affects welfare by its impact on the volatility of the welfare-related variables.76
In general, the combination of these two effects leads to a non-monotonic relationship
between the degree of nominal rigidity and the welfare stabilization costs, as it was shown
in Chapter 2 and confirmed, for instance, by Lombardo (2002).
In the present fiscal policy setup, the change on the degree of nominal rigidity has,
in addition, non negligible budgetary consequences and it may have consequences on the
relative contribution of the different policy instruments for debt stabilization. Thus, there
are additional effects that condition the optimal policy plans and their stabilization per-
See Chapter 2.
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formance. In effect, Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007a), in a closed-economy setup, showed
that the contribution to debt stabilization of the fiscal policy instruments is only signifi-
cant for low levels of steady-state debt. Moreover, they found that the tax rates are more
relevant for high-nominal rigidity while government spending contributes relatively more
to debt stabilization for low-nominal rigidity. For high levels of debt-output ratios, debt
stabilization mainly relies on the monetary policy and, as long as prices become more
exible, the monetary policy’s ability to change the real interest rate is reduced and there
is added reliance on ination surprise to return debt to its pre-shock steady-state level.
Notwithstanding, the need to reduce debt service costs may increase because, with large
price exibility, the decline of the real interest rate has a small positive effect on the out-
put and, consequently, on tax revenues.
In sum, the arguments above do not provide clear cut conclusions on the welfare
consequences of raising the degree of price exibility. Moreover, the degree of nominal
rigidity crucially affects the monetary and fiscal policy interactions, under binding bud-
getary constraints. Thus, in the present setting, the welfare consequences of instituting
reforms that decrease the degree of nominal rigidity are even less clear cut.
In effect, by focusing on the cooperative policy outcomes we find that, similarly
to our previous findings, the reduction of the degree of nominal rigidity causes non-
monotonic effects on welfare (Tables D.39 and D.40). Despite the steady-state debt-
output ratios, raising symmetrically price exibility in the monetary union only reduces
the union-wide welfare stabilization costs for a high enough degree of nominal exibility
 + The small and more open economy loses with high price exibility whilst, the
large country, in general, benefits (cf. Table D.42). This suggests a potential conict of in-
terests between small and large countries in a monetary union: large countries may desire
structural reforms that raise price exibility in all the union but, small countries, could
resist them. Moreover, the large countries would only face incentives to perform these
types of reforms unilaterally, if debt-stocks were low enough and the degree of nominal
exibility became sufficiently high. Otherwise, they would prefer having high nominal
rigidity and this also would be beneficial from a union-wide perspective (cf. Tables D.41
and D.42).
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In a symmetric country-size monetary union, consenting to asymmetric nominal
rigidities is beneficial for the country that maintains more nominal rigidity, because it
benefits from a larger monetary policy response, when debts are small and the monetary
policy instrument performs the traditional short-run stabilization task, and it profits from
a small reaction of the interest rate, when debts are large and the monetary policy instru-
ment specializes in debt-stabilization.77 The whole union and the country with high price
exibility only gain when this is sufficiently high.
Non-cooperative policy regimes lead to strategic interactions between fiscal and mon-
etary authorities. Different degrees of nominal rigidity may diversely shape these strategic
interactions and, consequently, the welfare ranking of the diverse policy regimes may suf-
fer alterations. We did not find evidence of this possibility in our previous policy setup, as
the welfare ranking of the various benevolent policy regimes remained unchanged. In the
present fiscal policy setup, there are non-trivial interactions between fiscal and monetary
decisions and, the steady-state debt-output ratio and the degree of nominal rigidity are
both decisive for those policy interactions. In fact, we have obtained results that seem to
confirm the importance of the degree of price exibility, on this fiscal policy context, for
the monetary and fiscal strategic interactions. The welfare ranking of the diverse policy
games revealed to be sensitive to the degree of price stickiness.
3.3.3 Tentative assessment of the EMU case
In order to assess how country-size asymmetry impinged on the monetary and fiscal
policy interactions in a monetary union, we have calibrated our model disregarding all
its other sources of potential asymmetry. In the two previous sections we have separately
considered the possibility of having asymmetric debts and asymmetric degrees of nominal
rigidity. The current EMU assembles a number of these asymmetries: large and small
The feedback coefficients on the shocks hitting the country with high nominal rigidity are large, for
small debts, and small, for high debt-stocks. This is analogous to the findings of Benigno (2004) and
Beetsma and Jensen (2004, 2005), among others. It is optimal to direct monetary policy at trying to keep
more stable ination in the country with high nominal rigidity. In our setting, this implies a more restrictive
monetary policy response to shocks hitting the country with more nominal rigidity, when debts are small,
and a less expansionary response, when debts are large. These results are available upon request.
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countries low and high debt countriesmore and less exible-price economies, inter alia.
To get an idea of how this would affect the stabilization outcomes, under the various
policy regimes, we calibrate our model to replicate some of the features of the current
EMU. Tables D.43-D.45 provide the welfare losses under various policy regimes. From its
examination it is apparent that under an EMU scenario and benevolent policymakers that
re-optimize every period, there are union-wide welfare gains from being in a monetary
leadership regime. The large and more indebted economies of the EMU would prefer to
be under a fiscal leadership regime while the small and more disciplined countries would
be better-off under a Nash. Full policy cooperation would deliver a worse outcome and no
country would face any incentive to promote this institutional arrangement (Table D.43
and D.44).78
Furthermore, delegating monetary policy to a conservative central bank deteriorates
welfare, except in fiscal leadership. Therefore, there are no gains from radicalizing the
preferences of the central bank towards the combat of ination variability, when the cen-
tral bank has a first move advantage but, it can be beneficial to do that, when fiscal author-
ities lead. If governments are more adverse to output variability than society, the stabi-
lization outcome worsens at both the union-wide and individual country levels. Notwith-
standing, it is preferable to have a monetary leadership regime. In sum, and in accordance
with our previous results, there are welfare gains from having benevolent policymakers
with a first moving advantage (Table D.43 and D.44).
Finally, if the central bank, in line with the institutional EMU arrangement, is exclu-
sively assigned to stabilize ination (a case of extreme weight-conservatism) and if fiscal
authorities are only concerned with the stabilization of domestic output terms (a case of
extreme output-bias), the welfare stabilization costs are extreme (Table D.45, LMLw and
LFLw). In this context, there would be substantial welfare gains from both the mone-
tary union and the central bank perspectives, if the national fiscal authorities cooperate in
minimizing the union-wide loss function. However, national fiscal authorities would face
incentives to deviate from this cooperative solution because they would be better-off un-
Our experiments showed that, for this model calibration, policy cooperation only would be beneficial
for the union-wide, if there were symmetry on government indebtedness in the monetary union.
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der non-cooperation.79 Full policy cooperation would deliver an even better stabilization
outcome but, it could be difficult to implement, especially when the fiscal stance ignores
the monetary policy ination goal.
	For instance, from the H fiscal authority perspective, the stabilization welfare costs increase from
47.55, under non-cooperation, to 156.51, under horizontal policy cooperation.
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This work explored the interactions between monetary and fiscal stabilization poli-
cies in a micro-founded macroeconomic dynamic model for a monetary union with country-
size asymmetry.
Our objectives, as spelled out in the introduction were to derive the optimal strate-
gic policy mix within an asymmetric country-size monetary union, and assess the effects
of some institutional arrangements (cooperation, fiscal constraints, the promotion of a
weight-conservative central bank) and of the level of government indebtness on the ef-
fectiveness of policy stabilization. Two scenarios were set up in order to accomplish this
exercise: the former, where monetary and fiscal policy instruments exert their stabiliza-
tion roles exclusively through the demand channel and without any consequence on debt
sustainability the latter, where fiscal policy has both demand and supply-side effects but
where lump-sum taxes are not enough to ensure fiscal policy solvency. Using a second-
order approximation to the union-wide (social) welfare, optimal policy reaction functions
under diverse policy regimes were computed and evaluated according to the stabilization
performance. We have also investigated whether the social welfare under discretionary
policy could be improved through some institutional arrangements, such as policy coop-
eration, the delegation of monetary policy to a conservative central bank, and the imple-
mentation of some structural reforms. We have found out that the results of these analy-
sis change qualitatively with the degree of country-size symmetry, and with both cross-
country average and dispersion of debt-to-output levels.
In regard to the optimal time-consistent stabilization policy mix in a monetary union,
our results show that the outcomes are highly sensitive to the available fiscal policy instru-
ments as well as to the existence of non-distortionary government sources of financing.
Furthermore, with divergent policy objectives, strategic interactions arising from the time
structure of the policy games, played by the national fiscal authorities and by the common
central bank, affect significantly the stabilization outcomes.
In a monetary union where heterogeneity derives exclusively from exogenous shocks
and balanced budget fiscal policies are enforced, optimal discretionary cooperative poli-
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cies lead to a clear specialization of the policy instruments for different stabilization
tasks: while monetary policy stabilizes union-wide aggregate variables, fiscal policy is
concerned with the stabilization of country-specific variables. Conversely, when policy
instruments are constrained by the need to ensure debt stabilization, fiscal policy responds
to both types of variables and, depending on the level of government indebtedness, a dif-
ferent specialization of the policy instruments emerges. In a large-debt monetary union,
the monetary policy instrument specializes on debt stabilization and the fiscal policy
instruments focus on short-run macroeconomic stabilization in a small-debt monetary
union, the reverse occurs. As a consequence, the dynamics of endogenous variables are
very different when the economies are hit by negative supply shocks: ination and out-
put gap co-move positively in a large-debt monetary union while, in a small-debt mone-
tary union, they co-move negatively. These different dynamics express the importance of
time-inconsistency problems when the debt accumulation process constrains policymak-
ing. Thus, and in the context of perfect coordination between policy authorities, if large
debts prevail in a monetary union (like the EMU), it seems to enclose a meaningful risk
for the monetary policy to shift away from the traditional price stabilization objective.
Compared with discretionary outcomes, optimal policy mix under commitment in-
duces a unit root in all real variables and yields a better short-run stabilization perfor-
mance at the expenses of a permanent adjustment in the government debt, irrespective
of the initial debt-to-output ratio. In contrast, under optimal discretionary policies, all
endogenous variables (inclusive the debt-to-output ratio) return to their pre-shock levels,
but there are larger short-run uctuations. Unlike commitment, the trajectories for the en-
dogenous variables depend on the initial level of government indebtedness. Hence, it may
be misleading to use the simplifying assumption of balanced budget fiscal policies in the
analysis of the monetary and fiscal policy interactions under discretion.
Considering divergent policy objectives – domestically-oriented fiscal authorities
and a benevolent union-oriented central bank –, non-cooperative policies lead to strate-
gic interactions among policymakers that produce a worse stabilization performance
however, when debts are small enough, these strategic interactions apparently mitigate
time-inconsistency problems and improve welfare. If non-cooperation prevails (strategic
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policymaking), welfare stabilization costs are minimized under the monetary leadership
regime, where the benevolent central bank, anticipating the policy conducting of the na-
tional fiscal authorities, sets its policy to manipulate that of the latter.
The results, in the case of country-size asymmetry within a monetary union, mean-
ingfully qualify the statements made throughout. A small country, suffering larger exter-
nality effects and benefiting less from a common monetary policy for stabilization pur-
poses, has to optimally rely on a more active fiscal policy and, as expected, it experiences
more welfare costs than a larger country.80 Our experiments also suggest that country-size
asymmetry, and consequently, asymmetric bargaining power, is a relevant variable in de-
termining the optimal strategic policy mix. The welfare evaluation of the alternative pol-
icy games show that: i) the large country achieves, in general, a better stabilization perfor-
mance under fiscal leadership because it can exploit, on its own benefit, its large strategic
power vis-à-vis the common central bank ii) conversely, the small country benefits more
from a benevolent monetary leadership regime iii) moreover, even when cooperation81
yields a superior outcome for the monetary union as a whole – the cases of balanced-
budget fiscal policies or of a large-debt monetary union –, it proves difficult to implement
such a policy arrangement, because the large country faces incentives to deviate.
We have also accessed on how the delegation of the monetary policy to a conserva-
tive central bank could improve the outcome of strategic games when the cooperative out-
come proved to be optimal – the cases of balanced-budget fiscal policies or of a large-debt
monetary union –. With symmetric-size countries, this solution increases the potential
conicts between fiscal and monetary authorities and, thus, it deteriorates welfare. How-
ever, in a small-debt monetary union, where policy cooperation would deliver a worse
stabilization outcome, there are welfare gains from accentuating the preferences of the
central bank for fighting ination variability.82 Additional strategic elements arising from

In spite of using a different framework, these results are in accordance with the findings of Canzoneri
et al. (2005).
Recall that the central bank’s policy objective is union-wide social loss. In this case, fiscal policy
cooperation is equivalent to full cooperation.
Adam and Billi (2006), for a closed-economy setup with balanced budget policies, found welfare
gains from delegating monetary policy to a conservative central bank. Blake and Kirsanova (2006), for a
closed-economy setup with a fiscal solvency constraint imposed on a small-debt economy, also found this
hypothesis to be welfare enhancing, but conditioned on the existence of ination persistence.
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different size countries in a monetary union, may overturn some of these conclusions, es-
pecially when monetary and fiscal interactions are amplified by the existence of binding
budgetary solvency constraints. We found out that when the central bank leads, there are
no advantages from delegating the monetary policy to a conservative central bank, but
when the large country fiscal authority leads, this arrangement may be welfare improv-
ing.83 These results add to the rationale for a conservative ECB, given that the larger
countries in the EMU may, by taking advantage of their relative size, behave strategically
and, thus, deteriorate the union-wide welfare.
If we take policymakers to exhibit extreme preferences (exclusively) over ination
variability (central bank) and over the stabilization of domestic output (national fiscal
authorities), the welfare stabilization costs would also be extremely high. In this case,
the central bank and the monetary union would prefer to get fiscal authorities cooperating
and internalizing the average monetary union ination goal, while national governments
would face incentives to deviate from the cooperative solution.
Largely motivated by the recent efforts of fiscal consolidation within the EMU coun-
tries, as well as by the debate on the need for the implementation of structural reforms,
we have tentatively assessed, in the context of our model and regarding only to the pol-
icy stabilization performance, the incentives for reforms aiming at reducing the degree of
nominal rigidity or that decrease the long-run debt-to-output ratio. Hence we focus on the
impacts of such reforms exclusively on the welfare costs attached to stabilization policies,
and not on their full structural impacts in the economy.
Reducing nominal rigidity symmetrically across the monetary union is likely to raise
the costs of stabilization policies, unless this reduction acquires a significant expression.
In general, smaller, and so more open, economies lose with this reform, whilst larger
countries benefit from it. Focusing exclusively on stabilization costs, this suggests a po-
tential conict of interests between small and large countries in a monetary union: large
countries may desire structural reforms to raise price exibility across the union, but small
countries may resist to them. An asymmetric reform improves the effectiveness of the
monetary policy instrument to deal with asymmetric shocks, but it could be difficult to
This is the case in a large-debt monetary union.
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implement, given the negative welfare stabilization effect on the country enhancing the
reform.
In what regards the effects of the debt levels, it is apparent from our results that, in
general, low welfare stabilization costs occur with low debt-to-output ratios. Moreover,
under a large-debt monetary union and discretionary non-cooperative policy regimes, rais-
ing the steady-state debt-output ratio symmetrically is welfare-reducing. However, each
country would face an incentive to unilaterally raise its public indebtedness and, addition-
ally, the other country would follow this behavior. As a consequence, debt would rise in
the whole monetary union and this would prove welfare decreasing for all. Thus, these
are accrued arguments to impose debt limits that push the steady-state debt-output ratios
to levels consistent with low-debt scenarios, when these incentives are absent. Our re-
sults also suggest that, in a country-size symmetric monetary union, there is rationale for
homogenizing the public debt ratios across countries.
Diversely, an unequal-sized monetary union would tend to accumulate public debt
differently. Under low-debt scenarios, the small countries would register large public
indebtedness, while under high-debt scenarios the large countries would have larger debt-
to-output ratios. This debt asymmetry favours stabilization policies outcomes for the
whole monetary union. In addition, we can infer from our results that the small countries
may be more enthusiastic towards fiscal reforms aimed at reducing public debt in a high-
debt monetary union.
From this sensitivity analysis to debt-level asymmetry, we can infer on both nor-
mative and positive sides of the policy-making in the EMU. i) On the normative side,
the results imply that low-debt levels are a desirable environment, even if we account
only for welfare stabilization costs. At the same time, our results also highlight that an
homogenized-debt target may not be a wise feature to impose in an EMU where coun-
tries are not size-symmetric. ii) On the positive side, our results also seem to confirm the
EMU current stance regarding long-term fiscal sustainability: in the EMU, where non-
homogeneous public indebtedness prevails and average public debt can be considered as
large, small countries tend to have small debt-to-output ratios while the large ones are, in
general, characterized by large debt-to-output ratios.
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Although we have contributed to the relevant literature by incorporating strategic pol-
icymaking in a dynamic open-economy framework with size-asymmetric countries, there
is still substantial controversy in regard to model specification and to the main features
it should include to mimic the reality of a multi-country world. Some of them, such as
the government spending effect on private consumption, are common to closed-economy
models. In our model fiscal policy causes a crowding-out effect on consumption which
seems to be in conict with empirical evidence.84 This seems to be an important issue
that deserves further research, as it should affect policy interactions and the design of
the optimal stabilization policies. Notice that, for instance, in line with the findings of
Beetsma and Jensen (2004), we found out that a mark-up shock called for a pro-cyclical
balanced-budget policy. However, if an increase on government spending raises private
consumption, the optimal fiscal policy response to a cost-push shock could act counter-
cyclically, amplifying the potential stabilization conict with the central bank. Another
promising extension to more realistically model fiscal policy is to consider implementa-
tion lags. This may reduce the gains from fiscal policy stabilization but Leith and Wren-
Lewis (2007b) still found non-trivial benefits from using fiscal policy in this case.
There are other extensions, specific to open-economy models, that are more probably
worth following in order to capture a clearer picture of the current EMU context for stabi-
lization policy conducting. One of them is to consider incompleteness on international fi-
nancial markets that introduce current-account as a channel of interdependencies85, deter-
mining an additional role for fiscal stabilization policies – the stabilization of asymmetric
demand-side shocks. Other extension stems from the need to represent more realistically
a monetary union composed by many small countries and few large ones. A two-country
model, as we have used as a good starting point for representing a monetary union with
country-size asymmetry, can be improved by describing part of the union as a continuum
of small open economies, as Gali and Monacelli (2006) do for the whole monetary union.
See Gali et al. (2007) for recent evidence and for the development of a closed-economy model that
allows for a positive effect of government spending on consumption. Pescatori and Pisani (2006) extend
this framework to a two-region monetary union.
See Ghironi (2006) for a recent model with incomplete markets.
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In the EMU, the majority of the country-members are small comparing to the union as a
whole, and so, taken in isolation, their policy decisions have very little impact.
Relying on political economy literature, future work should also develop a more ac-
curate specification of domestic-specific fiscal policy objectives, namely by endogenizing
inuential interests on the decision-making process.
Finally, and following the example of Fragetta and Kirsanova (2007) for the UK,
Sweden and the US, our plan to future use of the model includes an empirical examination
of monetary and fiscal interactions in large and small EMU countries, in order to retrieve
some information on policy objectives and to identify the implicit policy regime.
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Appendix A.0. Monetary leadership and Nash between the
fiscal authorities
This appendix summarizes the iterative dynamic programming algorithm for the discre-
tionary monetary leadership case when fiscal authorities play a Nash between them. This
is an extension of the algorithms developed by Oudiz and Sachs (1985) and Backus and
Driffill (1986) and popularized by Söderlind (1999). It closely follows the one developed
by Kirsanova et al. (2005).
There are five strategic agents in the game: three explicit players - the monetary and
the two fiscal authorities - and two implicit players - the private sector of both countries
- that always act in last. In this type of game, the monetary authority moves first and
sets the interest rate. Then the two fiscal authorities decide the levels of their fiscal policy
instruments. Finally, the private sector in both countries reacts being the ultimate follower.
To solve this type of game, one inverts the order of playing and begins by solving
the optimization of the last player, ending up with the optimization of the leader (the first
player). The private sector’s optimization problem is already solved out - the system of
equations of sections  and 1.2 in Chap. 1 - and can be represented by the following
system, written in a state space form:
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where  is an -vector of predetermined state variables,  is given, and 1 are the
effective instruments of the private sector, an -vector of non-predetermined or forward-
looking variables ( =    ). The policy instruments are represented by  , 	 and
! . 

 and 	 stand for the instruments of the followers which are, respectively, the
Home and the Foreign fiscal authorities, while ! represents the instrument of the leader,
which is the monetary authority. : is an $-vector of exogenous zero-mean ** shocks
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where <  < < 8  < 8,   <  and 	  < 	. The covariance matrice
of the shocks to  is 		  and matrices A, B, C, and D are partionated comformably
with  and 1 as
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A common special case is when   ? , but in general this matrix need not to be
invertible. This system describes the evolution of the economy as observed by policy-
makers.
A.1. The followers’ optimization problem
In the discretionary case, the three policymakers reoptimize every period by taking the
process by which private agents form their expectations as given - and where the expecta-
tions are consistent with actual policies (Söderlind 1999). The two Nash fiscal authorities
minimize their loss functions treating the monetary policy instrument as parametric but
incorporating the reaction functions of the private sectors. Assuming that the fiscal au-
thority of the Home country has the following objective function:
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where   is the target variables for the Home fiscal authority while  is the corre-
sponding matrix of weights. The target variables can be rewritten in terms of the pre-
determined and non-predetermined state variables collected on vector =, in terms of the
policy instruments  and in terms of combinations of these two variables.
The fiscal authority in H optimizes every period, taking into account that she will be
able to reoptimize next period. The model is linear-quadratic, thus the solution in   
gives a period return which is quadratic in the state variables, "  

@

  
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;, where @ is a positive semidefinite matrix and ; is a scalar independent of
 Moreover, the forward looking variables must be linear functions of the state vari-
ables, 1  A. Hence, the value function of the fiscal authority of H in  will
then satisfy the Bellman equation:
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Rewriting the system by using 1  A
Using the expression above to substitute into the upper block of , we get
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Multiplying the former equation by , setting the result equal to the latter equation and
solving for 1 we obtain
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where B is , C is 5 , C	 is 5	 and C! is 5! (5 and 5	 stand
respectively for the number of fiscal policy instruments of H and F, while 5! stands for
the number of monetary policy instruments)86.
It is assumed that  
 is invertible.
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The evolution of 
Use  in the first  equations in the system to get the reduced form evolution of
the predetermined variables
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Being a follower, the Home fiscal authority observes monetary authority’s actions and
reacts to them. In a linear-quadratic setup, the optimal solution belongs to the class of
linear feedback rules of the form:
  
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where  denotes feedback coeficcients on the predetermined state variables and  is
the leadership parameter. The other fiscal authority solves a similar problem and get:
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Being in a Nash game, the two fiscal authorities do not respond to each other’s actions.
The monetary leadership authority takes into account these fiscal policy reaction
functions as well as the private sector’s optimal conditions, when solves its optimization
problem. Thus, the leader can manipulate the follower by changing its policy instrument.
The monetary leadership reaction function takes the form of:
!  
!
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 (66)
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Reformulated optimization problem
Therefore we can substitute eqs.  and  into  to obtain an equivalent mini-
mization problem87:
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Hence, the problem faced by the Home fiscal authority has been transformed to a stan-
dard linear-quadratic regulator problem without forward looking variables but with time
varying parameters. The first-order condition is
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Since       ! and 	   	   	 ! , the first-order condition
can be solved for the feedback coefficients of the reaction function of the Home fiscal
authority:
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Finding the recursive equation for @
Substituting the decision rules    and  into  we obtain the recursive equa-
tions for
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Similar formulae can be derived for country F.
A.2. The leader’s optimization problem
This part of the problem is the standard optimization problem when the system under
control evolves as

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The monetary authority loss function is
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But, since the leadership integrates the followers’ reaction functions -     
 
!
 and 	   	   	 ! - into its optimization problem, the leadership’s loss
function as to be rewritten in terms of the relevant variables for the leadership authority.
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A.3. The iterative procedure
We start with initial approximation for the monetary policy rule, ! symmetric pos-
itive definite matrices (usually, identity matrices), @ and @	 , some (e.g. a matrix
of zeros) A and solve the follower’s problem, using Eq.   for country H
and equivalent equations for country F. We get  and , as well as  	 and 	
and updated matrices @ and @

	  We then take into account the policy reaction func-
tions of fiscal authorities and compute new matrices in Eq. , updated target variable
!  	
!

  1

 
! 


and solve the problem for the monetary authority. This
will give us the monetary policy reaction function, ! and updated matrices A and
@

! . Then, we again solve the problem for the fiscal authorities to update @

 and @

	
and , ,  	 and 	 and so on. The fixed point is found when the policy rules and
the matrices converge towards constants for a given level of tolerance.
Blake and Kirsanova (2007) have examined the existence of multiple discretionary
equilibria in dynamic linear quadratic rational expectations models. They have concluded
that linear quadratic discretionary problems can only have isolated stable equilibria. Even
when the number of stable eigenvalues exceed the number of pre-determined variables in
the model, there is no indeterminacy because the time-consistency property of the discre-
tionary equilibria rules out that possibility. However, there could be multiple but isolated
discretionary equilibria. To check this hypothesis (only when the number of explosive
eigenvalues is smaller than the number of non-predetermined variables) it is necessary to
initialize the algorithm with different matrices and see if the solutions obtained are or not
distinct.
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Figure 1: Percentage response to a 1% negative productivity shock at H - cooperation
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Figure 2: Percentage response to a 1% positive mark-up shock at H - cooperation
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Figure 3: Percentage response to a 1% negative productivity shock at country H - com-
mitment vs. discretion
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Figure 4: Percentage response to a 1% positive mark-up shock at country H - commitment
vs. discretion
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Figure 5: Percentage response to a 1% positive mark-up shock at H - cooperation vs. rule
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Figure 6: Percentage response to a 1% negative productivity shock at H - cooperation vs.
rule
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Figure 7: Percentage response to a 1% negative productivity shock at a large country H -
all policy regimes
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Figure 8: Percentage response to a 1% positive mark-up shock at H - benevolent Nash vs.
conservative Nash
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Figure 9: Percentage response to a 1% positive mark-up shock at the large country H -
benevolent Nash vs. conservative Nash
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Figure 10: Percentage response to a 1% positive mark-up shock at the small country F -
benevolent Nash vs. conservative Nash
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Figure 11: Percentage response to a 1% positive mark-up shock at country H - benevolent
Nash vs. output-biased FAs Nash
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Figure 12: Percentage response to a 1% positive mark-up shock at H - output-biased FAs
(Nash, ML, FL)
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Figure 13: Percentage response to a 1% innovation in consumption preference  
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Figure 14: Percentage response to a 1% symmetric negative productivity shock
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Figure 15: Percentage response to a 1% symmetric mark-up shock
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Figure 16: Percentage response to a 1% a negative productivity shock at H
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Figure 17: Percentage response to a 1% a mark-up shock at H
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Figure 18: Percentage response to a 1% a symmetric negative productivity shock under
commitment
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Figure 19: Percentage response to a 1% a negative productivity shock at H under com-
mitment
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Figure 20: Percentage response to a 1% a symmetric negative productivity shock under
small debts
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Figure 21: Percentage response to a 1% a symmetric negative productivity shock under
large debts
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Figure 22: Percentage response to a 1% a negative productivity shock at H under small
debts
145
FIGURES
0 10 20
-0.2
0
0.2
y
0 10 20
-5
0
5
10
x 10-3 Inflation
0 10 20
-1
0
1
2
yH
0 10 20
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
yF
0 10 20
-0.02
0
0.02
Inflation H
0 10 20
-5
0
5
x 10-3 Inflation F
0 10 20
-0.2
0
0.2
bH
0 10 20
-0.2
0
0.2
bF
0 10 20
-2
0
2
tH
0 10 20
-1
0
1
tF
0 10 20
-0.5
0
0.5
gH
0 10 20
-0.2
0
0.2
gF
0 10 20
-1
0
1
i
0 10 20
-1
0
1
Terms-of-trade gap
0 10 20
-0.5
0
0.5
c
NASH
COOP
Figure 23: Percentage response to a 1% a negative productivity shock at H under large
debts
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Figure 24: Percentage response to a 1% a symmetric negative productivity shock under
small debts
147
FIGURES
0 10 20
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Output gap
0 10 20
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
Inflation
0 10 20
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
bH
0 10 20
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
bF
0 10 20
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
Tax rate gap H
0 10 20
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
Tax rate gap F
0 10 20
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Government spending gap H
0 10 20
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Government spending gap F
0 10 20
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
Interest rate gap
Nash Rule
Figure 25: Percentage response to a 1% a symmetric negative productivity shock under
large debts
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Figure 26: Percentage response to a 1% a positive mark-up shock at the large country (H)
under large debts
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Figure 27: Percentage response to a 1% a positive mark-up shock at the small country (F)
under large debts
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Figure 28: Percentage response to a 1% a negative productivity shock at the large country
under small debts
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Figure 29: Percentage response to a 1% a negative productivity shock at the small country
under small debts
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Figure 30: Percentage response to a 1% a symmetric negative productivity shock under
small debts
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Figure 31: Percentage response to a 1% a symmetric negative productivity shock under
large debts
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Figure 32: Percentage response to a 1% a negative productivity shock at H under small
debts
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Figure 33: Percentage response to a 1% a negative productivity shock at H under large
debts
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Figure 34: Percentage response to a 1% a negative productivity shock at H under small
debts
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Figure 35: Percentage response to a 1% a negative productivity shock at H under large
debts
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Figure 36: Percentage response to a 1% a symmetric negative productivity shock under
small debts
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Figure 37: Percentage response to a 1% a symmetric negative productivity shock under
large debts
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Figure 38: Percentage response to a 1% a symmetric negative productivity shock under
small debts
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Figure 39: Percentage response to a 1% a symmetric negative productivity shock under
large debts
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Figure 40: Percentage response to a 1% a symmetric negative productivity shock under
small debts
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Figure 41: Percentage response to a 1% a symmetric negative productivity shock under
large debts
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Figure 42: Percentage response to a 1% a negative productivity shock at the large country
H under small debts
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Figure 43: Percentage response to a 1% a negative productivity shock at the large country
H under large debts
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Figure 44: Percentage response to a 1% a negative productivity shock at the large country
H under small debts
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Figure 45: Percentage response to a 1% a negative productivity shock at the large country
H under large debts
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Figure 46: Percentage response to a 1% a negative productivity shock at the small country
F under small debts
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Figure 47: Percentage response to a 1% a negative productivity shock at the small country
F under large debts
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TABLES
Baseline EMU
	 = 0.5 0.8 0.8 Size of country H (Germany+France+Italy in EMU)
! = 0.99 0.99 Household discount factor
 = 0.47 0.47 Inverse Frisch elasticity
" = 0.75 0.76 Degree of price rigidity in country H
" = 0.75 0.72 Degree of price rigidity in country F
#  -$ = 0.5 0 0.26 Fraction of rule-of-thumb firms in country H
#  -$ = 0.5 0 0.56 Fraction of rule-of-thumb firms in country F
%& = 2.5 2.5 Coefficient of private consumption risk aversion
%' = 2.5 2.5 Coefficient of public spending risk aversion
 = 11 11 Elasticity of substitution among domestically produced goods
 = 4.5 4.5 Elasticity of substitution between H and F produced goods
 = 0.75 0.74 s.s. consumption-output ratio
%

= 15% 60% 80% s.s. debt-output ratio at H
%

= 15% 60% 50% s.s. debt-output ratio at F
( = 29.12% s.s. tax rate at H
( = 27.88% s.s. tax rate at F
 = 0.85 0.815 Persistence of productivity shock
 = 0.85 0.842 Persistence of consumption shock
 = 0 0 Persistence of mark-up shock
& = 0.001 0.00624 Variance of productivity shock
& = 0.001 0.00392 Variance of consumption shock
& = 0.001 0.00295 Variance of mark-up shock
Table D.1. Calibration and implied steady-state (s.s.) values: baseline and EMU scenar-
ios
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TABLES
a
 a


 u


 u


 )


 )


 q
 i
 g
 g

Baseline:&='=0.4 =4.5=11 =0.47!=0.99 "

="

=0.75 $

=$

=0.5  n=0.5
g
 -0.1758 0.1734 -0.0065 0.0065 -0.0762 0.0762 -0.3106
Coop g
 0.1758 -0.1734 0.0065 -0.0065 0.0762 -0.0762 0.3106
i
 0.0000 -0.0000 0.1042 0.1042 1.6516 1.6516 0.0000
Const i
 0.0000 -0.0000 0.1042 0.1042 1.6516 1.6516 0.0000
Baseline + n=0.8
g
 -0.0703 0.0694 -0.0026 0.0026 -0.0305 0.0305 -0.1243
Coop g
 0.2812 -0.2775 0.0103 -0.0103 0.1219 -0.1219 0.4970
i
 -0.0000 0.0000 0.1667 0.0417 2.6426 0.6607 -0.0000
Const i
 -0.0000 0.0000 0.1667 0.0417 2.6426 0.6607 -0.0000
Table D.2. Feedback coefficients of policy rules - cooperation
a
 a


 u


 u


 )


 )


 q
 i
 g
 g

Baseline:&='=0.4 =4.5=11 =0.47!=0.99 "

="

=0.75 $

=$

=0.5  n=0.5
g
 -0.1765 0.1998 -0.0057 0.0064 -0.0091 0.0480 -0.3580
Nash g
 0.1765 -0.1998 0.0064 -0.0057 0.0480 -0.0091 0.3580
i
 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.1042 0.1042 1.6526 1.6526 0.0000
g
 -0.1717 0.1651 -0.0020 0.0027 0.0647 -0.0256 -0.2958
FL g
 0.1717 -0.1651 0.0027 -0.0020 -0.0256 0.0647 0.2958
i
 0.0000 -0.0000 0.1042 0.1042 1.6505 1.6505 0.0000 0.0515 0.0515
g
 -0.1765 0.1998 -0.0128 -0.0007 -0.1216 -0.0645 -0.3580 0.0681
ML g
 0.1765 -0.1998 -0.0007 -0.0128 -0.0645 -0.1216 0.3580 0.0681
i
 -0.0000 0.0000 0.1042 0.1042 1.6518 1.6518 -0.0000
Baseline + n=0.8
g
 -0.0703 0.0829 -0.0022 0.0025 0.0044 0.0113 -0.1485
Nash g
 0.2836 -0.3080 0.0106 -0.0095 0.1080 -0.0460 0.5517
i
 0.0000 0.0001 0.1667 0.0417 2.6433 0.6612 -0.0001
g
 -0.0672 0.0606 0.0002 0.0001 0.0516 -0.0359 -0.1086
FL g
 0.2806 -0.2859 0.0083 -0.0072 0.0612 0.0010 0.5121
i
 -0.0009 0.0010 0.1666 0.0417 2.6405 0.6614 -0.0017 0.0824 0.0206
g
 -0.0703 0.0829 -0.0135 -0.0003 -0.1750 -0.0335 -0.1485 0.0678
ML g
 0.2836 -0.3080 -0.0008 -0.0124 -0.0726 -0.0911 0.5517 0.0683
i
 -0.0000 0.0000 0.1667 0.0417 2.6427 0.6608 -0.0000
Table D.3. Feedback coefficients of policy rules - non cooperation
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TABLES
a
 a


 u


 u


 )


 )


 q
 i
 g
 g

Baseline:&='=0.4 =4.5=11 =0.47!=0.99 "

="

=0.75 $

=$

=0.5  n=0.5
Conservative Central Bank -       
g
 -0.1762 0.1946 0.0019 0.0136 0.1622 0.2128 -0.3486
Nash g
 0.1762 -0.1946 0.0136 0.0019 0.2128 0.1622 0.3486
i
 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.2048 0.2048 2.7836 2.7836 0.0000
g
 -0.1717 0.1651 0.0017 0.0064 0.1475 0.0572 -0.2958
FL g
 0.1717 -0.1651 0.0064 0.0017 0.0572 0.1475 0.2958
i
 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.2040 0.2040 2.7686 2.7686 -0.0000 0.0515 0.0515
g
 -0.1762 0.1947 -0.0113 0.0003 -0.0181 0.0325 -0.3487 0.0647
ML g
 0.1762 -0.1947 0.0003 -0.0113 0.0325 -0.0181 0.3487 0.0647
i
 0.0000 -0.0000 0.2043 0.2043 2.7783 2.7783 0.0000
Baseline + n=0.8
g
 -0.0701 0.0796 0.0097 0.0053 0.2774 0.0770 -0.1425
Nash g
 0.2834 0.3046 0.0223 -0.0064 0.3727 0.0228 0.5457
i
 0.0001 0.0001 0.3276 0.0819 4.4532 1.1133 -0.0001
g
 -0.0672 0.0606 0.0026 0.0007 0.1046 -0.0227 -0.1086
FL g
 0.2806 -0.2859 0.0177 -0.0048 0.2725 0.0539 0.5121
i
 -0.0000 0.0010 0.3264 0.0816 4.4313 1.1096 -0.0017 0.0824 0.0206
g
 -0.0701 0.0796 -0.0111 0.0001 -0.0067 0.0060 -0.1425 0.0637
ML g
 0.2834 -0.3047 0.0008 -0.0118 0.0799 -0.0504 0.5458 0.0656
i
 0.0000 0.0000 0.3269 0.0817 4.4452 1.1112 -0.0001
Table D.4. Feedback coefficients of policy rules - conservative CB
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TABLES
a
 a


 u


 u


 )


 )


 q
 i
 g
 g

Baseline:&='=0.4 =4.5=11 =0.47!=0.99 "

="

=0.75 $

=$

=0.5  n=0.5
Output-biased FAs -       
g
 -0.1693 0.1660 0.0033 0.0053 0.2125 0.0318 -0.2974
Nash g
 0.1693 -0.1660 0.0053 0.0033 0.0318 0.2125 0.2974
i
 0.0000 -0.0000 0.1045 0.1045 1.6574 1.6574 0.0000
g
 -0.1680 0.1546 0.0025 0.0020 0.1818 -0.0485 -0.2770
FL g
 0.1680 -0.1546 0.0020 0.0025 -0.0485 0.1818 0.2770
i
 0.0000 0.0000 0.1041 0.1041 1.6479 1.6479 -0.0000 0.0515 0.0515
g
 -0.1693 0.1660 -0.0026 -0.0006 0.1187 -0.0621 -0.2974 0.0565
ML g
 0.1693 -0.1660 -0.0006 -0.0026 -0.0621 0.1187 0.2974 0.0565
i
 -0.0000 0.0000 0.1042 0.1042 1.6535 1.6535 -0.0000
Baseline + n=0.8
g
 -0.0675 0.0662 0.0062 0.0021 0.2191 0.0118 -0.1187
Nash g
 0.2720 -0.2663 0.0085 0.0003 0.0545 0.2031 0.4771
i
 0.0000 -0.0000 0.1673 0.0418 2.6514 0.6630 0.0000
g
 -0.0666 0.0589 0.0018 -0.0000 0.0929 -0.0396 -0.1056
FL g
 0.2712 -0.2591 0.0064 0.0008 0.0028 0.2100 0.4641
i
 -0.0000 0.0005 0.1666 0.0417 2.6387 0.6598 -0.0008 0.0824 0.0206
g
 -0.0675 0.0662 -0.0032 -0.0003 0.0703 -0.0254 -0.1187 0.0560
ML g
 0.2720 -0.2663 -0.0010 -0.0021 -0.0969 0.1653 0.4771 0.0569
i
 0.0000 -0.0000 0.1668 0.0417 2.6455 0.6614 0.0000
Table D.5. Feedback coefficients of policy rules - output-biased FAs
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TABLES
Benevolent n = 0.5 n = 0.8
LCommit*100 2.6809 1.7356
LCoop 2.7015 1.7542
LML 2.7034 1.7549
LFL 2.7043 1.7553
LNash 2.7034 1.7549
LRule 2.7775 1.8028
Non-benevolent: conservative and output-biased       
LMLconservative 2.7117 1.7663
LFLconservative 2.7128 1.7668
LNashconservative 2.7118 1.7664
LRuleconservative 2.7859 1.8143
LMLoutputbiased 2.7063 1.7571
LFLoutputbiased 2.7070 1.7573
LNashoutputbiased 2.7063 1.7570
Table D.6. Union-wide Loss
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TABLES
Benevolent n = 0.5 n = 0.8
LHCommit*100 2.6809 1.1353
LHCoop*100 2.7015 1.1470
LHML*100 2.7034 1.1473
LHFL*100 2.7043 1.1468
LHNash 2.7034 1.1472
LHRule*100 2.7775 1.1531
LFCommitment*100 2.6809 4.1369
LFCoop*100 2.7015 4.1830
LFML*100 2.7034 4.1852
LFFL*100 2.7043 4.1891
LFNash 2.7034 4.1855
LFRule*100 2.7775 4.4018
Non-benevolent: conservative and output-biased       
LHMLconservative 2.7117 1.1536
LHFLconservative 2.7128 1.1534
LHNashconservative 2.7118 1.1536
LHRuleconservative 2.7859 1.1595
LFMLconservative 2.7117 4.2173
LFFLconservative 2.7128 4.2205
LFNashconservative 2.7118 4.2177
LFRuleconservative 2.7859 4.4336
LHMLoutputbiased 2.7063 1.1470
LHFLoutputbiased 2.7070 1.1469
LHNashoutputbiased 2.7063 1.1469
LFMLoutputbiased 2.7063 4.1971
LFFLoutputbiased 2.7070 4.1989
LFNashoutputbiased 2.7063 4.1976
Table D.7. Loss of a representative H and F household
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TABLES
Asymmetric shocks only Productivity shock Mark-up shock
   nH = 0.5 nH = 0.8 nH = 0.5 nH = 0.8
LCoop 2.6213 1.6776 0.080186 0.076561
LML 2.6231 1.6783 0.080226 0.076584
LFL 2.6241 1.6787 0.080215 0.076577
LNash 2.6231 1.6783 0.080224 0.076581
LRule 2.6974 1.7263 0.080113 0.076514
LMLConservative 2.6230 1.6783 0.088662 0.088063
LFLConservative 2.6241 1.6787 0.088692 0.088091
LNashConservative 2.6230 1.6783 0.088751 0.088181
LRuleConservative 2.6974 1.7263 0.088568 0.088014
LMLoutputbiased 2.6261 1.6804 0.080274 0.076639
LFLoutputbiased 2.6268 1.6807 0.080257 0.076597
LNashoutputbiased 2.6261 1.6804 0.080264 0.076626
Table D.8. Union-wide Loss, mark-up and productivity shocks
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
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 +

LW  	LHFA   	 L
F
FA  LCB
Asymmetric shocks nH = 0.5 nH = 0.5 nH = 0.5 nH = 0.8 nH = 0.8 nH = 0.8
Both FAs minimize
CB minimize
LFA
LCB
LW
LCB
LW
LW
LFA
LCB
LW
LCB
LW
LW
LMLCB 1.3437 1.3323 1.3577 0.8597 0.8527 0.8872
LMLHFA 1.4608 1.4649 1.3438 1.0471 1.0490 0.8843
LMLFFA 1.4608 1.4649 1.3438 0.9569 0.9624 0.7976
LMLW 2.8044 2.7972 2.7015 1.8888 1.8843 1.7542
LFLCB 1.3436 1.3323 1.3577 0.8597 0.8527 0.8872
LFLHFA 1.4603 1.4643 1.3438 1.0465 1.0483 0.8843
LFLFFA 1.4603 1.4643 1.3438 0.9557 0.9612 0.7976
LFLW 2.8039 2.7966 2.7015 1.8880 1.8835 1.7542
LNCB 1.3437 1.3323 1.3577 0.8597 0.8527 0.8872
LNHFA 1.4608 1.4649 1.3438 1.0471 1.0490 0.8843
LNFFA 1.4608 1.4649 1.3438 0.9569 0.9624 0.7976
LNW 2.8044 2.7972 2.7015 1.8888 1.8843 1.7542
Table D.9. Extreme Preferences
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TABLES
LCB  	



)


  	

)


 	

)


  	

)


LHFA   


 
 

*



 *


 	 +


 


	 *
 +

LFFA   


 
 

*





 *

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	 *


 +

LW  	LHFA   	 L
F
FA  LCB
Asymmetric shocks EMU calibration
Both FAs minimize
CB minimize
LFA
LCB
Lw
LCB
Lw
Lw
LFA
Lw
LMLCB 43.0326 42.6028 43.5649 43.9945
LMLHFA 54.1122 54.2143 49.2021 49.0966
LMLFFA 48.8402 49.1947 44.2753 43.9163
LMLW 96.0903 95.8133 91.7816 92.0551
LFLCB 43.0365 42.6040 43.5649 43.9959
LFLHFA 54.0879 54.1944 49.2021 49.0971
LFLFFA 48.7962 49.1395 44.2753 43.9144
LFLW 96.0661 95.7875 91.7816 92.0565
LNCB 43.0329 42.6019 43.5649 43.9908
LNHFA 54.1118 54.2156 49.2021 49.1005
LNFFA 48.8398 49.1957 44.2753 43.9197
LNW 96.0903 95.8135 91.7816 92.0551
Table D.10. Extreme Preferences - EMU scenario
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TABLES
Benevolent nH = 0.5 nH = 0.8
LCoop LML LFL LCoop LML LFL
" 
" 
2.5961 2.5966 2.5969 1.6722 1.6723 1.6724
" 
" 
2.7015 2.7034 2.7043 1.7542 1.7549 1.7553
" %

" %

2.7282 2.7318 2.7334 1.7840 1.7855 1.7862
" 
" 
2.7204 2.7291 2.7320 1.8000 1.8044 1.8055
" 

" 

2.7374 2.7543 2.7585 1.8264 1.8359 1.8376
" 
" %

2.6894 2.6918 2.6931 1.7427 1.7437 1.7447
" 
" 
2.5331 2.5359 2.5378 1.6395 1.6414 1.6435
" 
" 

2.2449 2.2476 2.2496 1.4774 1.4807 1.4838
" %

" 
2.6894 2.6918 2.6931 1.7739 1.7750 1.7751
" 
" 
2.5331 2.5359 2.5378 1.7550 1.7565 1.7563
" 

" 
2.2449 2.2476 2.2496 1.6426 1.6442 1.6438
Table D.11. Union-wide Loss - nominal rigidities
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TABLES
Benevolent nH = 0.5 nH = 0.8
LHC LHML LHFL LFC LFML LFFL LHC LHML LHFL LFC LFML LFFL
" 
" 
2.5961 2.5966 2.5969 2.5961 2.5966 2.5969 1.2866 1.2867 1.2866 3.2143 3.2146 3.2158
" 
" 
2.7015 2.7034 2.7043 2.7015 2.7034 2.7043 1.1470 1.1473 1.1468 4.1830 4.1852 4.1891
" %

" %

2.7282 2.7318 2.7334 2.7282 2.7318 2.7334 1.0649 1.0655 1.0646 4.6603 4.6655 4.6723
" 
" 
2.7204 2.7291 2.7320 2.7204 2.7291 2.7320 0.9766 0.9785 0.9766 5.0937 5.1080 5.1212
" 

" 

2.7374 2.7543 2.7585 2.7374 2.7543 2.7585 0.9752 0.9813 0.9783 5.2311 5.2544 5.2748
" 
" %

2.6080 2.6115 2.6120 2.7707 2.7721 2.7742 1.0395 1.0403 1.0394 4.5555 4.5574 4.5657
" 
" 
2.3894 2.3952 2.3955 2.6768 2.6767 2.6800 0.9301 0.9322 0.9313 4.4770 4.4785 4.4920
" 
" 

2.1039 2.1108 2.1117 2.3859 2.3845 2.3875 0.8952 0.8997 0.9007 3.8061 3.8049 3.8164
" %

" 
2.7707 2.7721 2.7742 2.6080 2.6115 2.6120 1.1777 1.1778 1.1775 4.1588 4.1635 4.1655
" 
" 
2.6768 2.6767 2.6800 2.3894 2.3952 2.3955 1.2281 1.2279 1.2279 3.8626 3.8711 3.8700
" 

" 
2.3859 2.3845 2.3875 2.1039 2.1108 2.1117 1.2352 1.2347 1.2351 3.2719 3.2823 3.2789
Table D.12. Loss of a representative H and F household - nominal rigidities
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TABLES
Benevolent Cooperative nH = 0.5 nH = 0.8
Shocks Productivity Mark-up Productivity Mark-up
" 
" 
2.5658 0.0303 1.6421 0.0300
" 
" 
2.6213 0.0802 1.6776 0.0766
" %

" %

2.5910 0.1372 1.6583 0.1257
" 
" 
2.4259 0.2945 1.5526 0.2474
" 

" 

2.1599 0.5775 1.3823 0.4440
" 
" %

2.5821 0.1073 1.6518 0.0909
" 
" 
2.3675 0.1656 1.5103 0.1292
" 
" 

2.0175 0.2273 1.2937 0.1836
" %

" 
2.5821 0.1073 1.6642 0.1097
" 
" 
2.3675 0.1656 1.5850 0.1700
" 

" 
2.0175 0.2273 1.4209 0.2217
Table D.13. Union-wide Loss, mark-up and productivity shocks - nominal rigidities
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TABLES
Benevolent Cooperative nH = 0.5 nH = 0.8
Shocks Productivity Mark-up Productivity Mark-up
LHC LFC LHC LFC LHC LFC LHC LFC
" 
" 
2.5658 2.5658 0.0303 0.0303 1.2573 3.1813 0.0293 0.0331
" 
" 
2.6213 2.6213 0.0802 0.0802 1.0762 4.0835 0.0708 0.0995
" %

" %

2.5910 2.5910 0.1372 0.1372 0.9552 4.4707 0.1097 0.1897
" 
" 
2.4259 2.4259 0.2945 0.2945 0.7880 4.6108 0.1885 0.4830
" 

" 

2.1599 2.1599 0.5775 0.5775 0.6833 4.1783 0.2918 1.0527
" 
" %

2.5132 2.6510 0.0949 0.1197 0.9647 4.4002 0.0748 0.1553
" 
" 
2.2466 2.4884 0.1428 0.1884 0.8383 4.1986 0.0919 0.2785
" 
" 

1.8875 2.1476 0.2164 0.2383 0.7635 3.4148 0.1317 0.3914
" %

" 
2.6510 2.5132 0.1197 0.0949 1.0725 4.0310 0.1052 0.1278
" 
" 
2.4884 2.2466 0.1884 0.1428 1.0656 3.6627 0.1625 0.2000
" 

" 
2.1476 1.8875 0.2383 0.2164 1.0276 2.9940 0.2076 0.2779
Table D.14. Loss of a representative H and F household, mark-up and productivity shocks
- nominal rigidities
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TABLES
Benevolent nH = 0.5 nH = 0.8
Productivity Mark-up Productivity Mark-up
LC LHC LFC LC LHC LFC LC LHC LFC LC LHC LFC
$ 
$ 
2.6213 2.6213 2.6213 0.0802 0.0802 0.0802 1.6776 1.0762 4.0835 0.0766 0.0708 0.0995
$ 
$ 
2.4830 2.4830 2.4830 0.1038 0.1038 0.1038 1.5891 1.0095 3.9075 0.0994 0.0911 0.1326
$ 
$ 
2.3404 2.3404 2.3404 0.1068 0.1068 0.1068 1.4978 0.9657 3.6264 0.1028 0.0946 0.1358
$ 
$ 
2.4644 2.2888 2.6399 0.0933 0.0835 0.1032 1.5275 0.9447 3.8589 0.0819 0.0712 0.1247
$ 
$ 
2.4644 2.6399 2.2888 0.0933 0.1032 0.0835 1.6344 1.1017 3.7650 0.0973 0.0943 0.1094
Table D.15. Loss of a representative H and F household - ination persistence
Baseline: &='=0.4 =4.5 =11 =0.47 !=0.99"

="

=0.75$

=$

=1   n = 0.5 B/4Y=15%

 


 ,


 ,


 


 


 


 +
 


 




 -0.0392 -0.0392 0.0396 0.0396 -0.0016 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0319 0.0319
*
 0.2217 -0.1488 -0.0663 -0.0072 0.0015 -0.2167 0.2167 -0.3881 -0.0534 -0.0058
Coop (
 -0.5701 -2.0372 2.4255 0.2031 -0.0531 1.1064 -1.1064 1.9819 1.9561 0.1638
*
 -0.1488 0.2217 -0.0072 -0.0663 0.0015 0.2167 -0.2167 0.3881 -0.0058 -0.0534
(
 -2.0372 -0.5701 0.2031 2.4255 -0.0531 -1.1064 1.1064 -1.9819 0.1638 1.9561
Rule 
 0.5062 0.5062 -0.5104 -0.5104 0.0206 0 0 0 0 0
Table D.16. Feedback coefficients of policy rules (small debt) - cooperation
Baseline: &='=0.4 =4.5 =11 =0.47 !=0.99"

="

=0.75$

=$

=1   n = 0.5 B/4Y=60%

 


 ,


 ,


 


 


 


 +
 


 




 0.7052 0.7052 -0.1734 -0.1734 -0.2400 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.5733 -0.5733
*
 0.2642 -0.1062 -0.0497 0.0109 -0.0269 -0.2053 0.2053 - 0.3678 -0.1644 0.0359
Coop (
 0.4607 -0.8773 1.0910 -0.9886 0.0709 0.6206 -0.6206 1.1117 3.6068 -3.2681
*
 -0.1062 0.2642 0.0109 -0.0497 -0.0269 0.2053 -0.2053 0.3678 0.0359 -0.1644
(
 -0.8773 0.4607 -0.9886 1.0910 0.0709 -0.6206 0.6206 -1.1117 -3.2681 3.6068
Rule 
 0.5912 0.5912 -0.1454 -0.1454 -0.2012 0 0 0 0 0
Table D.17. Feedback coefficients of policy rules (large debt) - cooperation
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TABLES
Baseline: ==0.4 =4.5 =11 =0.47=0.99

=

=0.75

=

=1    n = 0.5 B/4Y=15%
	 	

 


 


 

 	

 	

  

 

  

 

 

 


 -0.0261 -0.0261 0.0263 0.0263 -0.0011 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0212 0.0212
 0.2230 -0.1563 -0.0594 -0.0078 0.0014 -0.3985 0.3985 -0.7138 -0.0479 -0.0063
N  -0.2434 -2.1553 2.1416 0.2766 -0.0489 6.8393 -6.8393 12.2515 1.7271 0.2231
 -0.1563 0.2230 -0.0078 -0.0594 0.0014 0.3985 -0.3985 0.7138 -0.0063 -0.0479
 -2.1553 -0.2434 0.2766 2.1416 -0.0489 -6.8393 6.8393 -12.2515 0.2231 1.7271
 0.0988 0.0988 -0.0996 -0.0996 0.0040 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0803 -0.0803 0.0174 0.0527 0.0174 0.0527
 0.2229 -0.1562 -0.0594 -0.0079 0.0014 -0.3821 0.3821 -0.6845 -0.0479 -0.0063
FL  -0.3320 -2.1059 2.2453 0.2125 -0.0497 6.3636 -6.3636 11.3994 1.8108 0.1714
 -0.1562 0.2229 -0.0079 -0.0594 0.0014 0.3821 -0.3821 0.6845 -0.0063 -0.0479
 -2.1059 -0.3320 0.2125 2.2453 -0.0497 -6.3636 6.3636 -11.3994 0.1714 1.8108
 -0.0375 -0.0375 0.0378 0.0378 -0.0015 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0305 0.0305
 0.2239 -0.1552 -0.0603 -0.0089 0.0014 -0.3913 0.3913 -0.7010 -0.0487 -0.0072 0.0667
ML  -0.0960 -2.0709 1.9921 0.1924 -0.0442 6.2414 -6.2414 11.1803 1.6066 0.1552 3.1149
 -0.1552 0.2239 -0.0089 -0.0603 0.0014 0.3913 -0.3913 0.7010 -0.0072 -0.0487 0.0667
 -2.0709 -0.0960 0.1924 1.9921 -0.0442 -6.2414 6.2414 -11.1803 0.1552 1.6066 3.1149
Table D.18. Feedback coefficients of policy rules (small debt) - non-cooperation
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TABLES
Baseline: ==0.4 =4.5 =11 =0.47=0.99

=

=0.75

=

=1   n = 0.5 B/4Y=60%
	 	

 


 


 

 	

 	

  

 

  

 

 

 


 0.7769 0.7769 -0.1911 -0.1911 -0.2644 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.6316 -0.6316
 0.2616 -0.1234 -0.0471 0.0131 -0.0235 -0.2269 0.2269 -0.4065 -0.1557 0.0433
N  1.6351 -0.5481 0.5464 -0.8137 -0.1850 -1.8627 1.8627 -3.3367 1.8061 -2.6899
 -0.1234 0.2616 0.0131 -0.0471 -0.0235 0.2269 -0.2269 0.4065 0.0433 -0.1557
 -0.5481 1.6351 -0.8137 0.5464 -0.1850 1.8627 -1.8627 3.3367 -2.6899 1.8061
 0.7491 0.7491 -0.1842 -0.1842 -0.2550 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.6090 -0.6090 -0.0588 0.0332 -0.0588 0.0332
 0.2582 -0.1197 -0.0437 0.0097 -0.0236 -0.1830 0.1830 -0.3278 -0.1445 0.0320
FL  1.7424 -0.6456 0.4446 -0.7143 -0.1866 -2.6778 2.6778 -4.7968 1.4696 -2.3613
 -0.1197 0.2582 0.0097 -0.0437 -0.0236 0.1830 -0.1830 0.3278 0.0320 -0.1445
 -0.6456 1.7424 -0.7143 0.4446 -0.1866 2.6778 -2.6778 4.7968 -2.3613 1.4696
 0.7162 0.7162 -0.1761 -0.1761 -0.2437 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.5823 -0.5823
 0.3232 -0.0615 -0.0621 -0.0023 -0.0445 -0.2350 0.2350 -0.4210 -0.2052 -0.0076 -0.0803
ML  -0.7074 -2.8514 1.1360 -0.2607 0.6056 -1.5500 1.5500 -2.7766 3.7553 -0.8619 3.0057
 -0.0615 0.3232 -0.0023 -0.0621 -0.0445 0.2350 -0.2350 0.4210 -0.0076 -0.2052 -0.0803
 -2.8514 -0.7074 -0.2607 1.1360 0.6056 1.5500 -1.5500 2.7766 -0.8619 3.7553 3.0057
Table D.19. Feedback coefficients of policy rules (large debt) - non-cooperation
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TABLES
Baseline: ==0.4 =4.5 =11 =0.47 =0.99

=

=0.75

=

=1   n = 0.8 B/4Y=15%
	 	

 


 


 

 	

 	

  

 


 -0.0628 -0.0157 0.0633 0.0158 -0.0016 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0510 0.0128
 0.1324 -0.0595 -0.0706 -0.0029 0.0015 -0.0867 0.0867 -0.1552 -0.0569 -0.0023
Coop  -1.7924 -0.8149 2.5474 0.0812 -0.0531 0.4426 -0.4426 0.7928 2.0543 0.0655
 -0.2381 0.3109 -0.0115 -0.0619 0.0015 0.3467 -0.3467 0.6210 -0.0093 -0.0500
 -3.2595 0.6522 0.3249 2.3037 -0.0531 -1.7702 1.7702 -3.1711 0.2620 1.8578
Rule  0.8100 0.2025 -0.8166 -0.2041 0.0206 0 0 0 0 0
Table D.20. Feedback coefficients of policy rules (small debt, size-asymmetry) - cooper-
ation
Baseline: ==0.4 =4.5 =11 =0.47=0.99

=

=0.75

=

=1   n = 0.8 B/4Y=60%
	 	

 


 


 

 	

 	

  

 


 1.1283 0.2821 -0.2775 -0.0694 -0.2400 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.9173 -0.2293
 0.2005 -0.0425 -0.0432 0.0043 -0.0269 -0.0821 0.0821 -0.1471 -0.1428 0.0144
Coop  -0.0657 -0.3509 0.4979 -0.3954 0.0709 0.2482 -0.2482 0.4447 1.6459 -1.3072
 -0.1699 0.3279 0.0174 -0.0562 -0.0269 0.3285 -0.3285 0.5885 0.0574 -0.1859
 -1.4037 0.9871 -1.5817 1.6842 0.0709 -0.9929 0.9929 -1.7786 -5.2289 5.5676
Rule  0.9460 0.2365 -0.2327 -0.0582 -0.2012 0 0 0 0 0
Table D.21. Feedback coefficients of policy rules (large debt, size-asymmetry) - cooper-
ation
186
TABLES
Baseline: ==0.4 =4.5 =11 =0.47 =0.99

=

=0.75

=

=1   n = 0.8 B/4Y=15%
	 	

 


 


 

 	

 	

  

 

  

 

 

 


 -0.0395 -0.0055 0.0337 0.0116 -0.0009 0.0809 -0.0809 0.1449 0.0272 0.0094
 0.1235 -0.0555 -0.0604 -0.0081 -0.0014 -0.3152 0.3152 -0.5646 -0.0487 -0.0065
N  -1.3848 -0.9624 2.1126 0.2538 -0.0478 7.4588 -7.4588 13.3612 1.7037 0.2047
 -0.2581 0.3223 -0.0119 -0.0529 0.0013 0.5957 -0.5957 1.0670 -0.0096 -0.0427
 -3.5163 1.1845 0.4026 1.9483 -0.0475 -10.2829 10.2829 -18.4200 0.3246 1.5712
 0.1505 0.0451 -0.1442 -0.0531 0.0040 -0.2637 0.2637 -0.4724 -0.1163 -0.0428 0.0325 0.0808 0.0029 0.0232
 0.1233 -0.0556 -0.0601 -0.0082 0.0014 -0.3073 0.3073 -0.5504 -0.0485 -0.0066
FL  -1.4113 -0.9376 2.1521 0.2160 -0.0479 7.3468 -7.3468 13.1606 1.7356 0.1742
 -0.2586 0.3233 -0.0114 -0.0539 0.0013 0.5801 -0.5801 1.0392 -0.0092 -0.0435
 -3.4870 1.1031 0.3646 2.0388 -0.0486 -9.9185 9.9185 -17.7673 0.2940 1.6442
 -0.0638 -0.0114 0.0639 0.0120 -0.0015 -0.0422 0.0422 -0.0755 0.0515 0.0097
 0.1365 -0.0616 -0.0731 -0.0025 0.0015 -0.1325 0.1325 -0.2373 -0.0589 -0.0020 0.0675
ML  -1.5298 -0.7924 2.2790 0.0622 -0.0473 1.7297 -1.7297 3.0984 1.8379 0.0502 3.2302
 -0.2528 0.3094 -0.0164 -0.0407 0.0012 0.6863 -0.6863 1.2294 -0.0132 -0.0328 0.0654
 -3.4474 1.7321 0.3414 1.3880 -0.0350 -11.5969 11.5969 -20.7739 0.2753 1.1194 3.0009
Table D.22. Feedback coefficients of policy rules (small debt, size-asymmetry) - non-cooperation
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TABLES
Baseline: ==0.4 =4.5 =11 =0.47 =0.99

=

=0.75

=

=1   n = 0.8 B/4Y=60%
	 	

 


 


 

 	

 	

  

 

  

 

 

 


 1.1694 0.3891 -0.2338 -0.1495 -0.2652 -3.1787 3.1787 -5.6941 -0.7730 -0.4942
 0.1619 -0.0396 -0.0242 -0.0059 -0.0208 -0.3065 0.3065 -0.5490 -0.0800 -0.0194
N  1.3014 -0.3765 -0.0721 -0.1553 -0.1574 -3.5439 3.5439 -6.3483 -0.2384 -0.5135
 -0.1984 0.3480 0.0210 -0.0578 -0.0255 0.4076 -0.4076 0.7302 0.0694 -0.1910
 -0.4382 1.8071 -1.6558 1.3191 -0.2330 -16.9330 16.9330 -30.3326 -5.4738 4.3608
 1.1514 0.3466 -0.1666 -0.2018 -0.2549 -2.3561 2.3561 -4.2206 -0.5509 -0.6670 -0.0552 0.0259 -0.0623 0.0398
 0.1603 -0.0378 -0.0226 -0.0075 -0.0208 -0.2692 0.2692 -0.4823 -0.0747 -0.0249
FL  1.3680 -0.4020 -0.1151 -0.1225 -0.1644 -4.0777 4.0777 -7.3045 -0.3805 -0.4048
 -0.1945 0.3440 0.0172 -0.0539 -0.0254 0.3051 -0.3051 0.5466 0.0568 -0.1783
 -0.5850 1.9612 -1.5078 1.1694 -0.2342 -13.0557 13.0557 -23.3870 -4.9846 3.8657
 1.0652 0.3740 -0.1957 -0.1582 -0.2449 -3.0052 3.0052 -5.3833 -0.6470 -0.5231
 0.2077 -0.0223 -0.0323 -0.0133 -0.0315 -0.4877 0.4877 -0.8736 -0.1069 -0.0438 -0.0432
ML  -0.0952 -0.8401 0.2100 0.0200 0.1592 -0.0250 0.0250 -0.0447 0.6942 0.0662 1.2287
 -0.1055 0.3864 0.0069 -0.0760 -0.0478 0.0574 -0.0574 0.1028 0.0227 -0.2512 -0.0824
 -4.2353 0.3678 -1.0044 1.9556 0.6582 -4.6962 4.6962 -8.4124 -3.3203 6.4647 3.3086
Table D.23. Feedback coefficients of policy rules (large debt, size-asymmetry) - non-cooperation
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TABLES
Baseline: ==0.4 =4.5 =11 =0.47 =0.99

=

=0.75

=

=1    n = 0.5 B/4Y=15%

=0.75= =0.5
	 	

 


 


 

 	

 	

  

 

  

 

 

 


R  0.4868 0.4868 -0.4908 -0.4908 0.0198 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
 0.1269 0.1269 -0.1280 -0.1280 0.0052 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.1032 -0.1032 0.0076 0.0901 0.0076 0.0901
 0.2158 -0.1607 -0.0523 -0.0032 0.0011 -0.3449 0.3449 -0.6178 -0.0422 -0.0026
FL  -0.0925 -2.0084 2.0141 0.1040 -0.0428 4.2763 -4.2763 7.6602 1.6243 0.0839
 -0.1607 0.2158 -0.0032 -0.0523 0.0011 0.3449 -0.3449 0.6178 -0.0026 -0.0422
 -2.0084 -0.0925 0.1040 2.0141 -0.0428 -4.2763 4.2763 -7.6602 0.0839 1.6243
 -0.0719 -0.0719 0.0725 0.0725 -0.0029 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0584 0.0584
 0.2204 -0.1583 -0.0569 -0.0058 0.0013 -0.3641 0.3641 -0.6522 -0.0459 -0.0047 0.0586
ML  0.1135 -2.0691 1.7792 0.1924 -0.0398 4.2208 -4.2208 7.5609 1.4348 0.1552 3.4871
 -0.1583 0.2204 -0.0058 -0.0569 0.0013 0.3641 -0.3641 0.6522 -0.0047 -0.0459 0.0586
 -2.0691 0.1135 0.1924 1.7792 -0.0398 -4.2208 4.2208 -7.5609 0.1552 1.4348 3.4871
Table D.24. Feedback coefficients of policy rules (small debt) - conservative CB
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TABLES
Baseline: ==0.4 =4.5 =11 =0.47 =0.99

=

=0.75

=

=1    n = 0.5 B/4Y=60%

=0.75= =0.5
	 	

 


 


 

 	

 	

  

 

  

 

 

 


R  0.5880 0.5880 -0.1446 -0.1446 -0.2001 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
 0.8422 0.8422 -0.2071 -0.2071 -0.2867 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.6848 -0.6848 -0.0725 0.0165 -0.0725 0.0165
 0.2556 -0.1194 -0.0419 0.0084 -0.0232 -0.1839 0.1839 -0.3295 -0.1386 0.0279
FL  1.8705 -0.4515 0.4380 -0.7870 -0.2415 -2.4486 2.4486 -4.3863 1.4481 -2.6017
 -0.1194 0.2556 0.0084 -0.0419 -0.0232 0.1839 -0.1839 0.3295 0.0279 -0.1386
 -0.4515 1.8705 -0.7870 0.4380 -0.2415 2.4486 -2.4486 4.3863 -2.6017 1.4481
 0.8880 0.8880 -0.2184 -0.2184 -0.3022 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.7219 -0.7219
 0.3184 -0.0670 -0.0613 -0.0005 -0.0428 -0.2148 0.2148 -0.3849 -0.2026 -0.0018 -0.0716
ML  -0.4613 -2.7103 1.0391 -0.2590 0.5398 -2.2958 2.2958 -4.1125 3.4350 -0.8563 2.7478
 -0.0670 0.3184 -0.0005 -0.0613 -0.0428 0.2148 -0.2148 0.3849 -0.0018 -0.2026 -0.0716
 -2.7103 -0.4613 -0.2590 1.0391 0.5398 2.2958 -2.2958 4.1125 -0.8563 3.4350 2.7478
Table D.25. Feedback coefficients of policy rules (large debt) - conservative CB
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TABLES
Baseline: ==0.4 =4.5 =11 =0.47 =0.99

=

=0.75

=

=1    n = 0.8 B/4Y=15%, 

=0.75= =0.5
	 	

 


 


 

 	

 	

  

 

  

 

 

 


R  0.7789 0.1947 -0.7852 -0.1963 0.0198 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
 0.1831 0.0751 -0.1484 -0.1119 0.0053 -0.8300 0.8300 -1.4868 -0.1196 -0.0903 0.0292 0.1264 -0.0154 0.0452
 0.1083 -0.0534 -0.0450 -0.0104 0.0011 -0.4259 0.4259 -0.7630 -0.0363 -0.0084
FL  -0.6257 -0.9105 1.3665 0.1823 -0.0313 9.1959 -9.1959 16.4729 1.1020 0.1470
 -0.2672 0.3342 -0.0030 -0.0645 0.0014 0.3866 -0.3866 0.6926 -0.0024 -0.0520
 -3.2426 0.6111 0.1162 2.5369 -0.0536 -3.2433 3.2433 -5.8099 0.0937 2.0459
 -0.1248 -0.0173 0.1265 0.0167 -0.0029 -0.1849 0.1849 -0.3313 0.1021 0.0135
 0.1345 -0.0658 -0.0709 0.0016 0.0014 -0.0744 0.0744 -0.1333 -0.0572 0.0013 0.0583
ML  -1.3333 -0.7335 2.0832 0.0004 -0.0421 -0.5291 0.5291 -0.9478 1.6800 0.0004 3.7629
 -0.2555 0.3042 -0.0134 -0.0357 0.0010 0.6655 -0.6655 1.1922 -0.0108 -0.0288 0.0595
 -3.4735 1.9674 0.3661 1.1523 -0.0307 -9.3738 9.3738 -16.7916 0.2952 0.9293 3.0595
Table D.26. Feedback coefficients of policy rules (small debt, size-asymmetry) - conservative CB
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TABLES
Baseline: ==0.4 =4.5 =11 =0.47=0.99

=

=0.75

=

=1    n = 0.8 B/4Y=60%, 

=0.75= =0.5
	 	

 


 


 

 	

 	

  

 

  

 

 

 


R  0.9409 0.2352 -0.2314 -0.0578 -0.2001 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
 1.3016 0.3855 -0.1713 -0.2436 -0.2871 -2.6368 2.6368 -4.7233 -0.5662 -0.8054 -0.0685 -0.0093 -0.0769 0.0428
 0.1584 -0.0372 -0.0215 -0.0083 -0.0206 -0.2710 0.2710 -0.4854 -0.0712 -0.0274
FL  1.6818 -0.2057 -0.1177 -0.2454 -0.2512 -4.6132 4.6132 -8.2638 -0.3890 -0.8111
 -0.1975 0.3433 0.0179 -0.0538 -0.0248 0.2777 -0.2777 0.4975 0.0592 -0.1777
 -0.5032 2.0796 -1.4682 1.0805 -0.2683 -11.6668 11.6668 -20.8990 -4.8537 3.5720
 1.2661 0.4651 -0.2212 -0.2046 -0.2946 -3.3766 3.3766 -6.0486 -0.7313 -0.6762
 0.2050 -0.0230 -0.0318 -0.0130 -0.0310 -0.4669 0.4669 -0.8364 -0.1050 -0.0429 -0.0403
ML  -0.1935 -0.8875 0.2248 0.0410 0.1840 -0.0103 0.0103 -0.0184 0.7433 0.1356 1.4020
 -0.1116 0.3851 0.0086 -0.0759 -0.0465 0.0491 -0.0491 0.0880 0.0284 -0.2508 -0.0763
 -4.0427 0.4840 -1.0115 1.8868 0.6056 -3.6964 3.6964 -6.6214 -3.3439 6.2372 3.0994
Table D.27. Feedback coefficients of policy rules (large debt, size-asymmetry) - conservative CB
192
TABLES
Baseline: ==0.4 =4.5 =11 =0.47 =0.99

=

=0.75

=

=1    n = 0.5 B/4Y=15% 

=0.5= =0.75
	 	

 


 


 

 	

 	

  

 

  

 

 

 


 0.1023 0.1023 -0.1031 -0.1031 0.0042 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0832 -0.0832 0.0161 0.0533 0.0161 0.0533
 0.1859 -0.1590 -0.0238 -0.0034 0.0005 -0.1924 0.1924 -0.3446 -0.0192 -0.0027
FL  -0.6231 -1.8818 2.4964 0.0290 -0.0510 2.0627 -2.0627 3.6950 2.0133 0.0234
 -0.1590 0.1859 -0.0034 -0.0238 0.0005 0.1924 -0.1924 0.3446 -0.0027 -0.0192
 -1.8818 -0.6231 0.0290 2.4964 -0.0510 -2.0627 2.0627 -3.6950 0.0234 2.0133
 -0.0407 -0.0407 0.0410 0.0410 -0.0017 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0331 0.0331
 0.1873 -0.1582 -0.0253 -0.0040 0.0006 -0.1909 0.1909 -0.3419 -0.0204 -0.0032 0.0578
ML  -0.5064 -1.8738 2.3321 0.0677 -0.0485 2.3321 -2.3321 4.1775 1.8807 0.0546 3.4670
 -0.1582 0.1873 -0.0040 -0.0253 0.0006 0.1909 -0.1909 0.3419 -0.0032 -0.0204 0.0578
 -1.8738 -0.5064 0.0677 2.3321 -0.0485 -2.3321 2.3321 -4.1775 0.0546 1.8807 3.4670
Table D.28. Feedback coefficients of policy rules (small debt) - output-biased FAs
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TABLES
Baseline: ==0.4 =4.5 =11 =0.47 =0.99

=

=0.75

=

=1    n = 0.5 B/4Y=60% 

=0.5= =0.75
	 	

 


 


 

 	

 	

  

 

  

 

 

 


 0.6987 0.6987 -0.1719 -0.1719 -0.2378 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.5681 -0.5681 -0.0514 0.0229 -0.0514 0.0229
 0.2244 -0.1180 -0.0231 -0.0031 -0.0181 -0.1376 0.1376 -0.2464 -0.0763 -0.0101
FL  -0.0370 -1.8449 1.0769 -0.6141 0.3203 -4.7126 4.7126 -8.4417 3.5601 -2.0301
 -0.1180 0.2244 -0.0031 -0.0231 -0.0181 0.1376 -0.1376 0.2464 -0.0101 -0.0763
 -1.8449 -0.0370 -0.6141 1.0769 0.3203 4.7126 -4.7126 8.4417 -2.0301 3.5601
 0.7088 0.7088 -0.1743 -0.1743 -0.2413 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.5763 -0.5763
 0.2364 -0.1098 -0.0274 -0.0037 -0.0215 -0.1549 0.1549 -0.2775 -0.0906 -0.0123 -0.0191
ML  -2.4334 -4.0810 1.7245 -0.1224 1.1086 -4.0844 4.0844 -7.3166 5.7010 -0.4045 3.7767
 -0.1098 0.2364 -0.0037 -0.0274 -0.0215 0.1549 -0.1549 0.2775 -0.0123 -0.0906 -0.0191
 -4.0810 -2.4334 -0.1224 1.7245 1.1086 4.0844 -4.0844 7.3166 -0.4045 5.7010 3.7767
Table D.29. Feedback coefficients of policy rules (large debt) - output-biased FAs
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TABLES
Baseline: ==0.4 =4.5 =11 =0.47=0.99

=

=0.75

=

=1    n = 0.8 B/4Y=15% 

=0.5= =0.75
	 	

 


 


 

 	

 	

  

 

  

 

 

 


 0.1529 0.0458 -0.1447 -0.0556 0.0040 -0.2559 0.2559 -0.4585 -0.1167 -0.0448 0.0322 0.0803 0.0021 0.0236
 0.0872 -0.0598 -0.0243 -0.0033 0.0006 -0.1368 0.1368 -0.2450 -0.0196 -0.0027
FL  -1.4716 -0.7973 2.1786 0.1088 -0.0462 5.3041 -5.3041 9.5013 1.7569 0.0878
 -0.2633 0.2901 -0.0045 -0.0225 0.0005 0.2942 -0.2942 0.5271 -0.0037 -0.0182
 -3.2335 0.6022 0.1489 2.5040 -0.0536 -4.2152 4.2152 -7.5507 0.1200 2.0193
 -0.0669 -0.0136 0.0685 0.0127 -0.0016 -0.1038 0.1038 -0.1859 0.0552 0.0103
 0.0941 -0.0630 -0.0312 -0.0002 0.0006 -0.0403 0.0403 -0.0722 -0.0251 -0.0002 0.0581
ML  -1.8516 -0.6470 2.5586 -0.0395 -0.0509 -1.2857 1.2857 -2.3031 2.0634 -0.0319 3.7417
 -0.2587 0.2840 -0.0086 -0.0170 0.0005 0.3728 -0.3728 0.6678 -0.0069 -0.0137 0.0576
 -3.2699 1.2306 0.2417 1.8142 -0.0416 -8.8948 8.8948 -15.9335 0.1949 1.4631 3.0863
Table D.30. Feedback coefficients of policy rules (small debt, size-asymmetry) - output-biased FAs
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TABLES
Baseline: ==0.4 =4.5 =11 =0.47 =0.99

=

=0.75

=

=1    n = 0.8 B/4Y=60% 

=0.5= =0.75
	 	

 


 


 

 	

 	

  

 

  

 

 

 


 1.0937 0.3012 -0.1895 -0.1536 -0.2374 -1.3145 1.3145 -2.3546 -0.6263 -0.5078 -0.0569 0.0167 -0.0455 0.0292
 0.1434 -0.0421 -0.0196 -0.0053 -0.0172 -0.1625 0.1625 -0.2912 -0.0647 -0.0177
FL  -1.1895 -0.9379 0.5603 -0.0371 0.3620 0.2331 -0.2331 0.4176 1.8523 -0.1227
 -0.1974 0.3079 -0.0024 -0.0247 -0.0188 0.1590 -0.1590 0.2849 -0.0080 -0.0818
 -2.4836 0.9486 -1.3434 1.7209 0.2612 -1.2761 1.2761 -2.2859 -4.4410 5.6890
 1.0572 0.3140 -0.2281 -0.1092 -0.2334 -1.2710 1.2710 -2.2767 -0.7540 -0.3609
 0.1535 -0.0409 -0.0228 -0.0049 -0.0192 -0.1838 0.1838 -0.3293 -0.0755 -0.0160 -0.0131
ML  -3.6055 -1.5808 1.1413 0.1343 0.8826 3.5091 -3.5091 6.2860 3.7728 0.4440 2.4378
 -0.1818 0.3142 -0.0050 -0.0276 -0.0225 0.1724 -0.1724 0.3088 -0.0164 -0.0912 -0.0196
 -6.5617 -0.4126 -0.5241 2.2394 1.1869 2.2800 -2.2800 4.0843 -1.7327 7.4031 4.4861
Table D.31. Feedback coefficients of policy rules (large debt, size-asymmetry) - output-biased FAs
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TABLES
Idiosyncratic B/4Y = 15% B/4Y = 15% B/4Y= 60% B/4Y = 60%
Benevolent n = 0.5 n = 0.8 n =0.5 n = 0.8
LCommit*100 3.9719 2.5309 3.9791 2.5384
LCoop 4.9082 3.3339 4.8950 3.3917
LML 4.7941 3.2523 5.0697 3.4625
LFL 4.8393 3.2771 5.3826 3.5623
LNash 4.8134 3.2617 5.1264 3.5174
LSGP 19.0535 15.8344 20.9953 20.4378
Non-benevolent: conservative and output-biased       
LMLconservative 4.7527 3.2645 5.2812 3.5302
LFLconservative 4.7521 3.4264 5.2958 3.4638
LSGPconservative 14.3621 10.8245 17.6939 16.0476
LMLoutputbiased 4.8562 3.3321 5.5657 3.4574
LFLoutputbiased 4.8685 3.3357 5.8475 3.5671
Table D.32. Union-wide Loss (debt model)
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TABLES
Idiosyncratic B/4Y = 15% B/4Y = 15% B/4Y= 60% B/4Y = 60%
Benevolent n = 0.5 n = 0.8 n =0.5 n = 0.8
LHCommit*100 3.9719 2.2346 3.9791 2.2359
LHCoop*100 4.9082 2.6778 4.8950 2.7272
LHML*100 4.7941 2.8883 5.0697 2.5531
LHFL*100 4.8393 2.6682 5.3826 2.4701
LHNash 4.8134 2.6668 5.1264 2.5232
LHSGP*100 19.0535 12.5095 20.9953 17.8389
LFCommitment*100 3.9719 3.7158 3.9791 3.7482
LFCoop*100 4.9082 5.9584 4.8950 6.0497
LFML*100 4.7941 4.7085 5.0697 7.1002
LFFL*100 4.8393 5.7125 5.3826 7.9314
LFNash 4.8134 5.6416 5.1264 7.4944
LFSGP*100 19.0535 29.1342 20.9953 30.8335
Non-benevolent: conservative and output-biased       
LHMLconservative 4.7527 2.9407 5.2812 2.6257
LHFLconservative 4.7521 2.4945 5.2958 2.5010
LHSGPconservative 14.3621 7.3225 17.6939 13.0614
LFMLconservative 4.7527 4.5595 5.2812 7.1485
LFFLconservative 4.7521 7.1537 5.2958 7.3151
LFSGPconservative 14.3621 24.8326 17.6939 27.9925
LHMLoutputbiased 4.8562 2.8677 5.5657 2.7015
LHFLoutputbiased 4.8685 2.6630 5.8475 2.6492
LFMLoutputbiased 4.8562 5.1897 5.5657 6.4814
LFFLoutputbiased 4.8685 6.0267 5.8475 7.2384
Table D.33. Loss of a representative H and F household (debt model)
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TABLES
Symmetric B/4Y = 15% B/4Y = 15% B/4Y= 60% B/4Y = 60%
Benevolent n = 0.5 n = 0.8 n =0.5 n = 0.8
LCommit*100 0.0139 0.0139 0.0149 0.0159
LCoop 0.5351 0.5351 0.7192 0.7192
LML 0.5355 0.5324 0.7259 0.7283
LFL 0.5417 0.5462 0.7323 0.7376
LNash 0.5441 0.5488 0.7320 0.7371
LSGP 10.1117 10.1117 19.4468 19.4468
Non-benevolent: conservative and output-biased       
LMLconservative 0.5136 0.5007 0.7992 0.7859
LFLconservative 0.4634 0.4809 0.7683 0.7714
LSGPconservative 4.5354 4.5354 13.1210 13.1210
LMLoutputbiased 0.5459 0.5409 0.7535 0.7872
LFLoutputbiased 0.5516 0.5517 0.7839 0.8041
Table D.34. Union-wide Loss (debt model) - symmetric shocks
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TABLES
Symmetric B/4Y = 15% B/4Y = 15% B/4Y= 60% B/4Y = 60%
Benevolent n = 0.5 n = 0.8 n =0.5 n = 0.8
LHCommit*100 0.0139 0.0139 0.0149 0.0157
LHCoop*100 0.5351 0.5351 0.7192 0.7192
LHML*100 0.5355 0.5392 0.7259 0.7284
LHFL*100 0.5417 0.5458 0.7323 0.7404
LHNash 0.5441 0.5490 0.7320 0.7400
LHSGP*100 10.1117 10.1117 19.4468 19.4468
LFCommitment*100 0.0139 0.0139 0.0149 0.0169
LFCoop*100 0.5351 0.5351 0.7192 0.7192
LFML*100 0.5355 0.5052 0.7259 0.7277
LFFL*100 0.5417 0.5476 0.7323 0.7267
LFNash 0.5441 0.5479 0.7320 0.7253
LFSGP*100 10.1117 10.1117 19.4468 19.4468
Non-benevolent: conservative and output-biased       
LHMLconservative 0.5136 0.5069 0.7992 0.7891
LHFLconservative 0.4634 0.4717 0.7683 0.7714
LHSGPconservative 4.5354 4.5354 13.1210 13.1210
LFMLconservative 0.5136 0.4763 0.7992 0.7729
LFFLconservative 0.4634 0.5178 0.7683 0.7712
LFSGPconservative 4.5354 4.5354 13.1210 13.1210
LHMLoutputbiased 0.5459 0.5437 0.7535 0.8021
LHFLoutputbiased 0.5516 0.5500 0.7839 0.8139
LFMLoutputbiased 0.5459 0.5298 0.7535 0.7275
LFFLoutputbiased 0.5516 0.5584 0.7839 0.7647
Table D.35. Loss of a representative H and F household (dbt model) - symmetric shocks
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TABLES
Symmetric shocks LCoop LCoop L Coop LML LML LML
Benevolent n = 0.5 n = 0.5 n = 0.5 n = 0.5 n =0.5 n =0.5
B/4Y = 10% 0.4268 0.4268 0.4268 0.4269 0.4269 0.4269
B/4Y	H = 10%
B/4Y	F = 20%
0.5405 0.4630 0.6179 0.5275 0.4493 0.6057
B/4Y = 20% 0.6323 0.6323 0.6323 0.6421 0.6421 0.6421
B/4Y = 60% 0.7192 0.7192 0.7192 0.7259 0.7259 0.7259
B/4Y	H = 60%
B/4Y	F = 70%
0.7084 0.7091 0.7078 0.7196 0.7351 0.7040
B/4Y = 70% 0.6944 0.6944 0.6944 0.7002 0.7002 0.7002
Non-benevolent LMLc LMLc LMLc LMLe LMLe LMLe
B/4Y = 10% 0.4087 0.4087 0.4087 0.4551 0.4551 0.4551
B/4Y	H = 10%
B/4Y	F = 20%
0.4779 0.4002 0.5555 0.5570 0.4840 0.6299
B/4Y = 20% 0.6490 0.6490 0.6490 0.6456 0.6456 0.6456
B/4Y = 60% 0.7992 0.7992 0.7992 0.7535 0.7535 0.7535
B/4Y	H = 60%
B/4Y	F = 70%
0.7777 0.7821 0.7734 0.7472 0.7373 0.7572
B/4Y = 70% 0.7502 0.7502 0.7502 0.7335 0.7335 0.7335
Table D.36. Union-wide and H and F representative household’s Losses (debt model) -
symmetric shocks, debt-asymmetry
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TABLES
Asymmetric shocks LCoop LCoop L Coop LML LML LML
Benevolent n = 0.5 n = 0.5 n = 0.5 n = 0.5 n =0.5 n =0.5
B/4Y = 10% 4.8459 4.8459 4.8459 4.7047 4.7047 4.7047
B/4Y	H = 10%
B/4Y	F = 20%
4.8932 4.7748 5.0116 4.8577 4.4766 5.2387
B/4Y = 20% 4.9509 4.9509 4.9509 4.8943 4.8943 4.8943
B/4Y = 60% 4.8950 4.8950 4.8950 5.0697 5.0697 5.0697
B/4Y	H = 60%
B/4Y	F = 70%
4.8812 5.0224 4.7401 5.5028 6.8653 4.1402
B/4Y = 70% 4.8790 4.8790 4.8790 5.2227 5.2227 5.2227
Non-benevolent LMLc LMLc LMLc LMLe LMLe LMLe
B/4Y = 10% 4.7656 4.7656 4.7656 4.8659 4.8659 4.8659
B/4Y	H = 10%
B/4Y	F = 20%
4.9161 4.6343 5.1980 4.8596 4.6334 5.0859
B/4Y = 20% 4.9241 4.9241 4.9241 4.8855 4.8855 4.8855
B/4Y = 60% 5.2812 5.2812 5.2812 5.5657 5.5657 5.5657
B/4Y	H = 60%
B/4Y	F = 70%
5.5625 6.6302 4.4947 5.5807 6.2126 4.9489
B/4Y = 70% 5.3866 5.3866 5.3866 5.8230 5.8230 5.8230
Table D.37. Union-wide and H and F representative household’s Losses (debt model) -
asymmetric shocks, debt-asymmetry
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TABLES
Asymmetric shocks LCoop LCoop L Coop LML LML LML
Benevolent n = 0.8 n = 0.8 n = 0.8 n = 0.8 n =0.8 n =0.8
B/4Y = 10% 3.2550 2.5388 6.1200 3.1760 2.7997 4.6808
B/4Y	H = 10%
B/4Y	F = 20%
3.2274 2.5513 5.9321 3.1723 2.6625 5.2114
B/4Y	H = 20%
B/4Y	F = 10%
3.4211 2.7910 5.9414 3.4607 3.2519 4.2957
B/4Y = 20% 3.3962 2.7876 5.8307 3.3273 2.9507 4.8339
B/4Y = 60% 3.3917 2.7272 6.0497 3.4625 2.5531 7.1002
B/4Y	H = 60%
B/4Y	F = 70%
3.3861 2.7532 5.9175 3.5858 2.5061 7.9047
B/4Y	H = 70%
B/4Y	F = 60%
3.3722 2.6577 6.2302 3.4161 2.5415 6.9142
B/4Y = 70% 3.3726 2.6810 6.1391 3.5078 2.5040 7.5228
Non-benevolent LMLc LMLc LMLc LMLe LMLe LMLe
B/4Y = 10% 3.2257 2.8182 4.8556 3.2723 2.7012 5.5565
B/4Y	H = 10%
B/4Y	F = 20%
3.1924 2.8019 4.7547 3.2310 2.7259 5.2513
B/4Y	H = 20%
B/4Y	F = 10%
3.4835 3.2800 4.2976 3.4378 3.0325 5.0590
B/4Y = 20% 3.3293 2.8766 5.1402 3.3727 2.8992 5.2667
B/4Y = 60% 3.5302 2.6257 7.1485 3.4574 2.7015 6.4814
B/4Y	
H
= 60%
B/4Y	F = 70%
3.6835 2.6226 7.9268 3.5432 2.6962 6.9312
B/4Y	
H
= 70%
B/4Y	F = 60%
3.4725 2.5953 6.9809 3.4291 2.6496 6.5471
B/4Y = 70% 3.5881 2.5943 7.5637 3.4947 2.6378 6.9220
Table D.38. Union-wide and H and F representative household’s Losses (debt model) -
symmetric shocks, debt and size asymmetry
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TABLES
Benevolent   

  
  

  
LCoop LML LFL LCoop LML LFL
 
 
4.6606 4.6776 4.6779 4.7575 4.7495 4.8253
 
 
4.9082 4.7941 4.8393 4.8950 5.0697 5.3826
 
 
5.2144 4.8353 5.0086 5.0062 5.5604 5.8580
 
 
4.3833 3.9227 4.5187 4.9059 5.4059 5.4353
 
 
- 2.3988 - 2.5427 2.6435 2.6328
 
 
5.0307 4.7782 4.9180 4.9008 5.4121 5.8360
 
 
4.2406 - 4.2154 4.6361 4.8726 5.0010
 
 
2.8714 - 3.0128 3.9435 4.2467 4.3353
 
 
5.0307 4.7782 4.9180 4.9008 5.4121 5.8360
 
 
4.2406 - 4.2154 4.6361 4.8726 5.0010
 
 
2.8714 - 3.0128 3.9435 4.2467 4.3353
Table D.39. Union-wide Loss (debt model) - nominal rigidities
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TABLES
Benevolent
  

  
  

  
LHC LHML LHFL LFC LFML LFFL LHC LHML LHFL LFC LFML LFFL
 
 
4.6606 4.6776 4.6779 4.6606 4.6776 4.6779 4.7575 4.7495 4.8253 4.7575 4.7495 4.8253
 
 
4.9082 4.7941 4.8393 4.9082 4.7941 4.8393 4.8950 5.0697 5.3826 4.8950 5.0697 5.3826
 
 
5.2144 4.8353 5.0086 5.2144 4.8353 5.0086 5.0062 5.5604 5.8580 5.0062 5.5604 5.8580
 
 
4.3833 3.9227 4.5187 4.3833 3.9227 4.5187 4.9059 5.4059 5.4353 4.9059 5.4059 5.4353
 
 
- 2.3988 - - 2.3988 - 2.5427 2.6435 2.6328 2.5427 2.6435 2.6328
 
 
4.2846 4.2653 4.2354 5.7767 5.2911 5.6006 4.7652 6.7513 8.0259 5.0365 4.0728 3.6462
 
 
3.6455 - 3.4380 4.8357 - 4.9928 4.4270 5.8877 6.4018 4.8452 3.8576 3.6003
 
 
2.8523 - 3.1513 2.8905 - 2.8743 3.7945 5.1603 5.4256 4.0925 3.3330 3.2451
 
 
5.7767 5.2911 5.6006 4.2846 4.2653 4.2354 5.0365 4.0728 3.6462 4.7652 6.7513 8.0259
 
 
4.8357 - 4.9928 3.6455 - 3.4380 4.8452 3.8576 3.6003 4.4270 5.8877 6.4018
 
 
2.8905 - 2.8743 2.8523 - 3.1513 4.0925 3.3330 3.2451 3.7945 5.1603 5.4256
Table D.40. Loss of a representative H and F household (debt model) - nominal rigidities
Benevolent   

  
  

  
LCoop LML LFL LCoop LML LFL
 
 
3.0499 3.0769 3.0768 3.2112 3.2298 3.2965
 
 
3.3339 3.2523 3.2771 3.3917 3.4625 3.5623
 
 
3.6697 3.4239 3.5951 3.5019 3.4658 3.4848
 
 
2.8854 - 6.2913 3.4704 3.1918 3.4669
 
 
3.3295 3.0713 3.3669 3.3487 3.9588 4.4228
 
 
2.9793 - 3.6676 3.1726 3.9421 4.8188
 
 
3.6443 3.5473 3.4646 3.4942 3.3448 3.3525
 
 
2.8468 - 2.8420 3.4590 3.2680 3.2340
Table D.41. Union-wide loss (debt model) - size-asymmetry, nominal rigidities
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TABLES
Benevolent
  

  
  

  
LHC LHML LHFL LFC LFML LFFL LHC LHML LHFL LFC LFML LFFL
 
 
2.7551 2.8806 2.8528 4.2292 3.8623 3.9724 2.9821 3.0151 2.9786 4.1274 4.0884 4.5678
 
 
2.6778 2.8883 2.6682 5.9584 4.7085 5.7125 2.7272 2.5531 2.4701 6.0497 7.1002 7.9314
 
 
2.7327 3.1158 2.4983 7.4179 4.6567 7.9824 2.4299 2.0919 2.0100 7.7900 8.9612 9.3844
 
 
1.3634 - 3.6655 8.9731 - 16.7945 1.9322 2.8078 3.2538 9.6235 4.7282 4.3195
 
 
2.2319 2.6294 2.2564 7.7198 4.8390 7.8089 2.3970 2.1010 2.4002 7.1556 11.3898 12.5131
 
 
1.6655 - 1.9452 8.2345 - 10.5575 1.9654 3.7160 5.1969 8.0012 4.8468 3.3064
 
 
3.1522 3.2995 2.9595 5.6131 4.5385 5.4851 2.7763 2.5462 2.4801 6.3657 6.5390 6.8421
 
 
2.2153 - 2.3128 5.3724 - 4.9588 2.7432 2.5794 2.5503 6.3221 6.0223 5.9690
Table D.42. Loss of a representative H and F household (debt model) - size-asymmetry,
nominal rigidities
Idiosyncratic 
 	
  

 	  
Benevolent n = 0.8
LCommit*100 138.732
LCoop 181.241
LML 178.961
LFL 179.909
LNash 179.390
LSGP 946.268
Non-benevolent: conservative and output-biased       
LMLconservative 180.990
LFLconservative 179.275
LNashconservative 179.971
LSGPconservative 777.480
LMLoutputbiased 182.771
LFLoutputbiased 184.150
LNashoutputbiased 183.389
Table D.43. Union-wide loss (debt model) - EMU scenario
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TABLES
Idiosyncratic 
 	
  

 	  
Benevolent n = 0.8
LHCommit*100 127.757
LHCoop*100 151.426
LHML*100 148.785
LHFL*100 148.642
LHNash 149.872
LHSGP*100 864.277
LFCommitment*100 182.630
LFCoop*100 300.502
LFML*100 299.665
LFFL*100 304.977
LFNash 297.463
LFSGP*100 1274.231
Non-benevolent: conservative and output-biased       
LHMLconservative 149.373
LHFLconservative 148.462
LHNashconservative 149.338
LHSGPconservative 677.403
LFMLconservative 307.456
LFFLconservative 302.525
LFNashconservative 302.500
LFSGPconservative 1177.788
LHMLoutputbiased 152.754
LHFLoutputbiased 151.981
LHNashoutputbiased 153.314
LFMLoutputbiased 302.840
LFFLoutputbiased 312.825
LFNashoutputbiased 303.689
Table D.44. Loss of a representative H and F household (debt model) - EMU scenario
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TABLES
LCB  



	

  	

	

 


	

  	


	

LHFA   


 	
 




 

  

 

	
  
LFFA   


 	
 






 

  

 

	
 

 
LW  L
H
FA   	 L
F
FA  LCB
Asymmetric shocks EMU calibration
Both FAs minimize
CB minimize
LFA
LCB
Lw
LCB
Lw
Lw
LFA
Lw
LMLCB 9891.76 45.18 50.64 9891.76
LMLHFA 47.55 156.51 132.41 47.55
LMLFFA 42.35 147.75 123.38 42.355
LMLW 9938.27 199.94 181.24 9938.27
LFLCB 11954.40 54.32 50.64 11937.66
LFLHFA 47.56 139.45 132.41 47.56
LFLFFA 42.37 132.35 123.38 42.37
LFLW 12000.93 192.35 181.24 11984.18
Table D.45. Union-wide loss (debt model) - Extreme Preferences, EMU scenario
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